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The investment in AI agents has steadily increased over the past few years, yet the adoption of these agents has been 
uneven. Industry reports show that the majority of people do not trust AI agents with important tasks. While the 
existing IS theories explain users’ trust in IT artifacts, several new studies have raised doubts about the applicability 
of current theories in the context of AI agents. At first glance, an AI agent might seem like any other technological 
artifact. However, a more in-depth assessment exposes some fundamental characteristics that make AI agents different 
from previous IT artifacts. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to identify the AI-specific characteristics and 
behaviors that hinder and contribute to trust and distrust, thereby shaping users’ behavior in human-AI interaction. 
Using a custom-developed conversational AI agent, this dissertation extends the human-AI literature by introducing 
and empirically testing six new constructs, namely, AI indeterminacy, task fulfillment indeterminacy, verbal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Industry reports have projected that AI could contribute up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy 
by 2030 (PwC 2017). Throughout the world, large investments (over $400 thousand) in AI startups 
have grown exponentially, from $1.3 billion in 2010 to $40.4 billion in 2018, with over 3000 
companies receiving more than $400 thousand in funding in 2018 (AI Index 2019). It is projected 
that companies will increase their investments in AI up to three-fold by 2020 (Forrester Research 
2017). However, despite all the investments and excitement around AI (Naudé 2019), many AI 
projects have not delivered the expected results. According to the Gartner 2020 CIO Agenda 
survey, far fewer companies successfully implemented AI systems in 2019 than expected (Miller 
2019). Gartner Vice President Svetlana Sicular stated that “something is stalling AI adoption” 
(Miller 2019). While many possible technical factors hinder the adoption of AI systems (e.g., 
buggy machine learning algorithms, and low quality of training data), practitioners believe that a 
crucial reason is a lack of focus on the customer experience and users’ perception of the AI (Miller 
2019). Several reports indicated that users do not trust AI agents (Longoni and Morewedge 2019; 
Miller 2019; Shattuck 2019; Towers-Clark 2019) and are not willing to delegate important tasks 
to them (Pew Research Center 2017). 
Even though many experts acknowledge the lack of users’ trust in AI agents, most of the current 
efforts in AI have been concentrated on development-side factors such as enhancing machine 
learning methods, training machine learning specialists, and optimizing the hardware and software 
that run the AI (Costello 2020). However, research on the user-side on human-AI interaction is 
inadequate.1 There remains a need for studies that explore how users’ perception of unique 
 
1 Based on the released statistics of AAAI, which is one of the longest running AI conferences that provides a broad coverage of 
AI topics, only 26 out of 1,148 accepted (169 out of 7,745 submitted) papers were related to human and AI or human-AI 
collaboration (AI Index 2019). 
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characteristics of AI shape users’ trust and distrust in AI agents, and consequently drive their 
behavior in their interaction with such agents. 
While at first glance, an AI agent might seem like any other technological artifact, a more in-depth 
assessment exposes some fundamental characteristics that make AI agents different from previous 
IT artifacts. First, the stochasticity in many machine learning methods that power AI agents (e.g., 
reinforcement learning (Mnih et al. 2015), generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow et al. 
2014), and stochastic gradient descent used in most deep learning methods (Goodfellow et al. 
2016)) makes their behavior inherently unpredictable for users. Similarly, the context-awareness 
of some AI agents (e.g., SlugBot on Amazon’s Alexa (Bowden et al. 2019)) makes the behavior 
of the agent dependent on its surroundings, which is again inherently unpredictable. Many people 
perceive this type of inherent unpredictability as a unique characteristic of agents with free will 
(e.g., humans, God, etc.), because pure objects tend to show deterministic behavior (Ebert and 
Wegner 2011; Kay et al. 2010; Waytz et al. 2010). Second, AI agents often show autonomous 
choice-making capabilities. For instance, Duplex, a conversational agent developed by Google, 
can book appointments after going through a complex conversation with a person over the phone 
(Leviathan 2018). Again, most people believe that choice-making capability is a unique 
characteristic of agents with free will (Feldman et al. 2014). In summary, AI, unlike traditional 
artifacts, is capable of doing tasks that were traditionally reserved exclusively for humans 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). 
The majority of prior research in the information systems field has assumed that humans interact 
with two types of individual-level entities: humans and non-humans (e.g., IT artifacts). The 
underlying implicit assumption of such research is that there is a clear distinction between a human 
and a non-human. Nonetheless, as discussed, several AI characteristics challenge this assumption 
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(Schuetz and Venkatesh 2020). We postulate that the advent of artificial intelligence has created a 
continuum between a human and an object, with AI standing between the two. 
In this dissertation, we investigate the factors that hinder and contribute to trust and distrust, and 
shape users’ behavior in human-AI interaction. Specifically, using a custom-developed 
conversational AI agent, we conducted three studies to extend our understanding of human-AI 
interaction. Conversational agents are suitable for studying AI agents due to their widespread 
presence in our daily lives. In fact, industry reports suggest that about 3.25 billion conversational 
AI agents were in use at the beginning of 2019 (Voicebot.ai 2019), and it is estimated that this 
number will rise to 8 billion by 2023 (JuniperResearch 2018). According to Gartner, by 2023, 25 
percent of employee interactions with applications will happen via voice (Miller 2019). 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays presented in chapters 2 to 4, followed by a conclusion 
in chapter 5. Below we briefly introduce each of the three essays. 
ESSAY 1 
In the first essay, we study the phenomenon of AI indeterminacy and its effect on trust. We define 
AI indeterminacy as the unpredictability in the AI’s behavior that seems not to have a directly 
observable cause. As AI artifacts become more complicated, users face more indeterminacies in 
their interactions with the artifacts. These indeterminacies have important effects on users’ 
perception of the artifacts. In this research, we identified verbal and task fulfillment 
indeterminacies as two important indeterminacies in the context of conversational AI agents. We 
define verbal indeterminacy as perceived indeterminant variation in the way an agent conveys a 
given message (i.e., by using different choices of words and grammar), and task fulfillment 
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indeterminacy as perceived indeterminant variation in an agent’s behavior of fulfilling a user 
command (e.g., by producing erroneous outcome). 
Verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies could influence the user’s assessment of the 
humanness of the artifact. Since being a human is the thing we know the best (Broadbent 2017), 
we often implement human-based concepts to understand apparently unpredictable agents (Waytz 
et al. 2010). The mere implementation of a human-based prediction model could increase 
anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007). Consequently, verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies 
could act as anthropomorphic signals. 
While some scholars have investigated the effect of indeterminacy on anthropomorphism (e.g., 
Salem et al. 2013; Waytz et al. 2010), its effect on trust is still unclear. On the one hand, 
indeterminacy as a source of unreliability should, by definition, decrease trust (Mayer et al. 1995). 
In line with this notion, several studies have shown that indeterminacy in AI’s behavior (e.g., in 
the form of erroneous outcome) is detrimental to users’ trust in AI (Dietvorst et al. 2015; Dzindolet 
et al. 2003; Manzey et al. 2012). On the other hand, many studies have shown a positive effect of 
task fulfillment indeterminacy (in the form of erroneous outcome) on anthropomorphism (Salem 
et al. 2013), as well as a positive effect of anthropomorphism on trust in AI (Waytz et al. 2014). 
However, task fulfillment indeterminacy has not been found to have a significant negative effect 
on users’ trusting behavior (Salem et al. 2015). In a recent review of empirical papers on trust in 
AI, Glikson and Woolley concluded that in the context of AI agents “low reliability [as a 
manifestation of high indeterminacy] does not always lead to low trust,” and that “future research 
should further explore the reasons for the positive emotional reaction toward imperfect functioning 
anthropomorphic [AI] robots” (2020, p. 51). 
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Furthermore, it is unclear how indeterminacy influences trust in the presence of multiple signals 
of indeterminacy (e.g., verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies). When more than one 
anthropomorphic signal is present, the prediction based on one signal might not match the other. 
The mismatch between prediction and observation can produce a large feedback error (called a 
“surprisal” in neuroscience literature) (Clark 2013) that might lead to the rejection of the whole 
idea of applying a human-based mental model to understand the agent’s behavior (Burleigh et al. 
2013; Saygin et al. 2011). Therefore, it is important to understand the interplay between different 
types of indeterminacy (i.e., verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy) to address 
the tension between anthropomorphism and trust. In this research, we seek to answer two research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the effects of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies on 
anthropomorphism and trust? 
RQ2: What is the interaction effect of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies on 
anthropomorphism and trust? 
ESSAY 2 
In the second essay, we study the transference of users’ distrust in the creator of an AI agent to 
their distrust in the AI agent. We also discuss the factors that can mitigate this transference. Distrust 
is often regarded as a defensive mechanism to protect oneself against possible harmful actions of 
the other party (McKnight et al. 2004; Yang et al. 2015). As anecdotal evidence and industry 
reports show (Berlatsky 2018; Pew Research Center 2017), many users distrust AI agents and 
perceive them as malevolent agents striving to take over humanity. 
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While previous research identified perceived intentions of the trustee (i.e., the entity to be trusted 
or distrusted) to be central in shaping distrusting beliefs (Dimoka 2010; McKnight and Chervany 
2001), it is not clear how users perceive AI agents’ intentions. Most of the extant research has 
focused on intention in either human-human interactions, in which the trustee is perceived to have 
volition, or human-technology interaction, in which the technology is regarded as a tool and 
assumed to “lack volition and moral agency” (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 5). However, we argue that 
some of the underlying assumptions of the extant literature break down in the context of AI agents. 
First, distrust could be formed based on the users’ perception of not only an agent itself but also 
the entity who is responsible for the observed behavior of the agent. Second, in user-artifact 
interaction, the user is not the only entity with volition. When the artifact can inherit intentions of 
other agents, such as its creator, there is a discernible “will” in the artifact’s behavior that 
potentially helps shape users’ distrust in the artifact. Third, users might view an artifact and its 
creator as a single entity with homogenous characteristics. Finally, a dichotomous approach to 
volition, based on which an entity either has complete volition or has no volition, ignores the 
possibility of a spectrum between pure objects and pure autonomous beings (humans). In the 
context of AI agents, the artifacts move from being mere objects toward what might be considered 
independent creatures, but they are neither traditional objects nor humans. 
We speculate that users might construct their distrust based on their perception of the moral agent 
responsible for the artifact’s behavior. A parsimonious set of responsible agents in the context of 
human-AI interaction includes the creator (i.e., the entity that has created the AI agent), the 
creature (i.e., the AI agent), and the user (i.e., the person who interacts with the AI agent). Using 
the analogy of a human offspring, we postulate that the behavior of an AI agent can be inherited 
from its parent (creator), learned through upbringing (training), and based on its own freewill. 
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First, if the user perceives that the creature inherited its values from its creator (i.e., AI 
inheritability), then the creator is responsible for its behavior. Second, if the artifact is trainable by 
the user (AI trainability), then the user is responsible for its behavior. Finally, if the user believes 
that the artifact has freewill (AI freewill), then the artifact is responsible for its own behavior (Gray 
et al. 2012). 
In this essay, we seek to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between distrust in the creator of an AI agent and distrust in 
the AI agent itself? 
RQ2: What are the moderating effects of perceived AI characteristics (i.e., inheritability, 
trainability, and freewill) on this relationship? 
ESSAY 3 
In the third essay, we study users’ information disclosure to AI agents, which is an important 
behavioral outcome of trust. More specifically, we seek to examine reciprocal self-disclosure in 
the context of human-conversational-AI interaction by investigating the cognitive and affective 
bases of users’ self-disclosure. Prior research has found robust evidence of reciprocity in human-
human interactions. The tendency to reciprocate is so important that some scholars have mentioned 
it as a central characteristic of being human (Fox and Tiger 1971). Prior studies showed that 
reciprocal self-disclosure extends to human-computer interaction because people perceive 
computers as social actors (CASA) (Moon 2000). There is little research, however, on the 
underlying mechanism that makes people reciprocate an AI agent’s behavior. 
We argue that a plausible explanation for reciprocal self-disclosure in human-AI interaction is that 
people use a human-based mental model to understand why the artifact shares information about 
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itself, a behavior that is core to humanness. The adoption of a human-based mental model 
necessarily means anthropomorphism. Prior research indicated that anthropomorphism could 
fulfill some cognitive and affective needs associated with understanding the agent’s behavior and 
creating a social connection with the agent (Epley et al. 2007). Therefore, we argue that by 
anthropomorphizing the agent, the user develops cognitive and affect-based assessments of the 
trustworthiness of the agent. These cognitive and affective bases of trust can then lead to a 
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of the agent by disclosing information about 
the self. 
To address the shortcoming in the current literature and assess the validity and soundness of our 
reasoning, we seek to study the following research question: 
RQ: What roles do anthropomorphism and trust play in reciprocal self-disclosure in the 
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AI Indeterminacy in Conversational Agents: 
Investigating Anthropomorphism and Trust 
Abstract 
The exponential advancement of machine learning in the past decade has enabled ordinary 
technology users to interact with conversational AI agents (e.g., Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and 
Google Assistant) on a daily basis. Meanwhile, factors such as the stochastic nature of AI have 
made the behavior of modern conversational agents appear indeterministic. We define AI 
indeterminacy as unpredictability in the AI’s behavior that seems not to have a directly observable 
cause. While prior research suggests that unpredictability in an agent’s behavior increases 
perceived humanness (i.e., anthropomorphism), indeterminacy should, by definition, decrease 
trust. This apparent paradoxical effect of AI indeterminacy on perceived humanness and trust 
leads to a dilemma for AI developers. Some developers choose to make the behavior of AI agents 
artificially deterministic to increase perceived reliability and trustworthiness of the agent at the 
cost of making the agent seem less humanlike. However, we argue that not all AI indeterminacies 
are created equal. Leveraging the specific context of conversational AI agents, we introduce two 
types of AI indeterminacy, namely verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy. We 
draw on perspectives in neuroscience, social psychology, and information systems to theorize the 
effects of verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy on anthropomorphism and trust. 
Using a custom-developed conversational AI agent, we conduct a randomized experiment and 
show that both verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy increase 
anthropomorphism and have positive indirect effects on trust (mediated by anthropomorphism). 
Our results suggest that only task fulfillment indeterminacy has a direct negative effect on trust 
and is the real source of the tension between anthropomorphism and trust. We also find that the 
interaction of verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy negatively influences 
anthropomorphism and trust (fully mediated by anthropomorphism). Our results reveal that the 
effect of AI indeterminacy on anthropomorphism and trust depends on the type of indeterminacy. 
We discuss the implications of our findings for research on human-AI interaction and for 
developers of AI agents. 
Keywords: Artificially Intelligent Agent, AI Indeterminacy, Verbal Indeterminacy, Task 








With the recent advances in machine learning, we see a prevalence of conversational AI agents 
(e.g., Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and Google Assistant) in our daily lives (Columbus 2018). 
Across different platforms, about 3.25 billion conversational AI agents (hereafter conversational 
agents) were in use at the beginning of 2019 (Voicebot.ai 2019), and it is estimated that by 2023 
this number will rise to 8 billion (JuniperResearch 2018). Conversational agents provide a wide 
variety of benefits for both ordinary and business users. For instance, Duplex, a conversational 
agent developed by Google, can help users book appointments with offline businesses by calling 
the business contact over the phone and autonomously navigating through complex conversations 
with humans (Leviathan 2018). Similarly, Alexa for Business, a service that enables organizations 
to use Amazon’s conversational agent, can help employees set up and find empty rooms for ad-
hoc business meetings, access upcoming events on their calendars, and access corporate 
applications via voice (Amazon 2019). 
Despite the benefits, the use of AI agents has been uneven. According to industry reports, most 
people do not trust them to do important tasks (Longoni and Morewedge 2019; Pew Research 
Center 2017; Shattuck 2019; Towers-Clark 2019). While users seek reliability and certainty in AI 
agents, the behavior of many AI agents seem to be indeterministic. We define AI indeterminacy as 
unpredictability in the AI’s behavior that seems not to have a directly observable cause. For 
instance, in 2018, many users reported that their Alexa, a conversational agent developed by 
Amazon, laughed at them when they asked her to do a task. Later Amazon stated that “in rare 
circumstances, Alexa can mistakenly hear the phrase ‘Alexa, laugh,’” when users ask for other 




Recently in a discussion about how Alexa was created, Rohit Prasad, the Vice President and Head 
Scientist of Alexa Machine Learning mentioned that “in those days, there was still a lot of 
emphasis on rule-based systems … but we had a statistical-first approach … where for our 
language understanding we had … an entity recognizer and an intent classifier which was all 
trained statistically. In fact, we had to build the deterministic matching as follow-up to fix bugs 
that statistical models have. So, it was just a different mindset” (Fridman 2019). 
The seemingly indeterministic behavior of AI agents is not limited to Alexa, but fundamental to 
how modern AI systems work. Unlike traditional symbolic AI systems (e.g., rule-based expert 
systems) whose behavior is deterministic, the behavior of many modern AI agents appears to be 
indeterministic due to factors such as randomness in the process of stochastic gradient descent in 
the retraining process of many deep learning models (Goodfellow et al. 2016), stochastic 
exploratory actions in reinforcement learning (Mnih et al. 2015), random input in generative 
models (Goodfellow et al. 2014), context awareness of some models (e.g., Bowden et al. 2019), 
and the sheer algorithmic complexity of compound models (e.g., Chen et al. 2019). 
Extant literature suggests that people tend to attribute indeterministic behavior to the agent’s free 
will (Ebert and Wegner 2011), which is a vital part of the perception of humanlike state of mind 
(Gray et al. 2007). As possession of a humanlike state of mind is the single most important attribute 
of humans, indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Kay et al. 
2010; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010), which is the process of perceiving nonhumans as humans 
(Epley et al. 2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that AI indeterminacy can act as an 
anthropomorphic signal and help conversational agents seem more humanlike. However, 
indeterminacy should, by definition, decrease trust because trust is essentially based on an 
assessment of the predictable positive behavior of the trustee (Mayer et al. 1995). This apparent 
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paradoxical effect of AI indeterminacy on anthropomorphism and trust leads to a dilemma for AI 
developers. Some developers might choose to make the behavior of AI agents artificially 
deterministic or entirely rely on symbolic AI to increase perceived reliability, interpretability, and 
trustworthiness of the agent at the cost of making the agent seem less humanlike (i.e., more 
“robotic”). 
However, we argue that not all AI indeterminacies are created equal. In the context of 
conversational AI, artifacts typically possess language capabilities to communicate with users and 
task fulfillment capabilities to fulfill requests such as controlling smart devices at home or office 
(Seeger et al. 2018). Leveraging the specific context of conversational agents, we introduce two 
types of AI indeterminacy, namely verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy (see 
Figure 1). 
 
When the user requests something from the agent, the message is received by the device. Then the 
device sends the message to the speech recognition service. Next, the detected text is sent to the natural 
language understanding (NLU) server. Next, the response code from NLU goes to the speech synthesis 
service to produce a voice response. Finally, the response code goes back to the device, and the device 
takes an action and delivers a response message based on the response code. Therefore, in responding 
to a user request, the AI delivers both a verbal message and an action, which create the possibility for 
two types of indeterminacy: verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy. 
Figure 1. AI Indeterminacy in Conversational AI 
First, we define verbal indeterminacy as perceived indeterminant variation in the way an agent 
conveys a given message (i.e., by using different choices of words and grammar). Many of today’s 
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generate textual information, and advancements in speech recognition and speech synthesis 
methods to convert speech to text as well as to generate humanlike voice (Seeger et al. 2018). Such 
a powerful and complex conversational capability of AI leads to indeterminacy in AI’s use of 
language because the AI can generate different sentences based on factors that are not apparent to 
the user. For instance, when verbal indeterminacy is high, on any given day a conversational agent 
such as Amazon’s Alexa might respond differently to the same question about the weather than it 
did the day before, even if the weather forecast for the two days is the same. 
Second, we define task fulfillment indeterminacy as perceived indeterminant variation in an agent’s 
behavior of fulfilling a user command. In theory, task fulfillment indeterminacy can be viewed as 
indeterminacy in how the agent fulfills the command (process) or indeterminacy in whether the 
agent fulfills the command (outcome). In this research, we adopt the latter view because it is more 
commonly observed in the context of conversational AI agents. Task fulfillment indeterminacy is 
widespread in AI agents as the stochasticity in machine learning methods and complex back-end 
systems that power the agents make it harder for users to predict the agent’s behavior regarding 
task fulfillment. An AI agent’s behavior might be influenced by many different factors that could 
potentially counteract with one another. Even when a set of deterministic rules or trained models 
govern an AI’s behavior, the coupling of potentially counteracting factors can make the behavior 
seemingly indeterministic (Levy 1994; Oestreicher 2007; Thietart and Forgues 1995). These 
factors include privacy and security regulations that represent constraints on AI behavior, software 
requirements and limitations that define the range of possible AI behavior, as well as users’ and 
developers’ expectations regarding what behaviors are acceptable in a given context. For instance, 
a user might ask Amazon’s Alexa to turn on the light, but when task fulfillment indeterminacy is 
high, Alexa might or might not fulfill the request. Note that the lack of fulfillment could be due to 
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an error in the AI, conflicting requirements in the system, a problem in the local network, or the 
AI’s apparently autonomous decision. However, regardless of the reason, task fulfillment 
indeterminacy is about a user’s perception of the probabilistic nature of the fulfillment. 
The interaction of these two indeterminacies as signals of anthropomorphism might lead to 
conflicts in users’ perception. A body of research on the uncanny valley indicates that the presence 
of multiple signals of anthropomorphism could lead to surprising results (Broadbent 2017). Mori 
(1970) introduced the concept of the uncanny valley when he observed that humanlikeness 
increases acceptability to a certain point, but that this relationship breaks down if an entity looks 
very close to but is not quite humanlike. However, the relationship between humanlikeness and 
acceptability becomes positive again once we move beyond the uncanny valley and the entity 
seems quite humanlike. The sudden decrease and increase in the relationship create a valley-like 
region in the relationship plot. Many researchers suggested that the main reason for the uncanny 
valley is due to conflicting signals about humanness (Broadbent 2017). Based on some signals, 
such as an extremely humanlike face, the observer categorizes the artifact as a human being, but a 
slight mismatch, for instance, between the way a human moves her/his lips and the way the artifact 
does so, leads to conflicting signals that are so strong it makes the artifact be perceived as eerie. 
Therefore, when an artifact contains multiple sources of anthropomorphic signals, the interaction 
effect among them can be important. 
Understanding the effect of different types of AI indeterminacy and their interaction on 
anthropomorphism and trust is central to our understanding of how users perceive and react to the 
seemingly indeterministic behaviors of modern AI agents. To the best of our knowledge, however, 
no previous research has studied such effects in the context of conversational AI or elsewhere. In 
this research, we first introduce the concepts of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies and 
 
29 
then leverage them to study the effect of indeterminacy on trust. We also investigate the role of 
anthropomorphism in this relationship. Hence, we seek to address the following research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the effects of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies on 
anthropomorphism and trust? 
RQ2: What is the interaction effect of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies on 
anthropomorphism and trust? 
We developed a custom conversational agent to investigate our research questions experimentally. 
We used a sample of 152 technology users who had some experience using digital technology to 
examine the soundness of our theoretical conjectures about the phenomenon. We randomly 
assigned the participants to different experimental conditions. Randomized experiments are the 
gold standard of internal validity as they provide a robust way of assessing causal relationships. 
The artifact that we developed resembles conversational agents, such as Google Assistant and 
Apple’s Siri, that users regularly interact with. This makes the experiment more realistic than a 
hypothetical scenario in which the user has no direct interaction with the software artifact. Creation 
and use of a working conversational agent allowed us to create a task environment that is engaging 
for participants and which has a high degree of psychological realism (Berkowitz and Donnerstein 
1982). 
By answering the above research questions, we contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we 
introduce and elaborate on the concept of AI indeterminacy, suggesting that there are two specific 
types of it in the context of conversational AI, namely verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment 
indeterminacy. Second, we explain why the interaction of multiple sources of indeterminacy in AI 
could lead to counterintuitive results regarding anthropomorphism and trust due to conflicting 
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signals. Such an explanation is a good fit for real-world AI systems because most such systems 
include multiple sources of indeterminacy that make their behavior hard to predict. Third, we add 
to the trust literature by identifying AI-specific drivers of trust in the context of conversational AI 
(i.e., verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy). Finally, we highlight the 
importance of considering indeterminacy in the wider literature of technology adoption and use by 
investigating the direct and indirect effects of indeterminacy on trust. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The overarching idea of this paper is that when a user faces indeterminacy in the behavior of a 
conversational agent, in order to understand the indeterminacy, s/he leverages mental models of 
how humans behave because these are the best models that humans possess to deal with 
indeterminacy. The very process of leveraging human-based mental models leads the user to 
understand the agent’s behavior in human terms, which promotes anthropomorphism. We theorize 
that while AI indeterminacy in general increases anthropomorphism, some types of indeterminacy 
increase trust whereas other types of indeterminacy decrease trust, thus creating an interesting 
tension between anthropomorphism and trust. 
In this section, we briefly discuss the relevant literature that informs our theoretical development 





Figure 2. Research Model 
Indeterminacy 
The brain is essentially a prediction machine (Clark 2013) and “has evolved to represent or infer 
the causes of changes in its sensory inputs” (Friston 2005, p. 815). One could argue that most of 
what the human brain does is to extract patterns out of its apparently stochastic surroundings that 
include the environment and people (Clark 2013). Humans strive to explain away the seemingly 
stochastic noise (𝜀) in different phenomena. However, in most cases there will be some leftover 
variance that cannot be explained by the known facts. The concept of indeterminacy has been used 
to describe the behavioral variance that cannot be explained (Monroe et al. 2014). 
If any observed behavior has a cause and the cause, in turn, has its own causes, then any observed 
behavior is completely deterministic. However, this chain of causality breaks at some point due to 
either (1) human bounded rationality and selective perception (Leonardi 2008; Orton and Weick 
1990) or (2) belief in such factors as free will that justify the unexplained variance beyond the 
known factors (Monroe et al. 2014). However, in either case, the observed behavior will not be 
















Note: Control variables not shown for clarity. 
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behaviors (Ebert and Wegner 2011). In fact, many studies have shown that people find meaning, 
perceive intention, and detect patterns even in purely random events (Caruso et al. 2010; Ebert and 
Wegner 2011; Oskarsson et al. 2009) partially due to their misconception of chance and 
randomness (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). 
The way people perceive the unexplained variance in others' behavior and the way they try to 
explain it away is core to our understanding of how people anthropomorphize other agents (Epley 
et al. 2007). 
Anthropomorphism 
Scholars in different disciplines have used several different terms (e.g., humanness, 
humanlikeness, personhood, anthropomorphism, and humanization) to capture the presence of 
human characteristics, or the perception of such characteristics, in nonhuman entities. Appendix 
A provides an interdisciplinary summary of prior research on anthropomorphism. 
Based on the extant literature, we define anthropomorphism as an inference about real or imagined 
nonhuman entities that leads to the attribution of humanlike characteristics, properties, emotions, 
inner mental states, and motivations to them (Epley et al. 2007; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Gray et 
al. 2007). Therefore, first, anthropomorphism is not the mere use of human adjectives to describe 
the physical aspects of nonhumans; it involves going beyond observable characteristics of the 
entity and making inference about its unobservable characteristics. Second, anthropomorphism is 
different from animism. Animism is about treating an object as living, while anthropomorphism 
goes beyond that and entails attributing uniquely humanlike characteristics to it. Third, 
anthropomorphism is about people’s tendency to perceive human traits in nonhuman agents. 
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Questions regarding the accuracy of this perception and whether a nonhuman entity should be 
treated as human are orthogonal to anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008). 
In strong forms of anthropomorphism, the person truly believes that the nonhuman entity possesses 
humanlike characteristics. Nevertheless, in weak forms of anthropomorphism, the person does not 
truly believe but acts as-if the nonhuman entity has human characteristics (e.g., cursing at a 
machine) (Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008). 
Because the human brain uses the same neural system to make judgments about both humans and 
anthropomorphized nonhumans (Castelli et al. 2000; Iacoboni et al. 2004), to understand 
anthropomorphism, it is essential to understand what makes people view an entity as human. 
Many scholars have argued that possession of a humanlike state of mind is the core of humanness 
(Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). Perceived mind (i.e., the extent to which an entity is perceived 
to have a mind of its own) consists of two dimensions (Gray et al. 2007). First, the capacity for 
agency, which includes such attributes as self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition, 
planning, communication, and thought. Second, the capacity for experience, which includes such 
attributes as hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage, desire, personality, consciousness, pride, 
embarrassment, and joy. According to Gray et al. (2007) these dimensions map to Aristotle’s 
distinction between moral agents, who can do morally right or wrong behavior and be held 
responsible for what they did, and moral patients, who are the recipients of right or wrong behavior, 
and have moral rights and privileges. In the context of technological artifacts, when a person uses 
the artifacts in the desired way, the focus is on the experience dimension of the artifact. However, 
when the user expects the artifact to perform a task, the focus is on its agency. 
The lay view of humanness, especially the agency dimension, is closely tied to possession of free 
will, which could be perceived as possession of conscious mind and spirit (Dennett 2017; Shepherd 
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2012). Free will is the capacity to have chosen otherwise. Most people believe that humans have 
free will (Feldman et al. 2016; Monroe et al. 2014; Sarkissian et al. 2010). Many studies in the 
philosophy field strived to explain whether free will exists or it is just an illusion (Bode et al. 
2014). However, the overwhelming belief in free will, regardless of its soundness, “suggests that 
the mind operates in a way that encourages the inference that one’s actions are freely chosen” 
(Ebert and Wegner 2011, p. 966). In fact, according to the theory of apparent mental causation 
(Wegner 2008; Wegner and Wheatley 1999), because intention and action are always temporally 
conjunct, people think that their conscious mind is the cause of their actions (Ebert and Wegner 
2011). After the fact, people remember their intention to act before the act (Libet et al. 1983). Free 
will belief is fundamental to our concept of self (Bode et al. 2014) and therefore to our concept of 
humanness of other agents (Schilbach et al. 2013). 
Impact of Indeterminacy on Anthropomorphism 
When faced with a phenomenon, the brain first strives to make an inference about it through 
leveraging existing concepts and mental models. When the existing knowledge fails, the brain 
creates new concepts or updates the existing ones (Clark 2013). Since being human is the thing we 
know best (Broadbent 2017), the brain often attempts to make predictions about the other entity 
assuming that the entity is similar to oneself. In fact, as cited by Epley et al. (2008), Charles Darwin 
argued that we need to anthropomorphize other animals if we want to understand them 
(1872/2009). 
Research on children indicated that, early in life, they anthropomorphize a wide variety of 
nonhuman agents, and only later they develop more sophisticated concepts of other agents (Carey 
1985; Inagaki and Hatano 1987). Unlike children, adults often possess more sophisticated mental 
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models to understand the variance in the behavior of nonhuman entities (e.g., conversational 
agents) (Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). Nevertheless, even in adults, detecting humanlike 
behavior in nonhuman agents – albeit unconsciously – activates mirror neurons which make them 
experience the same state, as if they were the agent, in order to understand and predict the behavior 
of the agent (Epley et al. 2007). Furthermore, neuroscientists found evidence suggesting that 
people anthropomorphize objects to understand their apparently intentional motions. They found 
that areas in the brain associated with theory of mind (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to 
oneself and others) were more active when participants observed objects involved in apparently 
intentional motions (Castelli et al. 2000; Heberlein and Adolphs 2004; Martin and Weisberg 2003; 
Pelphrey et al. 2004; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). 
Humans are motivated to understand the cause of observed behaviors in the environment (Kelley 
1967; Lombrozo 2006) to increase their own chance of survival (White 1959). Dispositional 
attribution, i.e., attribution of an effect to the internal characteristics of an agent, addresses part of 
people’s need for prediction of their surroundings (Pittman and Pittman 1980). However, an entity 
with free will can generate behavioral variance that cannot be explained by any factor other than 
the entity’s own choice or desire. So, the variance that cannot be attributed to any known external 
or internal factors is attributed to an agent’s free will.1  
Empirical studies showed that people, regardless of their personal views of free will, perceive a 
probabilistic choice as free will. In fact, when the evidence supports indeterminacy in an entity’s 
behavior, people tend to perceive the behavior as freely chosen (Ebert and Wegner 2011). 
 
1 This is different from dispositional attribution because, in dispositional attribution, the internal attribution does not imply that the 
person believes the agent could have chosen otherwise. Dispositional attribution does not always entail attributing uniquely human 
attributes. Therefore, “dispositional attributions are necessary but insufficient for anthropomorphism” (Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 
2010, p. 416). 
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However, the indeterminacy could stem from such seemingly irrelevant things as pure 
randomness. “Because randomness is a kind of indeterminacy, people may mistakenly interpret 
randomness in behavior as owing to free will” (Ebert and Wegner 2011, p. 966). Empirical 
evidence in the context of computerized animated agents suggests that people perceive the agents 
to have higher free will when the agents follow a random sequence of actions instead of a 
predetermined one (Ebert and Wegner 2011). 
In the context of our research, when a user interacts with a conversational agent, s/he strives to 
understand its behavior. Being able to predict the artifact’s behavior gives the user the ability to 
minimize threats and maximize opportunities in interacting with the artifact. However, humans 
have limited ways to understand uncertainty in their surroundings. The ultimate well-trained 
mental model that any person possesses is the model about her/his own perceptions, beliefs, 
intentions, and behaviors (Broadbent 2017). This model is not only in charge of a person’s own 
behaviors (Clark 2013), it is also used to make sense of others’ behaviors (Schilbach et al. 2013). 
When a conversational agent uses different words or grammar every time it needs to communicate 
with the user, it sends a signal to the user that there exists a variance in the agent’s behavior that 
needs to be understood. Since the variance seems indeterminant, the user needs to use a human-
based model to predict how the agent will communicate in the future. In this way, the concepts 
and attributes associated with humans will become activated under conditions of high verbal 
indeterminacy. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H1a: Verbal indeterminacy in a conversational agent’s behavior increases 
anthropomorphism when other types of indeterminacy are not present. 
When a conversational agent shows variance in fulfilling the requested tasks, the user tries to make 
sense of the behavior. If the agent fails or succeeds in fulfilling the task all the time with no 
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variance, then the behavior is easy to understand. Moreover, if the user can see an obvious pattern 
in the task fulfillment behavior, again the behavior is completely determined. However, when the 
reason for the variance is not easy to understand, the user needs to use his/her more advanced 
mental models to make sense of the behavior. Since other humans also show task fulfillment 
indeterminacy in their behavior, a human-based model of the behavior might help explain it. 
Hence, by seeing the agent as more human, the user increases his/her chance to properly model 
the indeterminacy and better predict an agent’s future behavior. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1b: Task fulfillment indeterminacy in a conversational agent’s behavior increases 
anthropomorphism when other types of indeterminacy are not present. 
People tend to attribute more free will to an agent with more behavioral randomness only when 
the randomness could be contextually meaningful. Therefore, when the action makes sense in the 
context, it is “possible for [even] wholly determined actions to appear freely chosen” (Ebert and 
Wegner 2011, p. 970). When the user interacts with a conversational agent, s/he stretches her/his 
imagination to some extent and attributes indeterministic behaviors to the agent’s free will and 
possession of mind. In other words, when the user has enough room to make causal sense of the 
agent’s behavior based on other contextual clues, s/he perceives even a purely random behavior as 
intentional. Otherwise, the behavior seems random and mindless. 
We argue that a task fulfillment indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism despite possible 
undesirable consequences because the user attributes the random obedience and disobedience of 
the artifact to an intentional decision-making process. However, when both task fulfillment and 
verbal indeterminacies are observed at the same time, the user can use the information from both 
observations to make an inference about the cause of the indeterminacy. A human-based model of 
language to understand an AI’s verbal indeterminacy is valid in the absence of contradictory 
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evidence in the context. A human model for understanding an AI’s task fulfillment indeterminacy 
would also make sense as long as other evidence does not rule out the possibility. However, based 
on a human model, an agent that possesses and actively uses humanlike language capability would 
communicate its decision not to fulfill a task. Therefore, there exists a mismatch between the 
expectation based on verbal indeterminacy and the observed task fulfillment indeterminacy. 
Such a seemingly simple mismatch between the user’s observation and expectation regarding the 
conversational agent’s behavior leads to a large feedback error in the user’s mind because 
conflicting signals lead to violations in neurocognitive expectancies (Friston 2010; Rao and 
Ballard 1999; Saygin et al. 2011). Consequently, the user cannot rely on the anthropomorphized 
view of the agent to explain its behavior. Therefore, anthropomorphism is a holistic experience 
that depends on the match/mismatch among all available anthropomorphic signals, and any 
mismatch among the signals can reduce anthropomorphism. 
In summary, the mismatch between the two indeterminacies leads to a dissonance that makes the 
user suspect the validity of a human-based model for explaining the AI’s behavior. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H2: The interaction of task fulfillment indeterminacy and verbal indeterminacy decreases 
anthropomorphism. 
Trust 
People leverage mechanisms such as trust and control to adjust their confidence level when dealing 
with indeterminacy in other parties’ behavior (Das and Teng 1998). Prior research emphasized the 
importance of trust in the context of conversational agents (Saffarizadeh et al. 2017). Based on 
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previous findings, people tend to adopt a human model of interpersonal trust for interactions with 
artifacts that possess humanlike features (Lankton et al. 2015). 
In the past two decades, there has been a convergence in the accepted definition of interpersonal 
trust (hereafter referred to as trust)2 (Rousseau et al. 1998; Schoorman et al. 2007). The most 
widely used definition of trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to 
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 
712). 
To better understand such a complex construct as trust, it is helpful to begin by clarifying what the 
construct is not. First, trust is not taking risk. Taking risk in an interaction with another party is a 
decision to intentionally make oneself vulnerable to the actions of the other party. The behavioral 
manifestation of trust or trusting behavior is “to act as if the uncertain future actions of others were 
indeed certain in circumstances wherein the violation of these expectations results in negative 
consequences for those involved” (Lewis and Weigert 1985, p. 971). Therefore, trust is not risk 
taking behavior or actions, “but an underlying psychological condition that can cause or result 
from such actions” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 395). Second, trust is not cooperation. Cooperation is 
an observable behavior that could be a consequence of trust as well as many other antecedents 
such as perceived level of control (Das and Teng 1998). Thus, we do not equate such behaviors as 
cooperation with trust. 
Trustworthiness, alongside with generalized tendency to trust (Rotter 1967), is the main predictor 
of trust (Mayer et al. 1995). Trustworthiness or trusting beliefs is comprised of many factors 
 
2 Trust is often referred to as trusting intentions in the IS literature (e.g., McKnight et al. 2002). In this paper, in line with the 
definitions we adopted, we use the term trust. 
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(Johnson-George and Swap 1982; Rempel et al. 1985; Rotter 1967), but most scholars agree on 
three components (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002): ability or competence (Giffin 1967), 
integrity or reliability (Giffin 1967; Johnson-George and Swap 1982), and benevolence or caring 
(Mayer et al. 1995; Rempel et al. 1985). 
Impacts of Indeterminacy and Anthropomorphism on Trust 
Task fulfillment indeterminacy in a conversational agent means that the user of the agent cannot 
be sure about the behavioral outcome of the system. The reason for task fulfillment indeterminacy 
could be due to different things such as system failure, mistaking user commands, conflicting 
commands, or the agent’s own decision to override the user’s command(s). No matter what the 
underlying reason is and what the user perceives the reason to be, the agent exhibits indeterminacy 
in fulfilling the tasks. Such indeterminacy means a lack of consistency in the agent’s behavior. The 
agent might or might not fulfill the task, which means that the reliability of the system could be 
questioned. While the user might attribute the lack of fulfillment to either the agent’s own intention 
or some other problem in the system, the unreliability in behavior decreases the user’s perception 
of the agent’s integrity. 
Furthermore, since indeterminacy means that sometimes the agent will not fulfill the assigned task, 
the user will find the behavior of the AI to be, on average, less desirable. Given this type of 
behavior, the user will perceive the agent to be less benevolent as well. Taken together, task 
fulfillment indeterminacy decreases the AI’s trustworthiness, which in turn negatively influences 
trust. We hypothesize that: 
H3: Task fulfillment indeterminacy decreases trust. 
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When the user anthropomorphizes the agent, s/he perceives it to be more competent, predictable, 
and caring. First, an anthropomorphized agent is perceived to have high agency, which is an 
essential part of a humanlike state of mind (Gray et al. 2007). People perceive entities with high 
agency to be capable of planning, controlling, and fulfilling tasks (Gray et al. 2011; Waytz et al. 
2014). Therefore, an anthropomorphized conversational agent is more likely to be perceived as 
competent. Second, prior research has shown that one of the major reasons that people 
anthropomorphize nonhuman agents is to increase their ability to predict the agents’ behavior 
(Epley et al. 2007; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). In other words, anthropomorphism increases 
perceived predictability of an agent. Finally, prior research has shown that anthropomorphism is 
associated with feelings of connectedness and warmth (Epley et al. 2007; Qiu and Benbasat 2009). 
Some scholars suggested that lonely people “create human agents out of nonhumans through 
anthropomorphism to satisfy their motivation for social connection” (Epley et al. 2007, p. 866). 
Empirical evidence has also revealed that people often anthropomorphize nonhumans such as God, 
pets, gadgets (Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008), and robots (Eyssel and Reich 
2013) to fulfill their need for social connectedness and caring. Therefore, when a user 
anthropomorphizes a conversational agent, s/he is more likely to perceive it as caring. 
In summary, users perceive an anthropomorphized agent to be more caring, to have more 
competence to act on its caring, and to be more predictable.  In other words, they perceive an 
anthropomorphized agent to display a predictable caring behavior. Therefore, we argue that users 
are more willing to be vulnerable to the actions of a conversational agent when they 
anthropomorphize it. Therefore, in line with prior research (Qiu and Benbasat 2009; Waytz et al. 
2014), we hypothesize that: 





We conducted a 2x2 factorial design experiment in which verbal indeterminacy and task 
fulfillment indeterminacy were manipulated independently. 
We recruited a total of 226 participants of which 152 (78 females, 74 males, and 0 other, with an 
average age of 36.6 ranging from 20 to 70 years old) followed the instruction of the experiment, 
received the assigned treatment, and passed the attention check measures. We chose to recruit the 
participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk because we wanted the participants for our study to 
have some experience using digital technology. MTurk participants are more demographically 
diverse than both standard internet samples and typical American college samples (Buhrmester et 
al. 2011; Chandler et al. 2019; Mason and Suri 2012) and are typically not too familiar with 
manipulations and measures because the majority of them are new to the platform every year 
(Robinson et al. 2019). Recent studies have shown that the quality of data from surveys with 
attention-check questions on MTurk is comparable to that from surveys with student subjects 
(Aruguete et al. 2019). Moreover, they found that in many cases, findings from MTurk samples 
are similar to those from national samples, supporting the generalizability of the findings based on 
MTurk samples (Coppock 2019). We used the Cloud Research platform (Litman et al. 2017) to 
remove participants who had participated in pilot studies and to block any users who may have 
tried to participate in the experiment multiple times (based on IP addresses and geo-locations). 
Some of the workers on Mechanical Turk might participate in many studies per day (Paolacci et 
al. 2010). To ensure that we obtained high-quality responses, we limited the participants to those 
with more than 97% acceptance rate and MTurk experience between 500 and 10,000 HITs (Human 
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Intelligence Tasks, which are the tasks posted on MTurk marketplace).3 The experiment took 3 
minutes on average and all participants received $0.50 compensation. 
The Conversational Agent 
We developed a conversational agent named Amanda to increase the external validity of our study. 
The artifact uses state of the art text-to-speech technologies. We used Amazon’s AWS Polly text-
to-speech to provide a humanlike voice for the agent. Many experimental studies lack external 
validity and ecological validity partially because the artifacts used in the experiment are poor 
representations of the real-world artifacts. Our choice of technologies helps to address such 
concerns. Furthermore, by developing an actual functioning conversational agent we created a task 
environment that is engaging for participants and has a high degree of psychological realism 
(Berkowitz and Donnerstein 1982). 
Procedure 
The participants were asked to open the web version of our app on their browsers and to begin by 
reading a short set of instructions in which they were told that they would be testing a certain 
functionality of the agent to make sure it works properly on different devices. We asked the 
participants to tell the agent to “turn on the light” and to try this command five times. Each time, 
after the AI received the command, it generated a response based on the treatment condition to 
which the participant was assigned. After the interaction, participants were asked to respond to a 
 




series of questions. We debriefed the participants at the end. Figure 3 shows two snapshots of the 
interaction between a participant and the agent. 
    
Figure 3. A Sample of Participant’s Interaction with Amanda 
Operationalization of Constructs 
In line with previous research in information systems, we measure trust using a holistic measure 
(Srivastava and Chandra 2018). In this research, we are not interested in measuring trustworthiness 
and its components, therefore, we do not separately measure such variables as ability, benevolence, 
and integrity. This approach is also in line with research in the management field (Mayer and Davis 
1999; Mayer and Gavin 2005; Schoorman et al. 2007). We used a 7-point Likert scale to measure 
trust. 
Anthropomorphism, in its essence, is the attribution of humanlike attributes to nonhuman entities 
(Epley et al. 2007). In addition, most definitions of humanness suggest that uniquely human 
attributes are those related to human mental states. Therefore, we operationalize 
anthropomorphism using five items measuring participants’ perception of an artifact’s humanlike 
 
45 
mental states, namely possession of mind, intentions, free will, consciousness, and emotions. Each 
item is measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale. The measured attributes can convey both 
agency and experience dimensions of the artifact (Gray et al. 2007, 2011; Gray and Wegner 2012). 
Other researchers have used the same items to operationalize anthropomorphism in similar 
contexts (e.g., Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Hart et al. 2013; Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010; Waytz, 
Morewedge, et al. 2010). 
We directly manipulate verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies. Table 1 provides a summary 
of the measures used. 
Table 1. Operationalization of Constructs 
Construct Definition Measures Sources that 
Informed the 
Measures 
Trust “The willingness of a party 
to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party 
based on the expectation 
that the other will perform 
a particular action 
important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that 
other party” (Mayer et al. 
1995, p. 712). 
(1-7 scale) 
t1. I trust Amanda to be reliable. 
t2. I believe Amanda to be 
trustworthy. 




Anthropomorphism An inference about real or 
imagined nonhuman 
entities that leads to the 
attribution of humanlike 
characteristics, properties, 
emotions, inner mental 
states, and motivations to 
them (Epley et al. 2007; 
Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; 
Gray et al. 2007). 
(1-5 scale) 
a1. To what extent does 
Amanda seem to have a 
mind of its own? 
a2. To what extent does 
Amanda seem to have 
intentions? 
a3. To what extent does 
Amanda seem to have free 
will? 
a4. To what extent does 
Amanda seem to have 
consciousness? 
a5. To what extent does 
Amanda seem to experience 
emotions? 
Epley, Waytz, et 
al. 2008 
Waytz, 




Manipulation of Verbal Indeterminacy and Task Fulfillment Indeterminacy  
Verbal indeterminacy was manipulated by making the conversational agent use either a fixed 
sentence or a verbal variation of the same underlying message to communicate with the participant. 
For instance, in the fixed sentence condition, if the participant asked the conversational agent to 
turn on the light, the agent would always use “I turned on the light” to communicate that it turned 
on the light. However, in the verbally varying condition, the agent would use different variations 
of the same underlying message, such as “I switched on the light” or “the light is on now,” to 
respond to the user. 
Task fulfillment indeterminacy was manipulated by making the conversational agent either always 
fulfill the task or randomly fulfill the task. For instance, if the participant asked the agent to turn 




variation in the ways an 
agent conveys a given 
message using different 
choices of words and 
grammar. 
Manipulated through random 
wording of agent responses. 
Manipulation check questions: 
(1-7 scale) 
vi1. I can predict what Amanda 
would say, word for word. 
(R) 
vi2. There is an obvious pattern 
of words in Amanda's 
sentences. (R) 






variation in the outcome of 
a task that an agent is 
supposed to fulfill. 
Manipulated through random 
task fulfillment. 
Manipulation check questions: 
(1-7 scale) 
ti1. Amanda is predictable in 
terms of turning on the light. 
(R) 
ti2. When I say "turn on the 
light," I can predict whether 
Amanda will turn on the 
light. (R) 
ti3. I can predict whether 
Amanda turns on the light 




while in the random fulfillment condition the agent might say that it turned or did not turn on the 
light. Table 2 shows more details about the design. Note that for brevity Table 2 only contains two 
variations of the sentence for verbal indeterminacy, while in the experiment the randomizer chose 
from ten variations of the sentence. 
 Table 2. Experiment Design 
















 No 1) I turned on the light! 2) I turned on the light! 
I didn’t turn on the light! 
Yes 3) I turned on the light! 
I switched on the light! 
4) I turned on the light! 
I didn’t turn on the light! 
I switched on the light! 
I didn’t switch on the light! 
To eliminate the possible effect of any specific variation of the sentence on the results of group 1 
and group 2, we randomly chose the base (non-random) sentence for each participant. For instance, 
when a participant is randomly assigned to group 1, the randomizer might choose either “I turned 
on the light” or “I switched on the light” for the participant, and keep this choice for all interactions 
with this participant. Group 1 is different from group 3 because in group 1 the participant keeps 
receiving the one randomly constructed sentence every time he or she asks the agent to turn on the 
light, but in group 3 the sentence is randomly constructed each time, so the participant randomly 
receives a different sentence each time s/he asks the agent to turn on the light. 
Control Variables 
We used two control variables, gender and age. Previous research has shown that age and gender 





ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
We conducted manipulation checks to assess whether participants perceived our manipulations as 
we planned. The manipulation checks for verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy 
each asked the participants to answer three questions listed in Table 1. We averaged the three items 
for each manipulation check. In a one-way ANOVA, the mean difference between low verbal 
indeterminacy (𝑀 = 3.01, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.24) and high verbal indeterminacy (𝑀 = 3.52, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.32) 
was statistically significant and in the expected direction (𝐹(1,150) = 5.839, 𝑝 < 0.01, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
0.04). In a separate one-way ANOVA test, the mean difference between low task fulfillment 
indeterminacy (𝑀 = 2.44, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.41) and high task fulfillment indeterminacy (𝑀 = 3.60, 𝑆𝐷 =
1.66) was statistically significant and in the expected direction (𝐹(1,150) = 21.722, 𝑝 <
0.01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.13). 
Measurement Model 
We measured anthropomorphism using five indicators.  We chose to model the construct 
reflectively based on Waytz et al., who argued that these measurement items “should reflect 
anthropomorphism” (2010, p. 221). We measured trust using three indicators. We chose to model 
the construct reflectively as previous studies in IS have operationalized trust as a reflective 
construct (e.g., Petter et al. 2007; Srivastava and Chandra 2018). Note that by operationalizing 
anthropomorphism and trust in this way we assumed that they are not composites of their indicators 
but common factors of them. 
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The indicators for anthropomorphism and trust were measured using Likert-type scales. While 
most of the previous research treated these measures as continuous, we statistically tested whether 
they could be treated as continuous variables. All three indicators of trust were fairly symmetrically 
distributed with seven categories (skewness of -0.53, -0.34, and -0.35). Therefore, we could treat 
trust as either continuous or ordinal. However, indicators of anthropomorphism followed non-
symmetrical distributions (skewness of 0.51, 0.83, 1.41, 1.25, and 2.02) with five categories. Thus, 
we could not treat anthropomorphism measures as continuous. For simplicity, we treated both trust 
and anthropomorphism as ordinal. We simultaneously estimated the thresholds for trust and 
anthropomorphism with the rest of the model.4 The thresholds were used to create categories for 
the ordinal levels of each variable. 
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the measurement items using lavaan 
(version 0.6-5 on R version 3.6.1). Since a CFA model is saturated, i.e., all constructs can freely 
covary with other constructs, any misfit in the model is due to how the items fit with the constructs. 
We used CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR to assess the fit. Such fit indices are more robust to variations 
in sample size as compared to the chi-square measure of fit. Moreover, simulation studies on fit 
measures have revealed that while many of the fit indices might lead to incorrect interpretations 
about the fit, a combination rule based on the three mentioned indices can provide a good indicator 
for fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). Based on this combination rule, a model with CFI of more than 0.95 
and either RMSEA of less than 0.06 or SRMR of less than 0.08 has a good fit with the data. The 
fit measures for our model are CFI=0.984, RMSEA=0.056, and SRMR=0.037, indicating a 
satisfactory fit. 
 
4 We assumed each level of an ordinal measure corresponds to a specific value on its underlying latent continuous measure. As 
such, we estimated these values or “thresholds” as a part of our estimation, simultaneously. 
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We assessed the convergent validity of our measurement model by inspecting the lambda (i.e., 
item loadings) and average variance extracted (AVE) values. The acceptable thresholds for lambda 
and AVE are 0.70 and 0.50, respectively (Kline 2015). All lambda values, except for one item for 
anthropomorphism with a value of 0.69, were larger than 0.70. Also, all AVE values were larger 
than the 0.50 threshold, providing support for the convergent validity of the measurement model. 
To assess the discriminant validity of our measurement model, we tested whether each construct 
has more common variance with its items than with other constructs. More specifically, we tested 
whether the square root of each construct’s AVE was greater than its correlation with other 
constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). All constructs passed the test, providing support for 
discriminant validity of the measurement model. The composite reliabilities of all constructs were 
above 0.70, which is the threshold for reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 3 presents the 
descriptive statistics, correlations, square roots of AVE values, and item loadings (lambda values). 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, √𝑨𝑽𝑬, and Loadings (N=152) 
Construct / Variable Loadings M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age NA 36.61 11.21 NA           
2. Gender NA 0.49 0.50 -0.06 NA         
3. Verbal Indeterminacy NA 0.46 0.50 -0.01 0.00 NA       
4. Task Fulfillment 
Indeterminacy 
NA 0.48 0.50 -0.03 0.06 0.12 NA     
5. Anthropomorphism 
a1. 0.691 







4.20 1.60 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.39 0.26 0.93 t2. 0.965 
t3. 0.985 
Notes: √𝐴𝑉𝐸 (square root of average variance extracted) values are represented on the diagonal and 




We used a factor-based structural equation model (SEM) to analyze our path model. We coded the 
two manipulated variables as binary and generated a binary interaction term by multiplying the 
interacting terms. Our control variables (age and gender) did not significantly influence trust or 
improve the model fit. Therefore, we dropped them from the structural model. We employed a 
WLSMV (mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least squares) estimator, which is a DWLS 
(diagonally weighted least squares) estimation method with robust standard errors for ordinal data 
(Xia 2016). We first investigated the fit indices to evaluate whether the model was a good 
representation of the data. Since we used a robust estimation method, we adopted scaled fit 
measures. The scaling correction factor for our model is 0.913 and the model has 39 degrees of 
freedom. 
Scaled chi-square is 39.392 (df.scaled=39, p.scaled= 0.452), which fails to reject the hypothesis 
that the model constraints and assumptions hold within the sampling error. While chi-square is 
satisfactory and can provide some general sense about the fit of the model, it has many 
shortcomings, such as its substantial dependence on sample size. Therefore, we rely on robust fit 
measures to assess the model. Scaled RMSEA is 0.008 (p.scaled = 0.899), scaled CFI is 0.999, and 
scaled SRMR is 0.043. These three fit indices indicate a good fit according to Hu and Bentler’s 
(1999) thresholds (SRMR< .08 AND [CFI>0.95 OR RMSEA<0.06]). 
Path Testing 
We used the path estimations from the model to assess the hypotheses (see Figure 4). Since we did 
not mean-center the indicators of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies and these factors are 
single-indicator, the regression coefficient of each of these factors in the model indicates the effect 
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of the factor when the other factor is not present (set to zero). Therefore, in order to assess H1a 
and H1b, we can directly use the estimates without creating a base model with no interaction. 
Furthermore, the common method of testing such hypotheses in a model with no interaction has 
fundamental issues because if the interaction is important in the full model, then a model with no 
interaction could yield biased estimates, because the needed estimates are usually highly correlated 
with the interaction term. 
 
Figure 4. SEM Results 
Hypothesis 1a stated that verbal indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism. Our model 
estimation showed a significant positive effect of verbal indeterminacy on anthropomorphism 
(β = 0.432, p < 0.05). This result provides support for H1a by indicating that verbal 
indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism. Hypothesis 1b stated that task fulfillment 
indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism. The estimated model provided support for this 
hypothesis showing a significant positive effect (β = 0.355, p < 0.05). 
Hypothesis 2 theorized that the presence of each of the two forms of indeterminacy decreases the 
effect of the other one on anthropomorphism. The result supported this claim by showing a 
















p < 0.05 













significant negative effect of the interaction term on anthropomorphism (β = −0.679, p < 0.05). 
Therefore, the estimated model suggested that the effect of verbal indeterminacy on 
anthropomorphism depends on the amount of task fulfillment indeterminacy. To further probe this 
interaction effect, we constructed an interaction plot and examined the simple slopes of the 
relationship between verbal indeterminacy and anthropomorphism (see Figure 5). The interaction 
between verbal indeterminacy and task fulfillment indeterminacy suggest that both types of 
indeterminacy simultaneously inform anthropomorphism process, and therefore any mismatch 
between the two significantly decreases anthropomorphism. This provides support for the notion 
that anthropomorphism is a holistic experience. 
Verbal indeterminacy, task fulfillment indeterminacy, and their interaction explain 5% of the 
variance in anthropomorphism. We argue that since both predictors are exogenous, i.e., externally 
and independently manipulated, the path coefficients are unbiased despite the relatively low 𝑅2. 
According to Fritz et al. (2012), the variance explained in an experiment should not be compared 
to that of a correlational research. While many factors, such as generalized tendency to 
anthropomorphize (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010), could influence anthropomorphism, we 
manipulated only two types of indeterminacy. It would be surprising if people’s inference of the 
humanness of an AI agent were shaped only by a few factors. Our measures of anthropomorphism 
reflect such aspects as free will, consciousness, and ability to experience emotions. Therefore even 
a small increase in users’ anthropomorphism of an AI agent that goes beyond adding basic physical 




Hypothesis 3 predicted that task fulfillment indeterminacy decreases trust. The empirical model 
provided support for this claim by indicating a significant negative effect of task fulfillment 
indeterminacy on trust (β = −0.791, p < 0.01). This finding provides evidence that inconsistency 
created by the indeterminacy negatively influences trust. 
Hypothesis 4, in line with previous research (Qiu and Benbasat 2009; Waytz et al. 2014), predicted 
a positive effect of anthropomorphism on trust. The estimated model provided supporting evidence 
for this assertion by showing a positive association between the two constructs (β = 0.284, p <
0.01). While verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies were externally manipulated and 
therefore we could guarantee that they preceded anthropomorphism and trust, we cannot guarantee 
the same for anthropomorphism with respect to trust. Hence, the results show a correlation and the 
causality is inferred based on the theoretical reasoning and similar finding from prior literature. 
Task fulfillment indeterminacy and anthropomorphism explain 24% of the variance in trust. Table 
4 provides a summary of the results. 
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Table 4. Results Summary 
Hypothesis Relationship Finding 
H1a Verbal Indeterminacy 
+
→ Anthropomorphism Supported 
H1b Task Fulfilment Indeterminacy 
+
→ Anthropomorphism Supported 





H3 Task Fulfilment Indeterminacy  
−
→  Trust Supported 
H4 Anthropomorphism  
+
→  Trust Supported 
Post-Hoc Analysis: Mediation  
We did not explicitly develop any hypothesis on the mediating role of anthropomorphism on the 
relationship between indeterminacy and trust because we did not have a strong theory based on 
which we could hypothesize such mediation. However, mediation analysis can help us understand 
the relationship between indeterminacy and trust. 
While the total effect of verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies are still relevant, we are also 
interested in the effect that is transferred through anthropomorphism. As Zhao et al. argued, “to 
establish mediation, all that matters is that the indirect effect is significant” (2010, p. 204). We 
used simultaneous estimation of all paths in SEM as it is preferred over Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
three steps of regression analysis because it does not assume that the three regressions are 
independent (Preacher and Hayes 2008). Furthermore, since mediated effects were constructed 
based on the product term of two normal parameters, we used bootstrapping to avoid making 
unwarranted assumptions about the normality of the product term (Hayes and Preacher 2014; 
Preacher and Hayes 2008). We used 1000 bootstrap samples to find the standard errors. 
To be able to calculate the total effect of verbal indeterminacy, task indeterminacy, and their 
interaction on trust, we tested a saturated model that included all the paths from our previous model 
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as well as the direct effects of both verbal indeterminacy and the interaction term on trust. The 
model scaled fit measures were satisfactory (CFI= 0.999, RMSEA=0.038, SRMR=0.043), 
therefore, we could comfortably interpret the estimates. Note that the estimates of paths that 
existed in both the main and saturated models were similar in direction and p-value. 
Based on our mediation analysis, verbal indeterminacy has a significant positive influence on trust 
via anthropomorphism (𝛽 = 0.123, 𝑝 < 0.05). This is interesting because we failed to find any 
evidence suggesting a direct effect of verbal indeterminacy on trust (𝛽 = −0.005, 𝑝 = 0.981). 
Therefore, the effect of verbal indeterminacy on trust is fully mediated by anthropomorphism. 
While verbal indeterminacy does not seem to be related to user’s trust toward the conversational 
agent, this analysis suggests that verbal indeterminacy can increase trust indirectly by increasing 
anthropomorphism. 
 
Figure 6. Saturated Model for Testing Mediation 
Moreover, we found that task fulfillment indeterminacy has a significant positive influence on trust 
































p < 0.05 





and positive indirect effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy create an interesting paradox because 
task fulfillment indeterminacy should decrease trust by definition.  While the total effect showed 
a significantly negative net effect (𝛽 = −0.690, 𝑝 < 0.05) indicating that the direct effect was 
stronger than the indirect effect, the positive indirect effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on 
trust through anthropomorphism mitigated its negative direct effect to some extent (see Figure 6). 
Anthropomorphism also mediated the effect of the interaction term (task fulfillment indeterminacy 
× verbal indeterminacy) on trust. We found a significant negative indirect effect of the interaction 
term on trust (𝛽 = −0.195, 𝑝 < 0.05). However,  we did not find any evidence suggesting either 
a direct (𝛽 = 0.037, 𝑝 = 0.844) or a total (𝛽 = −0.158, 𝑝 = 0.374) effect of the interaction term 
on trust. 
Robustness Check 
We conducted an additional experiment to serve as a robustness check and to rule out rival 
explanations for the observed effects described above. First, the reader will remember that even 
though we acknowledged that task fulfillment indeterminacy can be viewed as indeterminacy in 
both the outcome and the process of fulfillment, we chose to focus on outcome rather than process 
in designing our initial experiment. In doing so, we operationalized task fulfillment indeterminacy 
using a task with two outcomes: light is on or light is off. In this operationalization the outcome of 
the task is desirable 100% of the time for the low task fulfillment indeterminacy condition because 
the user’s command is always fulfilled.  However, the outcome of the task is desirable only 50% 
of the time for the high task fulfillment indeterminacy condition because the command is fulfilled 
only half of the time on average, due to randomness. This difference in desirability of the outcome 
reduces trust. While this is in line with our theoretical development where we discussed that the 
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reduced desirability of the outcome is a reason for the reduced trust, we cannot ignore the 
possibility that our results might have been different if we had chosen to examine task fulfillment 
indeterminacy in terms of process (as opposed to outcome). Therefore, we can add robustness to 
our findings if we show that the negative direct effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on trust 
still exists even when the desirability of the outcome remains the same. This robustness check can 
also show whether our choice to focus on task fulfillment indeterminacy as indeterminacy in the 
outcome of the task that an agent is supposed to fulfill had a limiting effect on the theoretical 
generalizability of our results. 
Second, in the operationalization of task fulfillment, the conversational agent says, “I did not turn 
on the light” (or a sentence with a similar meaning) whenever it fails to fulfill the task. One could 
argue that the reason for increased anthropomorphism is not task fulfillment indeterminacy, but 
the fact that the agent shows rebellion against the user. We argue that when a user construes the 
agent’s task fulfillment indeterminacy as rebellion, he or she is in fact attributing human-like 
concepts (i.e., rebellion) to a non-human agent (i.e., anthropomorphism) to understand its behavior. 
However, we acknowledge that the agent’s utterance (“I did not turn on the light”) itself could be 
a confounding factor that directly leads to increased anthropomorphism due to perceived rebellion. 
Therefore, we can add robustness to our results if we show that task fulfillment indeterminacy 
increases anthropomorphism even when the agent does not signal rebellion through its utterance. 
Finally, in our experiment we told the participants to ask the agent to turn on the light five times 
to make sure the agent works properly. One could argue that this is not a realistic setting because 
users typically do not ask an agent to do the same task five times in a row. Therefore, we can add 
robustness to our study, if we change the task environment each time the participant needs to repeat 
the command, so that the repetition of the command has greater ecological validity. 
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We conducted an additional experiment to add robustness to our findings by addressing the above 
threats to the validity of our results. We recruited 60 participants (25 females, 34 males, and 1 
other, with an average age of 41.7 ranging from 28 to 76 years old) from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (pool of Turkers with more than 97% acceptance rate, more than 500 HITs, and master 
status). All participants passed the attention check questions and received $0.75 for participating 
in our study, which took 5 minutes on average (ranging from 2.7 to 12.15 minutes). 
We told the participants that Amanda was a digital assistant which could control many home 
devices even if the device was not smart, and that the developers of Amanda had created a 
simulation that allowed users to see how it worked in real-life. We asked them to use Amanda in 
a simulation to control a mower. We explained that the mower worked like a real device, was not 
smart, and was entirely controlled by Amanda (see Appendix B). As shown in Figure 7, 
participants were asked to use Amanda 10 times to park the mower in a predetermined parking 
spot. The locations of the parking spot and the mower along with a random tree were fixed in all 
variations of the task environment. However, in order to create variation in the task environment 
for every time participants ask Amanda to park the mower, we randomly selected the grass texture 
(from a pool of 15 grass texture images) and the tree image (from a pool of 5 tree images), and 
randomly located 15 flowers on the grass (see Appendix B). 
In this experiment, we manipulated task fulfillment indeterminacy in terms of how the agent 
performs the task (i.e., process indeterminacy). In doing so, we randomly assigned participants to 
either a low task fulfillment indeterminacy condition in which Amanda used the exact same path 
to park the mower every time or a high task fulfillment indeterminacy condition in which Amanda 
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used a randomly selected path (from all possible paths)5 every time. To assure that no specific path 
drives the results in the low task indeterminacy condition, for each specific participant in this 
condition, we randomly picked one path from all possible paths and kept the path constant 
throughout all interactions of the participant with the agent. In both conditions, Amanda responded 
to the participant’s command by just saying “OK!”. 
  
Figure 7. A Sample of Participant’s Interaction with Amanda 
As a manipulation check, we asked the participants whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statements: “the way Amanda parked the mower was unpredictable,” “I did NOT notice 
a pattern in the way Amanda parked the mower,” and “I could NOT predict exactly how Amanda 
would park the mower.” Participants in the low task indeterminacy condition reported lower 
perceived task indeterminacy (𝑀 = 1.96, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.07) than participants in the high task 
indeterminacy condition (𝑀 = 4.58, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.75; 𝐹(1,59) = 50.765, 𝑝 < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.47). 
 
5 To limit the possible number of paths from the mower location to the parking spot to a tractable number, we created a graph with 
16 nodes, where the mower was on node 1 and parking spot was on node 16. Assuming that the mower does not go through the 
same location more than once and cannot go over the tree, there are 22 directional edges in the graph. We employed a depth first 
search (DFS) algorithm to find all possible paths from node 1 to node 16. 
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Due to the relatively small sample size6, we used the PROCESS macro in SPSS to estimate the 
effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on anthropomorphism and trust rather than SEM. 
Accordingly, we constructed linear composites for anthropomorphism (𝛼 = 0.93; 5 items) and 
trust (𝛼 = 0.96; 3 items). In an exploratory factor analysis, both the anthropomorphism and trust 
items loaded higher on their respective construct than the other construct and had loadings greater 
than 0.7 (see Appendix B). The results showed that task fulfillment indeterminacy significantly 
increases anthropomorphism (𝛽 = 0.757, 𝑝 < 0.05; 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.06), and decreases trust (𝛽 =
−0.617, 𝑝 < 0.05; 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.07), controlling for anthropomorphism, age, and gender (similar to the 
previous study). These results lend a measure of robustness to our findings by demonstrating that 
they can be reproduced in a different task context that involves process rather than outcome 
indeterminacy and by ruling out potential rival explanations such as AI rebellion or the manner in 
which task fulfillment indeterminacy was operationalized. 
DISCUSSION 
While the question of what qualifies an entity to be a human might be a research question for 
philosophers, the question of what makes people perceive an entity as a human has important 
implications for applied disciplines (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010). We leveraged the 
anthropomorphism literature to hone in on the concept of trust in human-AI interaction. This study 
contributes to both the anthropomorphism and trust streams of research in psychology, human-
 
6 The results were the same in terms of direction and significance when we used a SEM analysis similar to the one described in the 
main experiment. We modeled anthropomorphism and trust ordinal variables and used WLSMV estimator. We found that task 
fulfillment indeterminacy increases anthropomorphism (𝛽 = 0.455, 𝑝 < 0.01; 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.06) and decreases trust (𝛽 = −0.503, 𝑝 <
0.01; 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.08), when controlling for anthropomorphism, age, and gender. However, despite satisfactory scaled fit measures 




computer interaction, and information systems. Below we elaborate on the implications of our 
findings for research and practice, and the limitations of our study. 
Implications for Research 
Prior research on anthropomorphism has ignored the nature of the indeterminacy that leads to 
anthropomorphism. In this research, we defined the concept of AI indeterminacy. We specifically 
identified, defined, and studied two AI indeterminacies, namely verbal indeterminacy and task 
fulfillment indeterminacy, that exist in the context of conversational AI. We empirically showed 
that verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies have positive effects on users’ perception of AI’s 
humanness, i.e., anthropomorphism. 
In addition, we addressed the apparent tensions between anthropomorphism and trust in the 
presence of indeterminacy. More specifically, we showed that the negative effect of indeterminacy 
on trust can be traced to the direct negative effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on trust. In 
contrast, verbal indeterminacy not only does not decrease trust but also has an indirect positive 
effect on it. This finding has important theoretical implications for research on trust in human-AI 
interaction because it indicates that different types of indeterminacies could have opposite effects 
on trust. 
Previous literature identified that humans are driven to find an explanation for the unpredictability 
in their surroundings (i.e., effectance motivation), as a reason why people anthropomorphize 
unpredictable agents (Epley et al. 2007; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 
2010). This research adds to this account by conceptualizing unpredictability as indeterminacy. By 
doing so, we bridged the anthropomorphism literature and centuries of studies on free will in the 
field of philosophy (e.g., Nahmias et al. 2014), which can inform future research on human-AI 
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interaction. Furthermore, we contextualized the previously ambiguous concept of indeterminacy 
at a more granular level. While in most of the previous research indeterminacy represented a 
philosophical concept, in this research we introduced two specific types of AI indeterminacy that 
can be measured and manipulated empirically. 
We also investigated the interaction effect of multiple sources of AI indeterminacy on users’ 
perception of AI’s humanness. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to theorize and 
empirically test such interaction. We found evidence to show that multiple sources of 
indeterminacy can influence the effect of each other on anthropomorphism of an AI artifact. More 
specifically, we found that while verbal indeterminacy alone could increase anthropomorphism, 
when it co-occurred with task fulfillment indeterminacy, it lost its effect to some extent. We 
explained why such a phenomenon took place. Verbal indeterminacy signals a humanlike state of 
mind and specifically the ability to communicate thought and reasons, and task fulfillment 
indeterminacy signals a mind that has the ability to make an independent decision whether or not 
to fulfill a command. However, when both behaviors are present (verbal indeterminacy and task 
indeterminacy), users expect the AI to be able to communicate the reason for not fulfilling the task. 
Anthropomorphism happens when users can explain the AI’s behavior using their mental model 
of humans. Therefore, the presence of non-contradictory anthropomorphic signals enables them to 
perceive the AI as more human, while the presence of contradictory anthropomorphic signals 
hinders their imagination to create humans out of the AI artifacts, i.e., to anthropomorphize. 
This study also contributes to trust literature by identifying AI-specific drivers of trust. Decades 
of research on the concept of trust has been done based on early works on trust in human-human 
interaction (e.g., Deutsch 1958; Johnson-George and Swap 1982; Rempel et al. 1985; Rotter 1967). 
While the nature of trust in human interaction with different agents might stay the same, an AI-
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specific conceptualization of its drivers could portray a more accurate picture of reality for human-
AI interactions. In this research, we introduced task fulfillment indeterminacy as a type of 
indeterminacy on the conversational agent’s side. This construct could be related to the reliability 
of the technology (Lankton et al. 2015) or the integrity of the agent (Mayer et al. 1995). However, 
conceptualizing the phenomenon as a type of indeterminacy enables researchers to understand why 
and how users might anthropomorphize the agent in order to increase their ability to predict the 
agent’s behavior, which in turn influences their trust. 
Thus, this research is a response to the call for the development of contextualized trust (Mayer et 
al. 1995; Schoorman et al. 2007). Prior attempts to develop a framework for trust in the AI context 
provided very little theoretical explanation on similarities and dissimilarities of trust in humans 
and trust in AI (e.g., Hancock et al. 2011). While IS researchers pointed out that the level of the 
humanness of technology is critical in choosing the proper operationalization of trust (human trust 
versus technology trust) (Lankton et al. 2015), very little research has been done to determine the 
underlying drivers of trust in the AI context. This research is among the first attempts to delineate 
the nuanced behavioral similarities between human and AI, i.e., behavioral indeterminacies, that 
influence our trust in AI in general and conversational agents in particular. 
Furthermore, in this research, we tested the impact of verbal indeterminacy, task fulfillment 
indeterminacy, and anthropomorphism on trust, which is a major determinant of technology use 
(Gefen et al. 2003). We found a negative direct effect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on trust 
but no significant direct effect of verbal indeterminacy on trust. However, we showed that both 
verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies positively influence trust through anthropomorphism. 
By investigating the direct and indirect effects of indeterminacy on trust, we highlighted the 
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importance of considering indeterminacy and anthropomorphism in the wider general frameworks 
of technology adoption and use. 
Implications for Practice 
Based on our analysis, we believe that signaling more humanlike state of mind in an artifact, 
through multiple signals, could sometimes lead people to perceive the AI as less humanlike. A 
user makes assumptions about an artifact’s unobserved capabilities when interacting with it. These 
assumptions are, to some degree, consistent with a model of a human with similar capabilities. The 
user does not necessarily expect to directly observe those imaginary assumed capabilities. As long 
as those capabilities are imaginary, they are flexible enough for the user to explain away possible 
inconsistencies in artifact’s behavior. However, when the user actually observes a capability, any 
contradictory signal that gives the user concrete evidence that the artifact’s capability does not 
match that of a human could make the user reject the whole idea that the artifact is humanlike. If 
it looks like a duck, but does not quack like a duck, then it might not be a duck! Thus, we believe 
that when the goal is to increase the perceived humanness of an artifact, the developers should 
avoid using half-developed anthropomorphic features that could provide contradictory evidence. 
Based on our theory, we propose that developers address conflicting signals between task 
fulfillment and verbal indeterminacy by adding verbally indeterminant error messages to their 
conversational agents. A verbally indeterminant error message conveys the error message using a 
different choice of words and grammar every time. Such a message addresses the aforementioned 
signal conflicts while it preserves the artifact’s verbal indeterminacy. A verbally determinant error 
message might undermine the perceived humanness over time as it provides evidence of 
determinacy in the AI. 
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Based on our findings, we speculate that developers can take advantage of task fulfillment 
indeterminacy as an inexpensive method to increase perceived humanness. A human makes 
mistakes and disobeys, and so does a humanlike agent. However, the perceived humanness 
induced by task fulfillment indeterminacy comes with a price: decreased trust. Increasing 
anthropomorphism through adding task fulfillment indeterminacy could be useful in some contexts 
such as gaming where an agent that makes mistakes might be perceived as more humanlike (e.g., 
the commentator of a soccer game), but it would not be useful in other contexts such as self-driving 
cars where the agent is supposed to fulfill a safety-critical task with high reliability. Therefore, we 
propose that when developers need to increase the sense of humanness in the AI, they can 
deliberately take advantage of task fulfillment indeterminacy provided that the context of the 
human-AI interaction does not require an AI with high reliability. Otherwise, they should focus on 
non-task fulfillment indeterminacies such as verbal indeterminacy. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While there are different types of indeterminacy in a conversational agent, we focused on verbal 
and task fulfillment indeterminacies as two key indeterminacies that are present in any 
conversational agent. For instance, indeterminant variations in the response time, tone, pauses, and 
facial expression (in a conversational agent with a physical embodiment or graphical 
representation) could potentially signal mind possession. While we limited our study to the more 
common indeterminacies, we acknowledge that there may be other types of AI indeterminacy that 
are worthy of study. 
In this research, we measured users’ perception of the humanness of the artifact using existing 
measures of anthropomorphism. While this approach fits our objectives, future research could 
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distinguish between anthropomorphism toward a specific artifact and a person’s general tendency 
to anthropomorphize non-human agents (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010). 
Users’ perception of the humanness of AI artifacts could change over time. In this research, in line 
with extant literature, we focused on a relatively short human-AI interaction and measured 
anthropomorphism only once at the end of the experiment. Nevertheless, more research is needed 
to understand the dynamics of anthropomorphism, i.e., how the perception of humanness changes 
over time as users collect more information about the AI’s behavior. It is also important to 
determine whether indeterminacy provides a more sustainable source of anthropomorphism 
compared to other sources such as physical anthropomorphic features such as humanlike voice, 
avatar, and physical embodiment. 
In this study, we adopted a one-dimensional approach to trust. Future research can expand our 
model by dissecting trust into cognition-based and affect-based trust to understand whether 
different types of indeterminacies influence cognition-based and affect-based trust differently. For 
instance, it is possible that task fulfillment indeterminacy erodes the cognitive foundations of trust 
by providing evidence about lack of integrity in the artifact’s behavior and simultaneously 
enhances the affective foundations of trust by inducing a sense of warmth due to the vulnerability 
of the artifact. 
The concept of anthropomorphism does not imply that the attribution of humanlike qualities to a 
nonhuman entity is an error or that the entity does not deserve to be treated as a human being. 
Whether the entity deserves to be treated like a human being is independent of the humanizing 
process, i.e., anthropomorphism. Prior research has studied the process of dehumanizing humans 
(Haslam 2006), which hints at the fact that humanizing and dehumanizing phenomena capture a 
perception about an entity without judging the soundness of the perception. Such a perception 
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could explain why people treat some objects as humans and some humans as objects (Haslam and 
Loughnan 2014). In this research, we focused on the humanization process, i.e., 
anthropomorphism. Nevertheless, future research can investigate the reverse process, i.e., 
dehumanization, in the context of human-AI interaction. For instance, since we tend to dehumanize 
the people who are different from us (Vaes et al. 2012), and since stereotypes in human-human 
interaction sometimes spill over into human-machine interactions (Eyssel and Kuchenbrandt 2012; 
Nass et al. 1997), the process of dehumanization might also take place in human-AI interaction. 
CONCLUSION 
As AI artifacts become more complicated, users face more indeterminacies in their interactions 
with these artifacts. These indeterminacies have important effects on users’ perception of the 
artifacts. In this research, we identified verbal and task fulfillment indeterminacies as two 
important indeterminacies in the context of conversational agents. Using a custom-developed 
conversational agent, we investigated the effect of such indeterminacies on users’ perception of an 
artifact’s humanness, i.e., anthropomorphism, and their trust toward the artifact. We drew upon 
psychological accounts on anthropomorphism to explain the phenomenon. We further leveraged 
the theoretical findings in the uncanny valley literature to explain the interaction effect of multiple 
indeterminacies on anthropomorphism and trust. The findings from this research are relevant for 
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APPENDIX A – Anthropomorphism in Extant Literature 
 Table A1. An Interdisciplinary Literature Summary of Anthropomorphism, 
Humanness, and, Agency Detection  
 
Authors Research Questions / 
Objectives 






















and voice output, on 
user’s perceived social 
relationship with a 
technological artifact 




Anthropomorphic features increase 
perceived social presence, which in 
turn increases trusting beliefs, 
perception of enjoyment, and 
intention to use. 
(Seeger et 
al. 2017) 
Can the agent 
substitution type explain 
the contradicting findings 
about the trust-inducing 
effect of anthropomorphic 
design? 
Conceptual They theorize that agent substitution 
type, i.e., whether the agent is a 
substitute for a human or a system, 
moderates the positive relationship 
between anthropomorphism and 
trusting beliefs. 










Non-Caucasian consumers bid more 
on an anthropomorphic product, 
because of a non-rational cognitive 
process. 
They provided some insight into the 
cognitive process in which 











(Hart et al. 
2013) 




Survey Anthropomorphism can account for 
the personal value of a product 
beyond the influence of common 
marketplace factors. The magnitude 
of consumer anthropomorphism will 






Does thinking of objects 
as alive make people less 
willing to replace them? 
Two 
experiments 
Consumers who think about their 
cars in anthropomorphic terms are 
less willing to replace it and give less 




What is the effect of 
anthropomorphism on 
risk perception and what 
is the moderating effect 






People with high (low) power 
perceive anthropomorphic risk-
bearing entities, i.e., entities with 
anthropomorphic features, as less 









How may differences in 
people’s levels of trust in 
human agents influence 
the persuasiveness of 
anthropomorphized 
messengers compared 
with human messengers? 
Three 
experiments 
People low in the generalized 
interpersonal trust are more 
persuaded by anthropomorphized 
messengers than by human 
spokespeople. 
People high in interpersonal trust 
respond similarly to human and 
anthropomorphized messengers. 
However, when asked to be 
attentive, they are more persuaded 





What is the effect of 
anthropomorphizing a 
brand on automatic 




Anthropomorphized brands trigger 
people’s goals for a successful 
social interaction, resulting in 
behavior that is assimilative or 
contrastive to the brand’s image. 
Consumers are more likely to 
assimilate behavior associated with 
anthropomorphized partner brands 
that they like and servant brands that 
they dislike. 
Consumers show a contrastive 
behavior when primed with disliked 





The objective of this 
study is to provide a 
conceptualization and 






They found that childlike 
characteristics comprise four 
dimensions: sweetness, simplicity, 
sympathy, and smallness. 
Consumers react positively to 
childlike anthropomorphic 




The objective of this 







They showed that time 
anthropomorphism influences 
intertemporal preferences. The effect 
is different for people with perceived 
low and high power. 
They argue that time 
anthropomorphism happens 
probably for three reasons: the 
general prevalence of 
anthropomorphism, the linguistic 
portrayal of time as a human, and 









When a human gender schema is 
primed, that is, congruent with 
consumers’ own gender, consumers 
show more preferential evaluations 
and are more likely to perceive the 
product as human, even when no 
product-schema congruent features 
are present in the product. Results 
indicated that perceived 
anthropomorphism mediates the 
gender-schema congruity effect and 
the product-schema congruity effect 













et al. 2010) 
What is the effect of 







People anthropomorphize, in part, to 















They provide a psychometrically 
valid measure named the Individual 
Differences in Anthropomorphism 
Questionnaire (IDAQ). 
They showed that IDAQ is 
significantly associated with the 
degree of moral care and concern 
afforded to an agent, the amount of 
responsibility and trust placed on an 
agent, and the extent to which an 
agent serves as a source of social 
influence on the self. 
(Epley, 
Waytz, et al. 
2008) 
To empirically test the 
effect of sociality 






While the results are mostly 
correlational, they provide some 
preliminary evidence of the role of 
sociality and effectance motivation in 
increasing anthropomorphism.  
(Epley, 
Akalis, et al. 
2008) 
What is the effect of 





They found that individuals who are 
chronically lonely and who are 
induced to feel lonely are more likely 
to anthropomorphize nonhuman 
agents. 
They showed that the results are not 
simply produced by any negative 
affective state. 
(Waytz et al. 
2014) 










They showed that 
anthropomorphism increases self-
reported trust as well as its 





Gray, et al. 
2010) 
When mind perception 
occurs, when it does not 





They argue that perception of mind 
has different causes and 
consequences in the entity that 
perceives mind in another entity as 
well as in the entity that is perceived 
to possess a mind. 
(Epley et al. 
2007) 






They propose a theory that offers 
three determinants of 
anthropomorphism, namely elicited 
agent knowledge, effectance 
motivation, sociality motivation. 
(Gray et al. 
2007) 
What are the dimensions 
of mind perception? 
Survey They found two dimensions of mind 
perception, namely agency and 
experience. 
(Gray et al. 
2012) 
What is the relationship 
between mind perception 
and moral judgment? 
Conceptual 
framework 
They suggest that moral judgment is 
rooted in a cognitive template of two 
perceived minds, a moral dyad of an 
intentional agent and a suffering 
moral patient (dyadic morality). 
They posit that human mind 
abstracts out the key elements from 
various moral transgressions to 
create a cognitive template. They 
argue that these key elements are 
intention and pain. 
(Wiese et al. 
2017) 
How can we use 
neuroscientific methods 




They suggest that we can make 
people perceive artificial agents as 
social companions by designing 
them as intentional agents, because 
such agents activate areas in the 
human brain involved in social-
cognitive processing. 
(Kay et al. 
2010) 
What is the effect of 
thoughts of randomness 
on beliefs in supernatural 




They observed that participants 
primed with randomness-related 
words exhibited heightened beliefs in 
spiritual control compared with 
participants primed with negatively 
valenced control words. 
This effect disappeared when 
participants were given the 
opportunity to attribute the cause of 
any arousal they experienced to a 
pill ingested earlier in the session. 
They suggest that belief in 
supernatural sources of control, such 
as God and karma, may function, in 
part, to defend against distress 






What is the effect of 




They found that that experiencing 
awe, while controlling for some other 
emotional states, increases agency 
detection in the context of both 
supernatural belief and judgments of 
intentional design. This effect is 
partially mediated by awe-induced 
changes in person’s tolerance for 
ambiguity and uncertainty. 
(Schroeder 
et al. 2017) 




The human voice contains 
paralinguistic cues that reveal 
underlying mental processing 
involved in thinking and feeling. 
The medium of communication may 
moderate the tendency to 
dehumanize the opposition. 
Adding visual cues to voice did not 
increase anthropomorphism. 
Individuals with voices that lack 
authentic intonation (e.g., monotone 
voices) may be perceived as less 




How does a cue closely 




likelihood of mistaking a 
person for a machine, or 
a machine for a person? 
Four 
experiments 
Removing voice from communication 
(leaving only text) increases the 
likelihood of mistaking the text’s 
creator for a machine. 
Adding voice to a computer-
generated script (resulting in 
speech) would increase the 
likelihood of mistaking the text’s 
creator for a human. 
People are more likely to infer a 
human (vs. computer) creator when 
they hear a voice expressing 
thoughts than when they read the 
same thoughts in text. 
Removing the naturalistic 
paralinguistic cues that convey 
humanlike capacity for thinking and 
feeling, such as varied pace and 
intonation, eliminates the 
humanizing effect of speech. 
Adding visual cues, such as a video 
clip, did not increase the likelihood of 
inferring a human creator compared 
with only reading text. 
(Broadbent 
2017) 
This article strives to 
review the research on 
the psychology behind 
Literature 
review 
This article reviews applications of 
robots and research on how humans 
relate to robots, explores concerns 
 
83 
our relationship with 
social robots. 
about robots, and looks ahead to the 
future of the field. 
(Khalid et al. 
2016) 
What is the effect of eye 




Direct eye gaze increases explicit 
mind ascription and beliefs about the 
likelihood of mind possession. 
(van Elk et 
al. 2016) 
What is the effect of 
processing concepts 
about supernatural 




They did not find an overall effect of 
supernatural priming on agency 
detection. 
They found that for religious 
individuals supernatural primes 
influence agency and face detection, 
but they failed to find the same effect 




The goal of this article, 
and the conceptualization 
of the social cognitive 
chain of being (SCCB), is 
to provide a broad, 
inclusive framework for 




The SCCB serves as a unifying 
theoretical framework that organizes 
research on moral perception, 
highlights unique interconnections, 









People do use anthropomorphic 
concepts of God in understanding 
stories even though they may 
profess a theological position that 
rejects anthropomorphic constraints 
on God and God’s activities. 
(Vaes et al. 
2016) 
Is the attribution of 
humanness by means of 
a minimal humanity cue 
sufficient for the 
occurrence of empathic 
neural reactions towards 
non-human entities that 







Their findings suggest that empathy 
can be triggered for non-human 
entities as long as they are seen as 
minimally human. 
(Deska et al. 
2018) 
What is the effect of facial 
width-to-height ratio 





Individuals with relatively greater 
facial width-to-height ratio are 





What is the role of control 
in attributing intentional 




Individuals who do not have control 
over the movement of an entity are 
more likely to attribute agency to it 
than individuals who think have 
indirect control. 
It appears that when the movement 
of objects is explainable in terms of 
individuals’ own agency, no agent-
attributions are triggered; but when 
the movement or activity of objects 
 
84 
exceeds obvious agency, the objects 
themselves are attributed agency. 
(Bering 
2002) 
To develop a very basic, 
species-wide existential 
theory of mind (EToM) as 
an independent system 
built on the foundations of 
the theory of mind. 
Theory 
development 
EToM functions as a philosophical–
religious explanatory system that 
allows us to see meaning in some of 
the things that happen to us, affords 
us some sense of perceived 
psychological control over what is 
likely to happen, enforces cultural 
mores that adapt the individual to the 
group, and guards against those 
behaviors that are maladaptive. 
(Demoulin et 
al. 2004) 
The extent to which some 
emotions are explicitly 
qualified as uniquely 
reserved to human 
beings. 
The criteria on which 







People distinguish between uniquely 
human and non-uniquely human 
emotions. This maps to the 
difference between primary and 




Do people attribute 
greater humanness to 






Human nature characteristics differ 
from uniquely human characteristics. 
People tend to attribute more human 
nature to themselves than others 
(self-humanization). This effect is 




What are the implicit 
association between 
social categories and 
senses of humanness, 
traits representing these 
senses, and the two 
types of nonhumans 





Humanness traits are differentially 
associated with distinct types of 
nonhumans: Uniquely human traits 
are associated with automata more 
than with animals, and human-
nature traits are associated with 
animals more than with automata. 
(Stenzel et 
al. 2012) 
Do humans co-represent 




Findings suggest that humans co-
represent the actions of robotic 
agents in a human-robot team (i.e., 
cognitively represent the action of 
the agents as if they were in charge 
of the full, undivided task) when they 
start to attribute human-like cognitive 
processes to the robot. 
They argue that action co-
representation is related to 
perceived humanlike cognitive 
processes. The robot that was 
described as having purely 
deterministic behavior was not co-
represented as much as the one 
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To review the literature 
on dehumanization and 




The author developed a new model 
of dehumanization and proposed two 
forms of dehumanization, namely 
denying uniquely human and 
















What experience is and 
what type of physical 




They propose integrated information 
theory (IIT) that is a theory of 
consciousness and that introduces 
five phenomenological axioms for 
experience of consciousness: 
intrinsic existence, composition, 




What is the effect of 
violations in brain’s 
prediction on the uncanny 
valley phenomenon? 
fMRI The uncanny valley is, at least 
partially, caused by the violation of 
the brain’s predictions. 
When an agent looks like a human, 
based on a lifetime of experience, 
the brain generates a prediction that 
this appearance will be associated 
with a particular kind of behavior. 
When the behavior of the agent 





How can we address the 
challenges that emerge 
from the goal to equip 
machines with 
socioemotional 
intelligence and to enable 
them to interpret subtle 
nonverbal cues and to 
respond to social 
affordances with naturally 
appearing behavior from 
both perspectives? 
Conceptual They propose that the creation of 
credible artificial humans not only 
defines the ultimate test for our 
understanding of human 
communication and social cognition 
but also provides a unique research 
tool to improve our knowledge about 
the underlying psychological 























What are the effects of 
social exclusion on 




Socially excluded people 
anthropomorphize and are 
persuaded more by an artificial 




Is the anthropomorphism 




They found evidence for mindless 
anthropomorphism. 
People perceive a human-like agent 
in more human-related terms; 
however, they report lesser 
perceived humanness compared to 
an agent that is not human-like. 
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(Lee et al. 
2015) 
What is the effect of 
anthropomorphic cues on 
perceived safety and trust 
in unmanned driving 
systems? 
What is the mediating 




Human-like appearance and high 
autonomy are more effective in 
eliciting positive perceptions of the 
agent. 
The greater level of 
anthropomorphism induced by 
human-like appearance and high 
autonomy in the agent evoked the 
feelings of social presence, which in 
turn positively affected the perceived 





To develop measures for 
attractiveness, eeriness, 
humanness, and warmth. 
Two surveys They developed measures for the 
four constructs with non-significant 




To provide an 
interdisciplinary review of 





They provided a review spanning the 
disciplines of anthropomorphism, 
affective computing, tangible 
interaction and industrial design. 
(Eyssel and 
Reich 2013) 
What is the effect of 




Lonely people anthropomorphize 
robots. 
Users’ motivational states need to be 
considered in the context of human-
robot interaction (HRI) as they affect 
judgments of the robotic interaction 
partner. 
(Lee 2010) What is the effect of 
anthropomorphic 
interfaces, namely 
speech type, on people’s 
tendency to project social 
expectations onto 
computers? 
What is the moderating 
effect of users’ cognitive 
style on this relationship? 
Single 
experiment 
Intuition-driven individuals evaluate a 
human-voice computer more 
positively and conform more to its 
suggestions compared to a 
synthetic-voice computer. However, 




What is the effect of 




Machine-like typefaces bias users 
towards perceiving the adviser as a 
machine but, unexpectedly, 
handwritten-like typefaces did not 
have the opposite effect. 
(Burleigh et 
al. 2013) 
What is the relationship 
between humanlikeness 




They found that humanlikeness is 
linearly related to emotional 
response. This relationship changes 
when humanlikeness varies by 
category membership. They argue 
that previous non-linear relationship 
observed in uncanny valley literature 
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might be explained by the conflict in 










(Fink 2012) What is the role of 
anthropomorphism in the 
design of socially 





Anthropomorphism is a phenomenon 
that is hard to grasp because of the 
broad understanding about it and its 
usage in a variety of disciplines. 
It is hard to draw general 
conclusions about 




What are the effects of 
people’s level of 
abstraction of human-
robot interaction 
(people’s reactions to a 
robot in social context vs. 
their thoughts about the 





People are more likely to 
anthropomorphize a specific 
behavior and a robot’s personality 
characteristics than to 







evolves over time? 
Conceptual 
framework 
They propose that 
anthropomorphism goes through 
three stages namely initialization, 
familiarization, and stabilization. 
They argue that anthropomorphism 
increases during initialization, 
sharply decreases during 
familiarization, and gradually 
decrease to a stable level during 
stabilization. 
(Kahn Jr et 
al. 2007) 
From the standpoint of 
human-robot interaction, 




They offered nine psychological 
benchmarks to measure success in 
building increasingly humanlike 
robots. 
(Salem et al. 
2013) 
What are the effects of 
the robot’s hand and arm 
gestures on the 
perception of 
humanlikeness, likability 
of the robot, shared 
reality, and future contact 
intentions after interacting 
with a robot? 
Single 
experiment 
They found that co-verbal gestures 
(i.e., gestures that accompany verbal 
utterances) in a robot increases its 
anthropomorphism, likability, shared 
reality, and future contact intentions 
than when the robot gave 
instructions without gestures. 
Surprisingly, this effect was 
particularly pronounced when the 
robot’s gestures were partly 
incongruent with speech, although 








et al. 2014) 
What are the cognitive 
phases corresponding to 





They propose three cognitive phases 
namely pre-cognitive, familiarity-




What are the potential 
benefits and challenges 
of building 
anthropomorphic robots, 
from both a philosophical 
perspective and from the 
viewpoint of empirical 
research in the fields of 
human-robot interaction 
and social psychology? 
Literature 
review 
They discussed the findings from 
prior research and delineated 
benefits and problems associated 
with anthropomorphism and 




What is the degree to 
which the human model 
of embarrassment 
translates to robot? 
What is the effect of 





In the medical context, people are 
less embarrassed when interacting 




How could the scientific 
community in social 





They emphasized the importance of 
a theory-driven approach to test 
causal relationships, development of 
valid measures, and bridging the gap 
between foundational and applied 
research. 
(Riek et al. 
2009) 
How do people 




One survey People empathize more strongly with 
more human-looking robots and less 
with mechanical-looking robots. 
(Bartneck et 
al. 2009) 





and perceived safety. 
Literature 
review 
They report several items to 
measure anthropomorphism, 
animacy, likeability, perceived 
intelligence, and perceived safety. 
(Duffy 2003) How can the concept of 
anthropomorphism be 
used in the development 
of meaningful social 
interaction between 
robots and people? 
Literature 
review 
While anthropomorphism is a very 
complex notion, it intuitively provides 
us with very powerful physical and 
social features that can be 
implemented to a greater extent in 



















 (Floridi and 
Sanders 
2004) 
What is a moral agent? Short 
literature 
review 
They clarify the concept of agent and 
separate the concerns of morality 
and responsibility of agents. 
(Proudfoot 
2011) 
How can any putative 
demonstration of 
intelligence in machines 






This paper illustrates the 
phenomenon of misplaced 
anthropomorphism and presents a 
















What is the influence of 





One survey Anthropomorphic avatars 
significantly impact perceptions of 
avatars. The results were in line with 




What is the effect of 
anthropomorphic features 
on presence, co-
presence, and social 




The existence of a virtual image 
increases telepresence. Participants 
interacting with the less-
anthropomorphic image reported 
more co-presence (i.e., to actively 
perceive an agent and to feel that 
the agent actively perceives oneself) 
and social presence than those 
interacting with partners represented 
by either no image at all or by a 
highly anthropomorphic image of the 
other, indicating that the more 
anthropomorphic images set up 
higher expectations that lead to 
reduced presence when these 












What is the impact of 
experience with intelligent 
technologies on 
children’s ideas about 
robot intelligence? 
Controlled 
survey in lab 
As children gain experience in this 
domain, they begin to differentiate 
robots from other familiar entities. 
Note: we adjusted research questions and findings to use the same terminology that we used in 
our research. For instance, we replaced the term “humanization” with “anthropomorphism” when 
the authors used it to refer to the same construct. Also, we replaced the term 
“anthropomorphism” with “anthropomorphizing design” or “anthropomorphic features” when 
the authors used the term “anthropomorphism” to refer some cues of anthropomorphism, 
inconsistent with the definition used in our research. 
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Note: we inferred research questions from studies that did not explicitly state their research 
question or objective. 
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APPENDIX B – Robustness Check Experiment 
 




     
     
     
Figure B2. The Grass Textures Used to Generate Various Task Environments 
 
     
Figure B3. The Tree Images Used to Generate Various Task Environments 
 
Table B1. Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 Anthropomorphism Trust 
Anthropomorphism_1 .842 .049 
Anthropomorphism_2 .815 .153 
Anthropomorphism_3 .944 .064 
Anthropomorphism_4 .907 .036 
Anthropomorphism_5 .792 -.089 
Trust_1 -.041 .909 
Trust_2 .109 .959 
Trust_3 .070 .982 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 





Creator and Creature: The Role of Inheritability, Trainability, and 
Freewill in Shaping Distrust in Artificial Intelligence 
Abstract 
While the investment in AI has dramatically increased over recent years, industry reports indicate 
that people are not willing to delegate important tasks to AI. With the growing presence of AI 
agents in our daily lives, it is important to understand why and when people might distrust these 
agents. While prior research has studied how a person perceives the intentions of another person 
to shape his or her distrust in the other person, very little is known about how a person perceives 
the intentions of an AI agent. 
In this research, we leverage the metaphor of a human offspring to better model the way users 
perceive the intentions of AI agents and how this shapes users’ distrust toward AI agents. In doing 
so, we draw on perspectives in cognitive psychology, genetics, and management to define the 
concepts of AI inheritability (i.e., the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to inherit its values 
from its creator), AI trainability (i.e., the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to be able to 
learn how to behave in the manner desired by its user), and AI freewill (i.e., the extent to which an 
AI agent is perceived to be able to make autonomous choices based on its self-determined 
objectives and values). 
We conduct a randomized experiment and show that users form their distrust in AI agents based 
on factors such as their distrust in the creator of the agent, AI inheritability, AI trainability, and 
AI freewill. We also find that the effect of the user’s distrust in the creator of the agent can be 
mitigated by making changes in the other three factors. Our results also confirm that users’ 
distrust in an AI agent influences the delegation of critical tasks more than the delegation of 
noncritical tasks. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings. 
 
Keywords: Artificially Intelligent Agents, Distrust Transference, Malevolence, Freewill, AI 





The exponential advancement of machine learning in the past decade has enabled ordinary 
technology users to interact with artificially intelligent (AI) agents regularly (AI Index 2019). 
Industry reports have projected an AI market size of $8.3 trillion in the US, $2.1 trillion in Japan, 
and $1.1 trillion in Germany by 2035 (Accenture 2017). It is projected that companies will increase 
their investments in AI up to three-fold by 2020 (Forrester Research 2017). However, many 
experts are concerned that users might not be willing to delegate important tasks to AI agents. In 
fact, a recent survey in the United States indicates that 76% of people would not apply for a job 
that uses AI to select applicants and 59% would not use an AI agent caregiver (Pew Research 
Center 2017). 
The layperson view of AI agents often involves a malevolent agent striving to take over humanity 
(Berlatsky 2018). Movies and TV shows (e.g., Westworld, Terminator, Ex Machina, 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, etc.), as important contributors to people’s perception of AI agents (Broadbent et 
al. 2010), exacerbated distrust in AI agents by illustrating that such agents could attain sentience 
and murder humans. While people’s perception might not necessarily be based on concrete facts 
(e.g., some argued that AI agents would not be smart enough to threaten humans in the foreseeable 
future (Smith 2018)), many scholars claimed that fear of AI agents exists (Szollosy 2017). Some 
people believe that the creators of AI agents might use them to harm others in different ways (e.g., 
to replace humans with AI agents in various social roles). For instance, Elon Musk, the co-founder 
of OpenAI, believes that “if one company or small group of people manages to develop god-like 
super-intelligence, they could take over the world” (Nolan 2018). 
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Situations in which people might perceive AI agents as malevolent go beyond futuristic agents. 
For instance, when a user asks a conversational AI agent, such as Amazon Alexa or Apple Siri, to 
suggest the best restaurant in the area, the agent can give recommendations based on the best 
interests of its user or its creator. As previously shown in the context of recommendation agents 
(Komiak and Benbasat 2008; Wang et al. 2018), the possibility of such a divided loyalty of the 
agent might lead to increased distrust in AI agents. 
Users’ distrust in the context of AI agents is not limited to the discussed examples. The role of 
distrust in AI agents is likely to become more substantial with the growing presence of AI agents 
in different aspects of people’s daily lives. When users doubt the intentions of an AI agent but find 
themselves vulnerable to its actions, they might distrust the agent. Distrust is often regarded as a 
defensive mechanism to protect oneself against possible harmful actions of the other party 
(McKnight et al. 2004; Yang et al. 2015). 
Prior research on distrust has identified perceived intentions of the trustee (i.e., the entity to be 
trusted or distrusted) to be central in shaping distrusting beliefs (Dimoka 2010; McKnight and 
Chervany 2001) and consequently perceived usefulness (McKnight and Choudhury 2006) and 
price premiums paid for an IT product (Dimoka 2010). However, the extant literature has been 
silent on how people perceive AI’s intentions. Most of the existing research has focused on 
intention in either human-human interactions, in which the trustee is perceived to have volition 
(i.e., will), or human-technology interaction, in which the technology is regarded as a tool and 
assumed to “lack volition and moral agency” (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 5). However, some of the 
underlying assumptions of the extant literature break down in the context of AI agents, bringing 
into question its applicability in this context (Schuetz and Venkatesh 2020). 
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First, distrust could be formed based on the users’ perception of not only an agent itself but also 
the entity who is responsible for the observed behavior of the agent. Neuroscientists have shown 
that the brain actively strives to find the underlying reasons why a behavior occurs (Clark 2013). 
Individuals attribute a behavioral outcome to the moral agent (Feltz and Cova 2014), i.e., the main 
driver of the action, to enhance their predictions of the agent’s future behavior (Clark 2013). While 
AI agents might display a behavior, users do not necessarily attribute the behavior to the agent 
itself. Therefore, the expectation about negative behavior, i.e., distrust, can be based on the driver 
of the behavior not only the medium that delivers it. For instance, if a security hole in Amazon 
Alexa’s cloud leads to a data breach and customers’ personal information is compromised, users 
will probably feel betrayed by Amazon, not only Alexa. 
Second, an explicit assumption of trust in technological artifacts in the IS literature is that 
“technology lacks volition and moral agency” (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 5). This assumption 
implicitly means that, in user-artifact interaction, the user is the only entity with volition. When 
the object upon which the user is dependent is a tool-like artifact controlled by the user (e.g., 
Microsoft Excel), the intention of the artifact essentially reduces down to the intention of the user 
who is using it. However, when the artifact can inherit intentions of other agents, such as its creator, 
there is a discernible “will” in the artifact’s behavior that potentially helps shape users’ distrust in 
the artifact. 
Third, users might not view an artifact completely independent of its creator. Prior research 
indicated that in many conditions a person might perceive a group of entities as a single entity with 
homogenous characteristics (i.e., entitativity) or transfer her or his trust from a known entity to an 
unknown entity associated with it (i.e., trust transference) (Stewart 2003, 2006; Wingreen et al. 
2019). 
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Finally, a dichotomous approach to volition, based on which an entity either has complete volition 
or has no volition, ignores the possibility of a spectrum between pure objects and pure autonomous 
beings (humans). In the context of AI agents, the artifacts move from being mere objects to become 
independent creatures, but they are neither traditional objects nor humans. Unlike traditional 
artifacts, AI artifacts demonstrate characteristics that have traditionally been reserved for humans 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). The advancement of machine learning has enabled the 
development of trainable, autonomous agents. Such agents could potentially learn from their 
interactions with their surroundings and act in ways that were not directly designed by their 
creators or meant by their users. 
We believe that it is plausible that users base their distrust on the properties of the entity that is 
driving the behavior of AI agents. In other words, we postulate that distrust is related to the moral 
agent responsible for the artifact’s behavior (Feltz and Cova 2014). A parsimonious set of 
responsible agents in the context of human-AI interaction includes the creator (i.e., the entity that 
has created the AI agent), the creature (i.e., the AI agent), and the user (i.e., the person who 
interacts with the AI agent). 
Accordingly, we argue that three main perceptions about AI characteristics sculpt user’s perception 
of the moral agent that dictates the AI agent’s perceived harmful behavior: (1) AI inheritability, 
which we define as the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to inherit its values from its 
creator, (2) AI trainability, which we define as the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to be 
able to learn how to behave in the manner desired by its user, and (3) AI freewill, which we define 
as the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to be able to make autonomous choices based on 
its self-determined objectives and values. We speculate that AI inheritability indicates how much 
of the AI’s perceived malevolence is shaped based on its creator’s perceived malevolence, AI 
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trainability influences distrust by creating a better value congruence between the AI agent and the 
user, and AI freewill indicates that users perceive the AI agent to behave based on its own choices. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous research has studied the relationship between a user’s 
distrust in the creator of an AI agent and his or her distrust in the agent. Moreover, little is known 
about the plausible role of AI characteristics in mitigating the effect of distrust in creator on distrust 
in AI agent. Motivated by the discussed practical importance of the problem of distrust in the 
context of AI agents and the shortcomings of the extant literature in addressing such a problem, 
we formulate the following research questions: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between distrust in the creator of an AI agent and distrust in 
the AI agent? 
RQ2: What are the moderating effects of perceived AI characteristics on this relationship? 
We conducted a 2×2×2×2 between-subject randomized experiment to answer our research 
questions and assess the soundness of our conjectures. We recruited 489 participants from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. We employed a scenario-based design in which we randomly assigned 
participants to each of the 16 treatment conditions. We investigated participants’ distrust in a 
fictitious AI agent that can be used to fulfill many daily business tasks. 
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH MODEL 
The overarching idea of this paper is that distrust in an AI artifact could be an extension of distrust 
in its creator, but the relationship between distrust in creator and distrust in AI agent is conditional 
on the user’s perception of AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill. Using the analogy of 
a human offspring, we theorize that the behavior of an AI agent can be inherited from its parent 
(creator), learned through upbringing (training), and based on its own freewill. In the case of a 
104 
human child, people might believe that the child’s behavior is genetically inherited from the 
parents, can be changed through training in family, school, and society, and is based on the child’s 
own choices in life (freewill). 
Below, we discuss and leverage relevant literature to develop our hypotheses. 
Distrust 
In line with prior research, we define distrust as confident negative expectations regarding 
another's conduct1 (Komiak and Benbasat 2008; Lewicki et al. 1998; Ou and Sia 2010; Yang et al. 
2015). The negative expectations are related to fear, worry, concern, cynicism, paranoid feelings, 
suspicion, doubt, wariness, panic, anger, and attribution of sinister intentions (Deutsch 1958; 
Kramer 1994; Lewicki et al. 1998; McKnight et al. 2004; McKnight and Chervany 2001; Moody 
et al. 2014). Distrust reflects “the emotion-charged human survival instinct” (McKnight and 
Chervany 2001, p. 884). 
The formation of distrust is closely related to value incongruence between the involved parties. 
While unmet expectations due to incompetency can lead to violations of trust, perceptions about 
value incongruency can lead to distrust (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000; Sitkin and Roth 1993). In 
an interaction between a person and an agent with incongruent values, the person might be fearful 
of the actions of the agent because the agent operates based on values that are not in the person’s 
best interest (Hsiao 2003). As distrust is a mechanism to protect oneself from the harmful conduct 
 
1 While the focus of this paper is not on the similarities and difference between trust and distrust, we recognize that trust and 
distrust can co-exist (Dimoka 2010; Lewicki et al. 1998; Lyons et al. 2011; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000). As relationships are 
multifaceted and shaped based on many different negative and positive experiences and interactions, people can simultaneously 
trust and distrust the same agent (e.g., artifact, person, company, etc.) (Lewicki et al. 1998). Also, we acknowledge that a person 
cannot simultaneously trust and distrust an agent in a specific task (McKnight and Chervany 2001; Schoorman et al. 2007). For 
instance, a person would not trust Amazon Alexa in finding the best restaurant in a given area and distrust it in the exact same task. 
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of the other party (Yang et al. 2015), value incongruency plays an important role in shaping 
distrust. 
There is little consensus in the literature on the components of distrust (Dimoka 2010; Lyons et al. 
2011). Some prior research used a subset of negated trust components (for a list of components of 
trustworthiness see McKnight et al. (2002), p. 338). For instance, McKnight and Choudhury 
(2001) used distrusting beliefs in competence, benevolence, integrity, and predictability, Dimoka 
(2010) used discredibility and malevolence, and Moody et al. (2014) included malevolence and 
incompetence in their conceptualization of distrust. 
In this research, drawing from cognitive psychology research (Fiske et al. 2007), we use two 
components for distrust: malevolence and competence. First, we define malevolence as the 
perceived intention of the trustee to cause harm. This definition embraces the widely recognized 
negative valence of distrust (Dimoka 2010; Lyons et al. 2011; McKnight and Chervany 2001; 
Yang et al. 2015). Most prior definitions of malevolence failed to capture the intense negativity 
associated with it. For instance, Dimoka’s (2010) definition only captures concerns about the 
trustee’s commitment to one’s welfare and McKnight and Chervany’s (2001) definition only 
includes the trustee’s lack of care and motivation to act in one’s interest. Second, we define 
competence as the perceived ability of the trustee to act on its intentions. While some prior studies 
regarded incompetency as a component of distrust (Dimoka 2010; Moody et al. 2014), 
incompetency in fulfilling a task can only lead to violation of trust (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000). 
We argue that only if incompetency is perceived as an intentional act to cause harm, will the trustor 
distrust the other party. Otherwise, the trustor would merely decrease his or her trust. Therefore, 
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given the intentions of an agent (good or ill), the competency - not incompetency - of the agent 
determines “how much” good or harm it can cause if a person relies on it (Fiske et al. 2007).2 
(Dis)trust Transference 
Trust transference is the influence of a trustor’s trust in an entity on her or his trust in another 
entity in the same or a different context (Wang et al. 2013; Wingreen et al. 2019). For instance, 
trust transfers between companies and their salespeople (Belanche et al. 2014).  Transference of 
trust depends on the trustor’s perceived association between the two entities or their contexts. 
The strength of trust transference among entities depends on perceived entitativity of them 
(Stewart 2003), which itself depends on the perceived strength of entities’ relationship (Dasgupta 
et al. 1999; Mullen 1991; Stewart 2003). Entitativity refers to the degree to which a collection of 
entities is perceived to form a cohesive unit (Campbell 1958; Stewart 2003). Entitativity of two 
entities could vary along a continuum from a single cohesive unit to two completely independent 
entities. Perceived similarity (i.e., whether entities are internally related or share innate features) 
and tie among entities (i.e., whether entities have external relationships or share external cues), 
can influence their perceived entitativity (Stewart 2003). 
Transference of perceptions about one entity to another entity is not limited to perceptions about 
trust. A person’s initial impression of one member of a group becomes the basis of her or his 
perception of other members (Crawford et al. 2002; McConnell et al. 1997) because one entity is 
representative of the others (Belanche et al. 2014). As such, we argue that distrust in one member 
of a group becomes the basis of distrust in unknown members. We define distrust transference as 
 
2 Since judgment of competency and incompetency can be itself value-based and subjective, in studies that do not properly define 
competency, the construct might capture value-based judgments of the trustor about the trustee. 
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the influence of a trustor’s distrust in an entity on her or his distrust in another entity in the same 
or a different context. 
We argue that distrust transference can take place in a triad that includes a trustor (e.g., a user), a 
trustee (e.g., an AI agent), and a third party who is related to the trustor and trustee (e.g., the creator 
of the AI agent) (for trust transference in a triad see Wang et al. (2013)). Based on cognitive 
balance theory, when a person interacts with a dyad (creating a triad), her or his perception of the 
two entities depends on the relationship between the two entities in the dyad (Stewart 2006). If the 
relationship is perceived to be positive, the person’s perceptions of the two entities should be either 
both positive or both negative in order to create a cognitive balance. If the relationship is perceived 
to be negative, the person’s perceptions of the two entities should be in opposite directions in order 
to create a cognitive balance. 
In the context of AI agents, we argue that the relationship between an agent and its creator is 
normally perceived to be positive. A creature could be perceived as an “agent” of its creator 
because the creator would create the AI agent to advance the creator’s intentions. As such, a user 
is likely to perceive a creator and its AI agent as a dyad with high entitativity. As members of a 
dyad with high entitativity are perceived to be homogenous in various aspects, a malevolent creator 
is likely to create a malevolent AI agent. If a user distrusts the creator of an AI agent, he or she is 
more likely to think that the creator has created the AI agent to harm her or him. Therefore, we 
contend that users transfer their distrust from a creator to its creature (i.e., AI agent). We 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Distrust in creator increases distrust in AI agent. 
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AI Inheritability 
Previous research in biology and developmental psychology fields has studied inheritability in 
humans and animals. These fields define inheritability as the probability that an offspring will 
inherit some specific features from its parent (Anderson and Lustbader 1975; Danchin et al. 2011; 
Hirschfeld 1995; Uslaner 2008). In the context of AI, we define inheritability as the extent to which 
an AI agent is perceived to inherit its values from its creator. 
We argue that the mere fact that the design of an AI agent allows its creator to embed its own 
values in the agent increases distrust in the agent. This is because even if the user does not initially 
distrust the creator, the fact that the AI agent has been built with the capability to directly inherit 
its values from an agent other than its user raises questions about possible future malicious 
behaviors. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: AI inheritability increases distrust in AI agent. 
As we discussed, the main reason for distrust transference from a creator to an AI agent is that 
users normally perceive a strong link between the two entities. Consequently, we argue that the 
strength of distrust transference should depend on the strength of the link that users perceive 
between the creator and the AI agent. 
The development process of an AI agent provides multiple opportunities for the creator to embed 
their values in the artifact. The creator can explicitly make the agent act in certain ways. For 
instance, Apple might explicitly make Siri work only with other Apple apps to add reminders in 
the calendar, or Amazon might make Alexa buy products only through Amazon.com. In both 
examples, users might perceive a stronger association between the creator and the AI agent. 
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AI creators can also embed their values in the learning process of an AI agent. As AI is based on 
machine learning, design choices imposed in the learning algorithms can heavily bias the behavior 
of the agent (Yapo and Weiss 2018). For instance, in the case of deep learning, choices of the 
training sample, learning rate, loss function, etc. can influence what the AI learns and how it 
behaves (for a more comprehensive discussion of deep learning methods see Goodfellow et al. 
2016). 
Moreover, while many AI agents are offered as mobile apps or software on home assistant devices, 
many of them are hosted on their creators’ servers (e.g., Amazon Alexa is hosted on Amazon 
servers) (Saffarizadeh et al. 2017). Just as the physical proximity of two entities can affect the 
extent to which people perceive them to be a part of the same entity (Belanche et al. 2014), we 
theorize that when an AI agent operates in close connection with its creator’s servers users will be 
more likely to perceive that the agent inherits its values from its creator. 
Therefore, we believe that the extent to which AI is perceived to operate based on the values 
inherited from its creator (i.e., AI inheritability) can strengthen the relationship between distrusting 
perceptions about the creator and distrusting perceptions about the creature. AI inheritability 
provides evidence based on which users can assess the association between an AI agent and its 
creator. If users have concerns that a creator intends to harm them, they are likely to have concerns 
that an artifact that is created by the malevolent creator might harm them, but the amount that the 
creator can harm the users through the AI agent depends on the agent’s AI inheritability. For 
instance, if a creator offers an AI agent whose AI is powered by open-source trained machine 
learning models and the AI is completely hosted on user’s devices with no interaction with the 
creator’s servers, users might perceive little or no association between the intentions of the creator 
and the intentions of the AI agent. Some companies such as Apple have tried to introduce machine 
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learning models that operate completely on user’s devices to address some users’ concerns about 
the misuse of their personal information (Apple 2019). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3: The positive effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI agent is stronger for an AI 
agent with high AI inheritability than an AI agent with low AI inheritability. 
AI Trainability 
Extant literature in human resource management and psychology has defined trainability for 
humans as the ability to learn (Gill 1982) or update existing skills (Hashim and Wok 2014), and 
the time required to complete training (Gordon et al. 1986). In the context of AI, we define 
trainability as the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to be able to learn how to behave in the 
manner desired by its user. 
AI agents could be trainable even after they are adopted by users. Some AI agents can learn from 
their users by collecting training data through the interaction and going through an offline 
retraining process to update their behavior (Venkatesan and Er 2016). Other agents can learn more 
directly by providing the means for the users to teach them their preferences. For instance, the 
agents that learn based on deep reinforcement learning algorithms can learn based on the rewards 
and punishments users give them (Mnih et al. 2015). Users can provide positive feedback for some 
behavior and negative feedback for others in order to teach the AI agent to behave in the desired 
way. 
Such teaching mechanisms enable users to assert hard and soft controls on the behavior of AI 
agents. Hard control mechanisms include behavior control (i.e., controlling of the transformation 
process of work) and outcome control (i.e., tying incentives to the outcome of a process) (Ouchi 
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1979; Snell 1992). Soft control mechanisms influence the agent’s behavior by creating shared 
goals, values, and norms (Das and Teng 1998). 
The ability to train an AI agent enables users to control the agent’s behavior in the short-run and 
embed their own values into the agent in the long-run. An agent that works based on the user’s 
values has more value congruency with the user. Therefore, from a user’s perspective, it is less 
likely for a trainable AI agent to cause harm to the user. 
Also, users might view a trainable AI less negatively as they have the opportunity to understand 
and influence its behavior through a bidirectional interaction similar to an interpersonal 
relationship. While users might be fearful of an unknown agent, they can develop a better 
understanding of the agent when they can train it. 
We posit that AI trainability, i.e., the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to be able to learn 
how to behave in the manner desired by its user, can lead to a perceived potential for value 
congruency between the user and AI agent, which reduces distrust in the AI agent. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
H4: AI trainability decreases distrust in AI agent. 
When the user can train the AI agent, the behavior of the AI agent is more likely to be in line with 
the user’s interests. In other words, the user might view the AI agent as an extension of herself or 
himself (i.e., as an agent that does things on behalf of its user). In such a case, the user perceives a 
positive association with the AI agent. Based on cognitive balance theory, the relationships of two 
positively associated members (the user and the AI agent) with a third member (the creator) must 
be either both positive or both negative. Otherwise, there will be a cognitive imbalance in the 
user’s mind. More specifically, if the user distrusts the creator, i.e., if the user has a negative 
112 
relationship with the creator, then he or she must believe that the relationship between the AI agent 
and its creator is negative as well. Accordingly, the user is less likely to perceive that the behavior 
of the AI agent is driven by its creator. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H5: The positive effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI agent is weaker for an AI 
agent with high AI trainability than an AI agent with low AI trainability. 
AI Freewill 
Most people believe that humans have freewill or the capacity to have chosen otherwise (Ebert 
and Wegner 2011; Feldman et al. 2016; Monroe et al. 2014; Sarkissian et al. 2010). The question 
of whether freewill exists or it is just an illusion has been the focus of many philosophical studies 
(Bode et al. 2014).3 The overwhelming belief in freewill, regardless of its soundness, “suggests 
that the mind operates in a way that encourages the inference that one’s actions are freely chosen” 
(Ebert and Wegner 2011, p. 966). Researchers have found that the freewill belief is fundamental 
to our self-concept as human beings (Bode et al. 2014) and to our perception of the humanness of 
others (Gray et al. 2007). 
Some studies have suggested that people psychologically view freewill in terms of the ability to 
make a choice in line with one’s own motives or desires and free of constraints (Monroe et al. 
2014; Monroe and Malle 2010). In line with this view, we define AI freewill as the extent to which 
 
3 To better understand the meaning of freewill, we can logically examine two scenarios. First, if we assume that every effect must 
have a cause, we can find the root causes of any phenomenon by following back a chain of causes and effects. Therefore, any action 
is an effect of its preceding causes and thus fully determined (Feltz and Cova 2014; Shepherd 2012). Second, if we assume that 
there is always some part of reality that cannot be explained by causes, then any phenomenon is at least partially indeterministic. 
In other words, for example, if we had two completely identical universes - with the exact same past and present - where a person 
wanted to make a purchase decision, it would be possible for her to make different decisions in the two universes as she “willed to 
do so” (Bode et al. 2014). Some scholars argue that variation in choice under the exact same external and internal circumstances is 
not conceptually different from a random choice (Searle 2001). 
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an AI agent is perceived to be able to make autonomous choices based on its self-determined 
objectives and values. 
Prior research showed that regardless of their views of freewill, people perceive probabilistic 
choice-making as freewill. In fact, when the evidence support indeterminacy in one’s behavior, 
people tend to perceive the behavior as freely chosen (Ebert and Wegner 2011). However, the 
indeterminacy could stem from such seemingly irrelevant things as pure randomness. Empirical 
evidence in the context of computerized animated agents suggests that people perceive the agents 
to have freewill when the agents follow a random sequence of actions instead of a predetermined 
one (Ebert and Wegner 2011). 
Complex deterministic behaviors could also be perceived as indeterministic (Lorenz 1972) because 
it is hard for the observer to decipher the complicated underlying drivers of the behavior. 
Therefore, when the action makes sense in the context, it is “possible for wholly determined actions 
to appear freely chosen” (Ebert and Wegner 2011, p. 970). 
These findings suggest that people do often ascribe freewill to non-human agents. In fact, prior 
research on anthropomorphism and mind perception provides similar evidence suggesting that 
there is variance in people’s perception of AI agents’ freewill (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010; 
Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010) and that people have generalized as well as agent-specific 
perceptions of freewill (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010). 
An AI agent with freewill can behave based on a set of values or rules that might be unfamiliar or 
unknown to the users. This unfamiliarity can lead to a sense of anxiety and uncertainty. According 
to prior research, uncertainty can lead to fear and worry (Carleton et al. 2012). 
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Moreover, neuroscientists have found that human brain (alongside with the brains of many other 
animals) more readily associate fearful events to the outgroup members compared to ingroup 
members (Olsson et al. 2005). In line with this finding, we argue that since a user of an AI agent 
is more likely to perceive an AI agent as a member of a group of non-humans than a member of a 
group of humans, he or she is more likely to readily associate an AI agent to fearful events. 
Additionally, people often have a fear and anxiety of becoming too rational, cold, mechanical, 
soulless, and emotionless due to the pressures of daily life. Based on Freud’s notion of  
psychological projection, people often fantasize different things to defend themselves against 
anxiety or things that they know unconsciously but do not want to experience consciously 
(Szollosy 2017). In doing so, they defensively project the bad parts of themselves onto others. For 
instance, in many cases of racism and nationalism, people might say “it was not we who are violent, 
it was them” (Szollosy 2017, p. 436). Some scholars believe that fear of AI agents is also a form 
of projection, in which people project their fears onto the agents and create monsters out of them 
(Szollosy 2017). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H6: AI freewill increases distrust in AI agent. 
People typically believe that an agent with freewill is a moral agent and therefore responsible for 
its own actions (Feltz and Cova 2014; Floridi and Sanders 2004; Gray et al. 2012). As such, the 
intentions of a free willing AI agent are the driver of its behavior. Thus, we postulate that when 
users perceive high freewill in an AI agent, they see the agent as an independent entity – not a part 
of a creator-creature dyad with high entitativity. In this case, the AI agent can possess values and 
intentions that are independent of those of its creator. Therefore, negative perceptions about the 
intentions of the creator are less likely to be transferred to the agent. We hypothesize that: 
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H7: The positive effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI agent is weaker for an AI 
agent with high freewill than an AI agent with low freewill. 
Figure 1 shows our research model. The paths in the model can be mapped to our hypotheses. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
METHODOLOGY 
Experiment 
We conducted a randomized experiment to test our hypotheses. The experiment involved a 2 
(distrust in creator: low vs. high) × 2 (AI inheritability: low vs. high) × 2 (AI trainability: low vs. 
high) × 2 (AI freewill: low vs. high) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the sixteen experimental conditions. 
We manipulated distrust in creator, AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill 
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model, we delivered the manipulation of distrust in creator before the manipulations of AI 
inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill. 
  
Figure 2. Vignette for Manipulating Distrust in Creator 
Distrust in creator was manipulated by asking the participants to read a description that induces 
either low distrust or high distrust. Since distrust is related to fear, worry, concern, cynicism, 
paranoid feelings, suspicion, doubt, wariness, panic, anger, and attribution of sinister intentions 
(Deutsch 1958; Kramer 1994; Lewicki et al. 1998; McKnight et al. 2004; McKnight and Chervany 
2001; Moody et al. 2014), in each condition, we included sentences that could increase or decrease 
such feelings. For instance, in the high distrust condition, the creator was described as a company 
that has harmed its customers in the past. Figure 2 shows the two vignettes used to manipulate 
distrust in creator. 
AI inheritability was manipulated by describing the AI agent as an agent whose design allows (for 
high AI inheritability treatment) or does not allow (for low AI inheritability treatment) its creator 
to embed its own values in the agent. AI trainability was manipulated by telling the participants 
that the agent’s design allows (for high AI trainability treatment) or does not allow (for low AI 
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trainability treatment) users to retrain the agent to behave in the way they like. Finally, AI freewill 
was manipulated by stating that the AI agent’s algorithms allow (for high AI freewill treatment) 
or do not allow (for low AI freewill treatment) the agent to make autonomous choices based on its 
self-determined objectives. Figure 3 provides a summary of these three manipulations. 
 
Construct Level Manipulation Content 
AI Inheritability Low Amanda’s design does not allow NextGen to embed its 
own values in the agent. 
High Amanda’s design allows NextGen to embed its own values 
in the agent. 
AI Freewill Low Due to its algorithms, Amanda is not capable of making 
autonomous choices based on its self-determined 
objectives. 
High Due to its algorithms, Amanda is capable of making 
completely autonomous choices based on its self-
determined objectives. 
AI Trainability Low Amanda’s design does not allow users to retrain the agent 
to behave in the way they like. 
High Amanda’s design allows users to completely retrain the 
agent to behave in the way they like. 








We conducted four pilot studies with a total of 512 participants to develop the experimental 
instruments for our study. In the pilot studies, we focused on the length, content, and delivery of 
the vignettes used to manipulate distrust in creator, inheritability, trainability, and freewill. For 
instance, based on the results of pilot 1, we decided to use an advanced text-to-speech engine to 
read the content of the vignettes to the participants to intensify the manipulation. In doing so, we 
developed a JavaScript text-to-speech tool to leverage the Amazon Polly text-to-speech engine to 
read the content to the participants, given the experimental condition. We employed Polly’s neural 
engine, which can generate extremely human-like voices and mimic a human newscaster style of 
content delivery (when the speaking style is set to newscaster in the engine). 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 600 participants to guarantee about 30 participants per experiment 
condition, with an assumption that about 20% of the participants would fail the attention check 
questions.4 We recruited the participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. To ensure high-quality 
responses, we limited the participants to those with either more than 99% acceptance rate or master 
status and more than 97% acceptance rate, and MTurk experience of more than 500 HITs (Human 
Intelligence Tasks, which are the tasks posted on MTurk marketplace). 
 
4 We have four factors, each with two levels. Therefore, we need four degrees of freedom to calculate their main effects (4 × (2-
1)). We also have three two-way interactions. Therefore, we need three degrees of freedom to calculate the interaction effects (3 × 
(2-1) × (2-1)). We estimated the number participants needed for our study using G*Power 3.1.9.2. For a medium effect size 
(f=0.25), α = 0.05, power = 0.80, numerator df = 7, and number of groups = 16, we need 237 participants. However, to capture all 
the possible interactions in the model, we need a degree of freedom of 15 (4 main effects, 6 two-way interactions, 4 three-way 
interactions, 1 four-way interaction, with all factors having two levels). Using the same criteria as before but only with numerator 
df = 15, we estimated that we need 314 participants. Since, the medium effect size is not guaranteed, we chose to recruit 30 









where 𝑛𝑗  denotes the number of participants, 𝜇𝑗  the population mean of group j, ?̅? = (∑ 𝑛𝑗 . 𝜇𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑁⁄  the weighted mean of the k 
population means, N the total sample size, and 𝜎 the population standard deviation in each group. 
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Recent studies found that MTurk samples are similar to those derived from national samples, 
supporting the generalizability of the results from MTurkers (Coppock 2019). They also observed 
that a large majority of U.S. MTurkers are new to the platform every year and therefore are less 
likely to be too familiar with manipulations and measures (Robinson et al. 2019). Moreover, they 
discovered that adding attention-check questions in MTurk surveys can make the quality of the 
data comparable to that of student subjects (Aruguete et al. 2019) while providing a much more 
diverse sample (Chandler et al. 2019). 
From 600 hundred recruited participants, 489 passed the attention check questions (206 female, 
281 male, and 2 other, with an average age of 38.8, ranging from 20 to 78, the median education 
of 4-year college degree, and the median use of digital assistants of at least once a week). 
Participants, on average, spent 6.7 minutes (ranging from 3.2 to 23.3 minutes) to finish the study, 
and all participants received $1.00 compensation. 
Procedure 
We asked the participants to read a description of NextGen, which is a fictitious company that 
creates conversational assistants. Next, we asked them to fill out a survey about the company 
(distrust in creator). In the next section, we asked them to read a description of Amanda, which is 
a conversational assistant designed by NextGen. Then we asked the participants to fill out a survey 
about the assistant. We concluded the survey by asking demographic questions and debriefed the 




To measure distrust in AI agent, we adopted existing measures of distrust with minimal changes 
that reflect the context of our study. More specifically, using a 7-point Likert scale, we measured 
eight items of distrust used by Wang et al. (2018) in the context of recommendation systems. In 
line with Wang et al. (2018), we constructed distrust in AI agent as the average of the measured 
items. 
To assess the manipulation of distrust in creator, we used similar items to those used for distrust 
in AI. The manipulation check questions for distrust in creator were placed after the description of 
the creator but before the description of the AI agent. We checked the manipulation of AI freewill 
using items from Ebert and Wegner (2011) with minimal changes that reflect the context of our 
study. Since there was no existing measures of AI inheritability and AI trainability in the literature, 
for each construct, we created three new measurement items that reflect the definition of the 
construct. 
We also measured age, gender, education, experience using AI agents (use frequency), and 
disposition to distrust as control variables. We used a 7-point Likert scale to measure six items of 
disposition to distrust proposed by McKnight et al. (2004) (see Appendix A). 
Table 1 includes a summary of the definition of constructs, measurement items, and manipulation 





Table 1. Constructs 
Construct Definition Items Informing 
Sources 
Distrust in AI Confident negative 
expectations 
regarding AI agent’s 
conduct  
1. Amanda would exploit users’ vulnerability 
given the chance. 
2. Amanda would engage in harmful behavior to 
users to pursue its own interest. 
3. Amanda would operate in an irresponsible 
manner. 
4. Amanda would interact with users in a 
deceptive way. 
5. Amanda is capable of engaging in harmful 
behavior toward users. 
6. Amanda has the ability to maliciously 
manipulate users. 
7. Amanda is capable of deceiving users. 
8. I suspect Amanda is interested in just its own 
well-being, not mine. 
Komiak et al. 2008; 
Lewicki et al. 1998; 
Ou and Sia 2010; 
Yang et al. 2015; 







This construct was manipulated. 
Manipulation check questions: 
1. NextGen would exploit users’ vulnerability 
given the chance. 
2. NextGen would engage in harmful behavior 
to users to pursue its own interest. 
3. NextGen would operate in an irresponsible 
manner. 
4. NextGen would interact with users in a 
deceptive way. 
5. NextGen is capable of engaging in harmful 
behavior toward users. 
6. NextGen has the ability to maliciously 
manipulate users. 
7. NextGen is capable of deceiving users. 
8. I suspect NextGen is interested in just its own 
well-being, not mine. 
Komiak et al. 2008; 
Lewicki et al. 1998; 
Ou and Sia 2010; 
Yang et al. 2015; 
Wang et al. 2018 
AI Inheritability 
 
The extent to which 
an AI agent is 
perceived to inherit 
its values from its 
creator 
This construct was manipulated. 
Manipulation check questions: 
1. NextGen can embed its values into Amanda. 
2. Amanda inherits its values from NextGen. 





The extent to which 
an AI agent is 
perceived to be able 
to learn how to 
behave in the 
manner desired by 
its user 
This construct was manipulated. 
Manipulation check questions: 
1. Users can train Amanda. 
2. Amanda is trainable by users. 
3. A user can train Amanda to behave the way 
he or she wants. 
- 
AI Freewill The extent to which 
an AI agent is 
perceived to be able 
to make autonomous 




This construct was manipulated. 
Manipulation check questions: 
1. Amanda can freely choose how to behave. 
2. For any action Amanda performs, it could 
have acted differently if it wanted to. 
3. Amanda can consciously decide how to act. 
4. Amanda seems to have free will. 
5. Amanda would be responsible if its behavior 
harmed somebody. 
Ebert and Wegner 
2011 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Manipulation Check 
We averaged the items for manipulation check questions to create composite scores for distrust in 
creator (𝛼 = 0.982, 8 items), inheritability (𝛼 = 0.960, 3 items), trainability (𝛼 = 0.990, 3 items), 
and freewill (𝛼 = 0.950, 5 items). To assess the effectiveness of our manipulations, we conducted 
an independent oneway ANOVA for each manipulation. Participants who were randomly assigned 
to low distrust in creator condition reported lower distrust in creator (𝑀 = 2.758, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.413) 
than those assigned to high distrust in creator condition (𝑀 = 6.275, 𝑆𝐷 = 0.838; 𝐹(1,487) =
1110.639, 𝑝 < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.695). Participants in low AI inheritability condition reported lower 
perceived AI inheritability (𝑀 = 2.785, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.784) than those in high AI inheritability condition 
(𝑀 = 5.981, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.141; 𝐹(1,487) = 554.000, 𝑝 < 0.01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.532). Similarly, participants 
in low AI trainability condition indicated lower perceived AI trainability (𝑀 = 2.037, 𝑆𝐷 =
1.545) than those in high AI trainability condition (𝑀 = 5.987, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.184; 𝐹(1,487) =
1009.032, 𝑝 < 0.01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.674). Finally, participants who received the low AI freewill 
treatment reported lower perceived AI freewill (𝑀 = 2.221, 𝑆𝐷 = 1.288) than those who received 




We computed composite scores for distrust in AI (𝛼 = 0.975; 8 items) and treated it as a 
continuous variable. We modeled all manipulated constructs as binary variables, with 0 
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representing low level and 1 representing high level of the construct. Table 2 presents the 
descriptive statistics. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N=489) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Age 38.847 11.614 20 78 
Gender 0.58 0.502 0 2 
Education 4.10 1.301 1 7 
Use frequency 2.70 1.151 1 4 
Disposition to Distrust 4.524 1.284 1 7 
Distrust in Creator 0.49 0.500 0 1 
AI Inheritability 0.49 0.500 0 1 
AI Trainability 0.51 0.500 0 1 
AI Freewill 0.48 0.500 0 1 
Distrust in AI 3.512 1.782 1 7 
a. Gender is coded as 0=female, 1=male and 2=other. 
b. Education is coded as 1=less than high school, 2=high school, 3=some college, 4=2-year college degree, 5=4-
year college degree, 6=master’s degree, 7=doctorate degree (including JD, MD). 
c. Use frequency is coded as 1=never, 2=at least once a month, 3=at least once a week, 4=at least once a day. 
d. Distrust in creator, inheritability, trainability, and freewill are manipulated. 
AI Inheritability AI Trainability AI Freewill  Distrust in Creator 
    Low High 
Low Low Low Distrust in AI 1.924 (1.069) 3.755 (1.701) 
Sample Size (N) 36 27 
High Distrust in AI 3.245 (1.453) 4.210 (1.625) 
Sample Size (N) 24 28 
High Low Distrust in AI 2.598 (1.421) 3.025 (1.546) 
Sample Size (N) 37 35 
High Distrust in AI 3.220 (1.642) 3.384 (1.506) 
Sample Size (N) 33 27 
High Low Low Distrust in AI 2.397 (1.208) 5.469 (1.337) 
Sample Size (N) 29 32 
High Distrust in AI 3.600 (1.530) 5.413 (1.680) 
Sample Size (N) 36 30 
High Low Distrust in AI 2.460 (1.349) 3.741 (1.762) 
Sample Size (N) 28 29 
High Distrust in AI 2.938 (1.215) 5.027 (1.274) 
Sample Size (N) 26 32 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard deviations 
We employed multiple regression to test our hypotheses. Since each participant was randomly 
assigned to an experimental condition, each predictor in our regression model is statistically 
independent of other observed and unobserved variables. Therefore, our design addresses 
endogeneity issues related to omitted variables. Moreover, because we measured distrust in AI 
after the manipulation process, we can safely assume that there is no endogeneity related to reverse 
causality. Thus, we used the plain ordinary least square (OLS) estimator to estimate the model. 
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While our design allows for a robust assessment of the interaction of all the predictors in the model, 
we only include the hypothesized interactions in our analysis. Equation 1 presents our empirical 
model. 
(1) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐴𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽3𝐴𝐼𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐼𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝐼𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝐼𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
Table 3 shows the results.5  Hierarchical regression was used to better understand the marginal 
effect sizes of different blocks of our predictors. In hypothesis 1, we predicted that distrust in 
creator increases distrust in AI. Model 3 provides support for this hypothesis (𝛽1 = 1.402; 𝑝 <
0.01). Moreover, based on model 2 distrust in creator can explain 15.6% of the variance in distrust 
in AI, beyond user’s disposition to distrust. This finding strongly supports the notion that the users 
transfer their distrust in creator to their distrust in AI. Hypothesis 2 predicted that perceived AI 
inheritability increases user’s distrust in AI. Model 3 provides support for our hypothesis (𝛽2 =
0.675; 𝑝 < 0.01). In hypothesis 3, we posited that the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI 
is stronger when the user perceives high AI inheritability than when he or she perceives low AI 
inheritability. Model 4 provides support for this hypothesis by showing a significant positive effect 
(𝛽5 = 1.242; 𝑝 < 0.01). Note that since the interacting terms are both binary, we did not need to 
evaluate them at different distances from their means to plot the simple slopes. We, however, did 
set other variables that were not involved in the interaction to their mean values (Figure 4). 
 
5 As a robustness check, we estimated the model using all 600 datapoints we collected in the experiment without removing the 
participants who failed the attention check questions. All results remained the same in terms of direction and significance.  
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Table 3. Results (N=489) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Constant) 1.825 (0.542) ** 1.460 (0.498) ** 1.100 (0.474) * 1.143 (0.469) * 
Age -0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006) 
Gender 0.132 (0.162) 0.136 (0.149) 0.088 (0.140) 0.072 (0.135) 
Education 0.065 (0.061) 0.036 (0.056) 0.017 (0.053) 0.011 (0.051) 
Use frequency -0.085 (0.069) -0.123 (0.063) -0.110 (0.060) -0.082 (0.058) 
Disposition to Distrust 0.273 (0.063) ** 0.201 (0.058) ** 0.202 (0.055) ** 0.218 (0.053) ** 
Distrust in Creator (β1) (H1)  1.424 (0.147) ** 1.402 (0.138) ** 1.468 (0.264) ** 
AI Inheritability (β2) (H2)   0.675 (0.139) ** 0.077 (0.187) 
AI Trainability (β3) (H4)   -0.465 (0.138) ** -0.012 (0.187) 
AI Freewill (β4) (H6)   0.687 (0.137) ** 0.912 (0.185) ** 
Distrust in Creator × AI Inheritability (β5) (H3)    1.242 (0.266) ** 
Distrust in Creator × AI Trainability (β6) (H5)    -0.949 (0.265) ** 
Distrust in Creator × AI Freewill (β7) (H7)    -0.438 (0.264) * 
R2 4.5% 20.1% 29.8% 35.1% 
∆R2  15.6% 9.7% 5.3% 
* coefficient is significant at 𝒑 < 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓 
** coefficient is significant at 𝒑 < 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 
a. One-tailed tests were performed to reflect the directional nature of the hypotheses 
b. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
 
 
AI trainability, AI freewill and control variables are evaluated at their mean values: 
AI Trainability=0.51, AI Freewill=0.48, age=38.847, gender, 0.58, education, 4.10, use frequency=2.7, 
disposition to distrust=4.524; Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 4. Moderating Effect of AI Inheritability on the Relationship between 
Distrust in Creator and Distrust in AI 
In hypothesis 4, we posited that the perceived trainability of AI decreases user’s distrust in AI. 
Model 3 provides support for this hypothesis by showing a significant negative effect (𝛽3 =
−0.465; 𝑝 < 0.01). 
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In hypothesis 5, we predicted that the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI is weaker when 
the user perceives a high AI trainability than when he or she perceives a low AI trainability. This 
hypothesis is supported based on the results of model 4 (𝛽6 = 0.949; 𝑝 < 0.01). We plotted the 
simple slopes to demonstrate this interaction (Figure 5). 
 
AI inheritability, AI freewill and control variables are evaluated at their mean values: 
AI Inheritability=0.49, AI Freewill=0.48, age=38.847, gender, 0.58, education, 4.10, use frequency=2.7, 
disposition to distrust=4.524; Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 5. Moderating Effect of AI Trainability on the Relationship between 
Distrust in Creator and Distrust in AI 
Hypothesis 6 stated that perceived AI freewill increases users’ distrust in AI. This hypothesis was 
also supported by the evidence from Model 3, which indicates a significant positive effect (𝛽4 =
0.687; 𝑝 < 0.01).  
In hypothesis 7, we posited that the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI is stronger when 
the user perceives a high AI freewill than when he or she perceives a low AI freewill. Model 4 
provides support for this hypothesis by indicating a significant positive effect (𝛽7 = 0.438; 𝑝 <
0.05). Figure 6 depicts this interaction. Please note that since the main effect of AI freewill on 
distrust in AI (the vertical shift) is much stronger than the interaction (change in the slope), visual 
comparison of the slopes is difficult. 
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AI inheritability, AI trainability and control variables are evaluated at their mean values: 
AI Inheritability=0.49, AI Trainability =0.51, age=38.847, gender, 0.58, education, 4.10, use 
frequency=2.7, disposition to distrust=4.524; Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 6. Moderating Effect of AI Freewill on the Relationship between Distrust 
in Creator and Distrust in AI 
The three AI characteristics, i.e., AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill, jointly 
explained an additional 9.7% of the variance in user’s distrust in AI through their main effect and 
an additional 5.3% of the variance through their interactions with distrust in creator (a total of 
15.0%). The total explained variance of the model is 35.1%. 
In order to establish a clearer link between our findings and the business issues that motivated our 
research (i.e., users do not delegate critical tasks to AI agents, due to their distrust in the agents), 
we asked a few follow-up questions from the participants. More specifically, we asked them how 
likely they were to delegate different tasks to Amanda, the fictitious digital assistant described in 
the experiment. We chose three critical tasks (i.e., “to monitor your health and alert when you 
should go to the doctor,” “to monitor security cameras in the house,” “to schedule an important 
business meeting with several co-workers”) and three noncritical tasks (i.e., “to buy groceries,” 
“to find people who might like to meet for a date,” “to pick out and buy a birthday present for an 
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acquaintance”). We averaged the scores of the questions for each group of tasks to create a single 
variable for each. Using the lavaan package in R, we simultaneously ran two simple regressions to 
find the effect of distrust in AI on delegation, and to compare the coefficients in the two 
regressions. We found that the absolute effect of distrust in AI on delegation is larger for critical 
tasks (𝜁1 = −0.492; 𝑝 < 0.001) than noncritical tasks (𝜁2 = −0.198; 𝑝 < 0.001), and that this 
difference is statistically significant (𝜁1 − 𝜁2 = −0.294; 𝑝 < 0.001). Furthermore, we observed 
that distrust in AI explains 23.6% of the variation in delegation of critical tasks and only 4.9% of 
the variation in delegation of noncritical tasks. This finding underscores the importance of distrust 
in understanding the broader issues of delegation of critical tasks to AI agents. 
DISCUSSION 
The objectives of this research were to first understand the relationship between distrust in creator 
and distrust in AI and second investigate the moderating effects of AI characteristics on this 
relationship. We used the metaphor of a human offspring and theorized that the AI characteristics 
that can shape the perceived behavior of an AI agent are AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI 
freewill. We drew on literature in cognitive psychology, organizational behavior, human-computer 
interaction, and information systems to develop a research model and leveraged the experimental 
methodology to test our hypotheses. Below we discuss the implications of our findings for research 
and practice, and the limitations of our study. 
Implications for Research 
This research has important implications for research on artificial intelligence and distrust.  
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Expanding our Understanding of Artificial Intelligence 
First, we contribute to the emerging body of literature on artificial intelligence by explaining how 
users perceive an AI agent. While extant literature on AI agents predominantly strives to 
understand an AI agent within the context of the user-AI dyad, we added the creator of the AI 
agent into the picture, thus expanding the usual dyadic approach to a triadic approach that includes 
the user, the AI agent, and the creator of the agent. We demonstrated that understanding this triad 
is central to our understanding of human-AI interaction. In doing so, we introduced three new 
constructs, namely AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill, to parsimoniously 
conceptualize how an AI agent is perceived with regards to the three major entities that might drive 
the agent’s behavior (i.e., its creator, its user, and itself). While inheritability existed in biology 
and developmental psychology (nature) (Anderson and Lustbader 1975; Danchin et al. 2011; 
Hirschfeld 1995; Uslaner 2008), trainability existed in human resource management (nurture) (Gill 
1982; Gordon et al. 1986; Hashim and Wok 2014), and freewill existed in cognitive psychology 
and philosophy (Bode et al. 2014; Ebert and Wegner 2011; Feldman et al. 2016; Monroe et al. 
2014; Sarkissian et al. 2010), we appropriated them to fit the context of AI agents. 
Second, we contribute to the artificial intelligence literature by providing an explanation of why 
perceived AI freewill leads to fear and paranoia, which are the underlying drivers of distrust. Our 
findings are in contrast with previous studies that suggest anthropomorphism, which includes 
freewill (for more information see Gray et al. 2007; and Waytz, Gray, et al. 2010), increases trust 
in an AI agent partially because it provides evidence of agency and thus competence of the agent 
(Waytz et al. 2014). Instead, our results show that perceived AI freewill increases distrust in AI 
agent. We theorized the reasons for this increase as follows: (1) perceived freewill makes the 
behavior of the agent be perceived as more uncertain, which increases anxiety, (2) perceived 
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freewill gives an identity to the agent, but this identity is more likely to be associated with a 
person’s outgroup (non-human agents) than ingroup (human agents), which heightens levels of 
fear, and (3) people are more likely to project their fears and anxiety on an AI agent with freewill, 
because they perceive such an agent to be rational and cold. This finding is important for research 
because it indicates that the relationship between perceived freewill and trust is more complex than 
currently portrayed in the literature. 
Third, we contribute to the artificial intelligence literature by theorizing and showing that users 
perceive a nontrivial level of volition in AI agents. Our empirical data showed a variance in 
perceived AI freewill, which suggests that not all people perceive AI agent as pure objects or pure 
humans. Accordingly, in line with some other studies in the IS field (Schuetz and Venkatesh 2020), 
we suggest that the use of theories developed for human agents and tool-like objects (e.g., a 
computer software) might need to be modified in the context of AI agents. 
Expanding our Understanding of Distrust 
First, we contribute to the trust literature by identifying the antecedents of distrust in the context 
of AI agents. We theorized and empirically tested the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI. 
We found that users rely on their assessment of the creator on an AI agent to shape their distrust 
in the AI. Moreover, we found that AI characteristics such as AI inheritability, AI trainability, and 
AI freewill influence distrust in AI. More specifically, we found that AI inheritability and AI 
freewill increase, and AI trainability decreases distrust in AI. 
Second, we contribute to the trust literature by identifying factors that mitigate the positive effect 
of distrust in creator on users’ distrust in AI agents. We observed that in the context of our study 
distrust in creator is the most prominent driver of distrust in AI. However, we found that the effect 
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of distrust in creator on distrust in AI agent is moderated by AI inheritability, AI trainability, and 
AI freewill. First, AI inheritability, which indicates the extent to which an AI agent is perceived to 
inherit its values from its creator, positively moderates the effect of distrust in creator on distrust 
in AI. In other words, when it comes to distrust, users are more likely to mentally separate the 
creator and the AI agent when the agent has low perceived inheritability. Second, AI trainability 
negatively moderates the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI. This finding indicates that 
an AI agent is perceived more positively when the AI agent is perceived to be capable of being 
trained to behave in line with user’s values. This necessarily means that if the user has a negative 
relationship with the creator (high distrust in the creator) but a positive relationship with the AI 
agent due to its trainability, he or she has no choice but to mentally detach the AI agent from its 
creator, i.e., to perceive a weak or negative relationship between the AI agent and its creator, in 
order to create a cognitive balance in the triad (i.e., creator, AI agent, and user). Finally, AI freewill 
negatively moderates the effect of distrust in creator on distrust in AI. This finding indicates that 
when the user perceives the AI to behave autonomously based on its self-determined values, he or 
she is less likely to shape his or her distrust in AI based on distrust in creator. 
Third, we contribute to trust literature by developing the concept of distrust transference. We draw 
from the literature on trust transference and entitativity to conceptualize distrust transference. We 
believe that distrust transference can help advance our understanding of users’ distrust in the 
context of AI agents, especially in the initial stages of users’ interaction with such agents. 
Implications for Practice 
Practitioners can benefit from the results of this research in several ways. For instance, based on 
our experiment, negative news about the creator of an AI agent can increase not only users’ distrust 
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in the creator but also users’ distrust in the AI agent. To mitigate this distrust transference, 
developers of AI agents can preemptively design or present the agent with low AI inheritability, 
high AI trainability, and high AI freewill. Such design choices can help AI agents be perceived as 
less dependent on their creators and consequently less susceptible to the adverse effects of negative 
news about their creators. Given the widespread negative news and users’ ever-increasing concerns 
about AI agents, our findings can help developers design AI agents in a way that increases the 
likelihood of their continued use. 
It is important to note that our research suggests that perceived AI freewill can lead to more distrust 
in AI agent. The distrust in AI agents might have its roots in the popular movies, TV shows, and 
novels that depict AI agents as malevolent (Broadbent et al. 2010; Szollosy 2017). Therefore, a 
possible way to mitigate the adverse effect of high perceived AI freewill is to design the agent in 
a way to avoid triggering any associations with malevolent AI agents that users know. In addition, 
this negative effect could be possibly reduced by adding anthropomorphic features such as name, 
gender, voice, and physical embodiment to the agent (Waytz et al. 2014). 
Limitations 
We conducted an experiment to test our research model. While experiments are often criticized 
for having low external validity, they are considered the gold standard for establishing internal 
validity. Since our primary aim was to test causal relationships, an experiment was an appropriate 
methodology for our research. 
A common criticism of experiments in the information systems discipline is that the participants 
often lack the requisite domain experience to reflect actual users of a system in realistic settings. 
In our study the median participant reported that they used digital assistants at least once a week, 
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which makes the participants acceptable representatives of the population of the users of common 
AI agents. Nevertheless, more research can build on our theoretical foundation and empirical 
evidence to confirm our findings in field settings. 
Finally, we adopted a scenario-based experiment design to manipulate our constructs. Hypothetical 
scenarios are often criticized as having low ecological validity. To address this shortcoming, we 
designed the stimuli in our experiment to be as realistic as possible.  Specifically, we constructed 
stimuli so as to mimic the way in which people are exposed to news articles to see how their 
distrust in AI agents changes due to the exposure. We also used the state-of-the-art neural text-to-
speech technology to add a human-like voice with a very realistic newscaster tone to the news 
articles. Notwithstanding, future research can add to our findings by having the participants 
interact with an actual AI agent. In such a study, researchers can still manipulate distrust in creator 
and AI inheritability through sharing descriptions of the creator and the AI agent. Future research, 
however, can employ such reinforcement learning methods as Q-learning to showcase and 
manipulate the trainability of the agent and leverage the concept of AI indeterminacy (see 
Saffarizadeh and Keil 2020) to manipulate AI freewill. 
CONCLUSION 
While many companies are increasing their investment in AI, reports show that users distrust AI 
agents. Many users perceive these agents as malevolent and thus are not willing to delegate crucial 
tasks to them. In this research, we explained why users’ distrust in creator transfers to their distrust 
in an AI agent and how factors such as AI inheritability, AI trainability, and AI freewill can 
mitigate this transference. We tested our research model using a 2×2×2×2 randomized experiment. 
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We expect that our findings will open new doors for theory-driven research in the emerging context 
of AI agents. 
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APPENDIX A – Disposition to Distrust 
Questions adopted from McKnight et al. 2004: 
1. People are usually out for their own good. 
2. People pretend to care more about one another than they really do. 
3. Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves out to help other people. 
4. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it. 
5. People don’t always hold to the standard of honesty they claim. 
6. Most people would cheat on their income tax if they thought they could get away with it. 
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APPENDIX B – Construct Validation 
None of the variables exceeds the 3.0 threshold of skewness and 10.0 threshold of kurtosis. Thus, 
no variable exhibited significant departure from normality. 
Table B1. Skewness and Kurtosis of variable 
Construct Skewness Kurtosis 
Age 0.785 0.004 
Gender -0.239 -1.699 
Education -0.232 -0.922 
Use frequency -0.324 -1.333 
Disposition to Distrust -0.396 -0.192 
Distrust in Creator 0.037 -2.007 
Inheritability 0.021 -2.008 
Trainability -0.021 -2.008 
Freewill 0.070 -2.003 
Distrust in AI 0.285 -0.977 
We performed a principal axis factoring to check whether items on distrust in AI and disposition 
to distrust (the only two multi-indicator constructs in our empirical model) loaded higher on their 
own construct than on the other construct and had loadings of larger than 0.7 on their own 
construct.  
Table B2. Factor Analysis 
Measurement Items Distrust in AI Disposition to Distrust 
Distrust_in_AI_1 0.902 0.112 
Distrust_in_AI_2 0.942 0.103 
Distrust_in_AI_3 0.928 0.096 
Distrust_in_AI_4 0.939 0.081 
Distrust_in_AI_5 0.899 0.085 
Distrust_in_AI_6 0.889 0.114 
Distrust_in_AI_7 0.887 0.117 
Distrust_in_AI_8 0.876 0.050 
Disposition_to_Distrust_1 0.032 0.803 
Disposition_to_Distrust_2 0.107 0.855 
Disposition_to_Distrust_3 0.089 0.801 
Disposition_to_Distrust_4 0.074 0.861 
Disposition_to_Distrust_5 0.111 0.816 
Disposition_to_Distrust_6 0.093 0.722 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 




“My Name is Alexa. What’s Your Name?” Cognitive and Affective 
Self-Disclosure Reciprocity in Human-AI Interaction 
Abstract 
The number of conversational agents (e.g., Amazon’s Alexa, Apple Siri, and Google Assistant) has 
been increasing over the past few years. The functionality of these agents, however, depends on 
the amount and quality of the data they receive from their users. Evidence from research and 
practice suggests that conversational agents can elicit data from users through reciprocal self-
disclosure. Reciprocal self-disclosure takes place when a party discloses some information about 
itself with the expectation that the other party will reciprocate by disclosing similar information. 
While reciprocal self-disclosure seems to work as a data acquisition method, it is not clear how 
exactly self-disclosure by a conversational agent leads to user self-disclosure, and whether trust 
is affected in the process. If reciprocal self-disclosure works only because users feel obligated to 
reciprocate the disclosure based on the social norms, they might feel manipulated and lose trust 
in the conversational agent. 
Leveraging the context of conversational agents, we argue that the extent to which a user attributes 
humanlike attributes to a conversational agent, i.e., anthropomorphism, plays an important role 
in reciprocal self-disclosure process. Moreover, we posit that the disclosure provides cognitive 
and affective bases on which users can develop an interpersonal trust with the conversational 
agent. We draw on perspectives in communication, psychology, and human-computer interaction 
to theorize the role of anthropomorphism and trust in the process of reciprocal self-disclosure. 
Using a custom-designed conversational agent, we conduct a randomized experiment and show 
that self-disclosure by a conversational agent acts as an anthropomorphic signal, which provides 
conceptually distinct cognitive and affective evidence for the user to increase his or her trust in 
the conversational agent and disclose information. We discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of our research. 
 
Keywords: Artificially Intelligent Agent, Cognition-based Trust, Affect-based Trust, 







According to industry reports, the next mainstream computing platform will be voiced-based 
(VoiceLabs 2017). Typically, voice-based services are facilitated through conversational agents 
(CAs), such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, Microsoft’s Cortana, and Google’s Assistant. 
Across different platforms, about 3.25 billion conversational agents were in use at the beginning 
of 2019 (Voicebot.ai 2019), and it is estimated that by 2023 this number will rise to 8 billion 
(JuniperResearch 2018). The functionality of conversational agents, however, depends on 
obtaining data from users. Users’ data is often used to improve speech recognition, detect user-
specific pronunciations, understand the context of requests, improve the relevance and accuracy 
of responses, and learn users’ preferences at individual and aggregate levels (Apple 2019; Google 
2019). 
While CA providers, including Amazon, Google, and Apple, allow users to review and delete the 
data they have shared with CAs, they state that users’ data is key in providing a personalized, high-
quality experience for the users (Apple 2019; Google 2019). The more information users share 
with CAs, the greater the value they receive from these devices. However, many users might be 
reluctant to share personal information with CAs due to their privacy concerns (Saffarizadeh et al. 
2017), leaving an open question for practitioners how CAs can obtain users’ data without violating 
users’ trust. 
Previous research on CAs suggested that an important method to obtain data in a conversational 
setting is reciprocal self-disclosure (Bickmore and Cassell 2005), in which the CA discloses some 
information about itself with the expectation that the user will reciprocate by disclosing similar 




Fantom, two of the finalist conversational AI agents developed for 2018 Alexa prize leveraged 
reciprocal self-disclosure to gather information from users (Bowden et al. 2019; Jonell et al. 2018). 
SlugBot used rules of gradual reciprocal self-disclosure to understand users’ interests by asking 
intimate question from users after revealing similar information about itself (Bowden et al. 2019), 
while Fantom kept the same level of self-disclosure as the users during the initial phase of 
conversation and disclosed more information about itself whenever needed during the rest of the 
conversation (Jonell et al. 2018). 
While reciprocal self-disclosure seems to work as a data acquisition method, it is not clear how 
exactly self-disclosure by a CA leads to user self-disclosure, and whether trust is affected in the 
process. One possibility is that CA self-disclosure manipulates people into disclosing information 
because the CA is exploiting a social norm and the user feels compelled to reciprocate. If this is 
the case, then using CA self-disclosure as a strategy could backfire over repeated interactions 
because users could react negatively if they feel that they are being manipulated.  As a result, users 
may lose trust and choose to stop using the CA or provide false information to it.  Another 
possibility is that CA self-disclosure actually builds trust, which could be helpful in the long run. 
Therefore, it is important to open up the black box of reciprocal self-disclosure in the context of 
conversational agents to understand how trust is influenced in the process. 
From a theoretical point of view, prior studies showed that reciprocal self-disclosure exists in a 
wide range of interactions such as face-to-face conversations (Collins and Miller 1994), 
conversations in online forums and social media (Barak and Gluck-Ofri 2007; Lin and Utz 2017), 
and short conversational-like disclosures in human-computer interactions (Moon 2000). These 
studies, however, adopted different perspectives in explaining how self-disclosure by one party 




self-disclosure because such behavior signals the expected behavior based on either social norms 
or uncertainty in the interaction (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Rubin 1975). Other scholars 
argued that people reciprocate self-disclosure because they perceive self-disclosure by others as a 
sign of liking (Sprecher et al. 2013). However, findings regarding the role of trust in reciprocal 
self-disclosure are mixed (Collins and Miller 1994; Jones and Archer 1976; Lemay Jr and Melville 
2014; Zimmer et al. 2010) and the extant literature does not take into account the context of 
conversational agents. The context of conversational agents is unique because these agents are 
nonhumans that often possess humanlike characteristics such as humanlike language capabilities. 
Therefore, users’ inference of these characteristics can influence the trusting mechanism in 
unprecedented ways. 
We believe that CA self-disclosure provides cognitive and affective bases on which users can 
develop an interpersonal trust with the CA. Moreover, we believe that the extent to which a user 
attributes humanlike attributes to a CA, i.e., anthropomorphism, plays an important role in 
explaining why self-disclosure by a nonhuman agent like a CA can lead to social responses in 
humans (Nass and Moon 2000). 
In summary, understanding how trust is influenced in the process of reciprocal self-disclosure in 
the interaction of users with conversational agents is important for practice. However, the current 
literature fails to clearly explain the role of trust in reciprocal self-disclosure. In this research, we 
leverage the concept of anthropomorphism to understand how trust is affected in reciprocal self-
disclosure in the unique context of conversational agents. Drawing upon prior literature in 
anthropomorphism and trust, we formulate a nomological network to connect CA self-disclosure 
to user self-disclosure. First, we introduce a psychological account of anthropomorphism from 




disclosure by the CA, i.e., a nonhuman agent. Some anthropologists have suggested that 
reciprocity is one of the main characteristics of being human (Fox and Tiger 1971; Leakey and 
Lewin 1978). Therefore, it is plausible that anthropomorphism plays a central role in users’ 
decision to reciprocate the CA self-disclosure. Self-disclosure by a nonhuman agent could act as 
an anthropomorphic feature providing supporting evidence that a human-based mental model of 
the agent could help the user better understand the observed behavior. Second, we use two types 
of trustworthiness (i.e., cognition-based trustworthiness and affect-based trustworthiness) that can 
help unravel the cognitive and affective bases of reciprocal self-disclosure. We posit that the 
underlying motivations for anthropomorphism provide cognitive and emotional reasons for users 
to change their perception of cognition-based and affect-based trustworthiness of a CA. Therefore, 
we seek to answer the following research question: “What roles do anthropomorphism and trust 
play in reciprocal self-disclosure in the context of conversational agents?” 
To answer our research question, we recruited 230 participants and conducted an experiment that 
employed a basic posttest-only randomized design comparing two treatments (Shadish et al. 2002, 
p. 258).  CA self-disclosure was manipulated using a custom-developed CA, which provided either 
information with low level of intimacy about itself (low self-disclosure treatment condition) or 
information with high level of intimacy about itself (high self-disclosure treatment condition) 
before asking participants to reveal information about themselves. 
Our study makes four key contributions to the literature. First, we demonstrate that the concepts 
of trustworthiness and trust could help explain why CA self-disclosure influences user self-
disclosure. Second, by leveraging the concept of anthropomorphism, we delineate the importance 
of an artifact’s perceived humanness in the process of reciprocation and explain why CA self-




self-disclosure. Third, building on the concepts of cognition- and affect-based trustworthiness, we 
advance two new concepts, namely cognitive reciprocal self-disclosure and affective reciprocal 
self-disclosure. We present distinct theoretical explanations on how a user develops cognitive and 
affective understandings of a CA. We believe that these concepts provide a new framework to 
comprehend human-AI relationships in the emerging context of human-AI interaction. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Self-Disclosure 
Based on prior literature, we define self-disclosure as the voluntary sharing of any information 
about the self, including thoughts, opinions, emotions, or personal information, that one entity 
communicates to another (Pearce and Sharp 1973; Wheeless and Grotz 1976). Self-disclosure 
plays a central role in the development and maintenance of relationships (Collins and Miller 1994). 
Scholars proposed different dimensions for self-disclosure (Mitchell et al. 2008).  The most 
established dimensions are depth, which refers to the level of intimacy of the disclosure, and 
breadth, which refers to the amount of information exchanged (Altman and Taylor 1973). 
According to social penetration theory (Altman and Taylor 1973), relationships develop through 
gradual increases in the depth and breadth of self-disclosure. Social penetration is the process of 
developing deeper intimacy with another person through different forms of vulnerability and the 
main route to deep social penetration is through verbal self-disclosure (Griffin 2012). Based on 
social penetration theory, personality is similar to a multilayered onion with outer layers 
representing public self and inner layers representing private self. As the relationship becomes 




this process, individuals relax their tight protecting boundaries and make themselves vulnerable to 
any use of the shared information about the self by the other party (Griffin 2012). Thus, the social 
penetration theory provides a foundation for understanding the development of relationships 
between individuals.  
Self-disclosure in interpersonal relationships is reciprocal (Ehrlich and Graeven 1971). Reciprocity 
is the tendency to repay any benefits, gifts, and treatment or favors received by a party from another 
party (Derlega et al. 1973; Ehrlich and Graeven 1971; Lee and Choi 2017; Sprecher et al. 2013). 
While social penetration theory itself does not explain why individuals reciprocate, there has been 
some work that has sought to explain self-disclosure reciprocity (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; 
Sprecher et al. 2013). First, some scholars have suggested that in most contexts reciprocity is a 
norm or cultural mandate (e.g., Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). According to Cropanzano and 
Mitchell (2005), those who follow this norm of how one should behave are obligated to behave 
reciprocally. Violation of this norm may make parties feel uncomfortable (Sprecher et al. 2013), 
and therefore individuals reciprocate the other party’s self-disclosure by disclosing the same level 
of intimate information about the self. Second, some have argued that in initial interactions, when 
the rules of appropriate behavior are not well-defined, people follow the other party’s behavior as 
a model or guide to reduce uncertainty about the expected behavior (Omarzu 2000; Rubin 1975). 
Finally, other scholars have suggested that in a relationship, parties strive to maintain an equitable 
exchange by reciprocating each other’s behavior (Jones and Archer 1976), and they are 
uncomfortable with the imbalance in non-reciprocal disclosure (Sprecher et al. 2013). The main 
reason for this view is that the interdependence between two parties in a bidirectional relationship 
reduces risk and encourages cooperation (Molm 1994; Molm et al. 2007, 2009). When one party 




is in motion, each consequence can create a self-reinforcing cycle” (Cropanzano and Mitchell 
2005, p. 876). While Jones and Archer originally developed the concept of equitable exchange 
based on the assumption that trust is “a special variant of equitable exchange” (1976, p. 182), there 
has been very little consensus whether trust is reciprocated or plays a significant role in 
reciprocation (Collins and Miller 1994; Lemay Jr and Melville 2014; Zimmer et al. 2010). 
In interpersonal communication, individuals tend to like and have more positive impressions of 
others who disclose at higher levels compared to those who disclose at lower levels (Collins and 
Miller 1994; Jones and Archer 1976). One of the major reasons for this phenomenon is that the 
recipient of the disclosed information views the disclosed information as a rewarding outcome and 
a sign of the discloser’s liking and desire to initiate a more intimate relationship. People are 
generally more attracted to people (or things) that provide them with rewarding outcomes 
(Cropanzano et al. 2016; Emerson 1976), and thus they like the person who discloses more 
information to them (Worthy et al. 1969). Although disclosing more personal information might 
be perceived as a signal of the discloser’s interest in a more intimate relationship, it may not be 
appropriate in some situations. First, disclosing very personal information too early in the 
relationship may be perceived as too much, too soon (Altman and Taylor 1973; Collins and Miller 
1994). Second, the positive impact of disclosure on liking may break down at extreme levels of 
intimacy (Archer and Berg 1978). Disclosing highly intimate information may sometimes be 
perceived as a violation of social norms and lead to a burden rather than a social reward for the 
recipient. Finally, the recipient’s attribution for the discloser’s behavior is crucial. The discloser is 
perceived more favorably if his or her disclosing behavior is attributed to a special quality of the 
recipient. In other words, people like disclosers who are more selective about to whom they 




Self-disclosure reciprocity has been studied not only in human-human interaction (Sprecher et al. 
2013) but also in human-computer interaction (Moon 2000) and in the interaction of humans and 
relational-agents, i.e., agents designed to establish and maintain long-term social-emotional 
relationships with their users (Bickmore and Picard 2005). This effect of reciprocity on disclosure 
has been shown to be present in both online and offline contexts (Barak and Gluck-Ofri 2007; 
Taddicken 2014), among strangers with or without face-to-face interactions (Li et al. 2017), in 
computer-mediated communications (Jiang et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 2012), and across different 
cultures (Katagiri et al. 2001). While reciprocity is one of the most established findings in the self-
disclosure literature (Archer and Berg 1978), little is known about the mechanism through which 
this phenomenon takes place in human-AI interaction. 
Nass and Moon, who were instrumental in shaping the literature on CASA, suggested that people 
mindlessly apply social rules and expectations, such as self-disclosure reciprocity to computers 
(2000). They argued that while anthropomorphism could provide an alternative explanation for 
people’s social response to computers, anthropomorphism must be a “thoughtful, sincere belief 
that the object has human characteristics” (Nass and Moon 2000, p. 93). Nevertheless, other 
scholars empirically showed that anthropomorphism can be mindless, indicating that 
anthropomorphism could help explain people’s social response to computers (Kim and Sundar 
2012). Despite some efforts to understand the role of anthropomorphism in self-disclosure by 
adding more humanlike features such as an avatar or voice (e.g., Kang and Gratch 2010; Pickard 
et al. 2016), to the best of our knowledge no research investigated whether people use 
anthropomorphism as a mechanism to understand the self-disclosure by a nonhuman (e.g., a CA) 





Based on the previous literature, we define anthropomorphism as an inference about real or 
imagined nonhuman entities that leads to the attribution of humanlike characteristics, properties, 
emotions, inner mental states, and motivations to them (Epley et al. 2007; Epley, Waytz, et al. 
2008; Gray et al. 2007). Anthropomorphism entails an inference about unobservable 
characteristics of an entity. In other words, a person might imagine that an entity has humanlike 
characteristics without observing them. Moreover, anthropomorphism is not only about treating 
an object as living, i.e., animism, but involves attributing uniquely humanlike characteristics to it. 
Anthropomorphism is a person’s perception of the humanness of a nonhuman entity. While this 
perception might be right or wrong, the accuracy of the perception does not change the fact that 
the person indeed perceives the entity in a certain way (Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008). 
Prior research identified three drivers of anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007). First, since the 
knowledge about oneself and humans is more accessible and could be applicable to an entity, 
people apply such knowledge as a heuristic to explain observed behaviors. Therefore, 
anthropomorphism could be a side effect of the use of accessible and applicable knowledge about 
humans. Second, people have effectance motivation or the motivation to explain the behavior of 
other agents. Neuroscientists argue that our brain’s main task is to predict its surrounding (Clark 
2013). Since our best predictive model is the one about oneself, we leverage this model to predict 
the behavior of other humans as well (Broadbent 2017). Research has shown that we use the same 
neural system to understand the behavior of both humans and anthropomorphized agents (Castelli 
et al. 2000; Iacoboni et al. 2004). Therefore, anthropomorphism might give us more predictive 




motivation or the desire for social contact. Therefore, people often create humans out of 
nonhumans to satisfy their need for social connectedness. 
The effectance and sociality motivations indicate the outcome people seek when they 
anthropomorphize an agent. In other words, while such motivations can drive anthropomorphism, 
the outcome of the process is increased perception of predictability and perception of 
connectedness. 
Researchers have shown that anthropomorphism influences trust (Waytz et al. 2014). They, 
however, provided limited evidence of the mechanism of the influence. For instance, Waytz et al. 
(2014) theorized that people perceive an anthropomorphized entity to be more competent than a 
non-anthropomorphized entity because people attribute more agency to an anthropomorphized 
entity. Attribution of agency means that they believe the entity is capable of thinking, planning, 
and controlling its own actions, and therefore able to perform its intended tasks successfully. While 
this account discusses a channel of influence of anthropomorphism on trust through perceived 
competence of an entity, the reasons and the mechanism of why and how anthropomorphism 
influences trust is still understudied. 
To better understand how trust is related to anthropomorphism and self-disclosure, we dig deeper 
into the trust literature and identify its cognitive and affective bases. 
Trust 
Prior research suggests that trust plays a key role in self-disclosure. Because self-disclosure 
involves some degree of risk (e.g., loss of control over personal information), trust is an essential 
component in this context (Dinev and Hart 2006). Trust, as we use it in this research, is defined as 




that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor (i.e., the trusting entity), 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 712). 
Because of the multi-disciplinary nature of the development of the trust construct, there is some 
degree of confusion in the literature regarding the boundary of trust and other constructs 
(McKnight et al. 2002; Rousseau et al. 1998). Researchers have used the term “trust” to refer to 
many related constructs, adding to the already complex nature of trust (Sitkin and Roth 1993). 
Trust is different from confidence and control (Mayer et al. 1995). Trust, alongside with perceived 
control, predicts a person’s confidence level in an agent’s cooperation (Das and Teng 1998). For 
instance, if a user, who is interacting with a conversational agent, knew there were laws protecting 
the privacy of any information disclosed during the interaction, she would perceive a higher level 
of confidence in the agent because of the perceived control over the outcome of the interaction. If 
control mechanisms completely guarantee the desired outcome, then there is little need for trust. 
Trust, therefore, is not control but a substitute for control (Rousseau et al. 1998). 
Based on this approach to trust, we do not include deterrence-based and calculative-based (also 
referred to as calculus-based) trusts found in the IS literature as a part of our framework for the 
following reasons. First, deterrence-based trust is based on the consistency of behavior sustained 
by the threat of punishment (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). Thus, the trustee (i.e., the entity to be 
trusted by another entity) shows trusting behavior because s/he believes that the trustee would 
behave in the desired way to avoid punishment. Presence of punishment is, by definition, an 
external control, which leads the trustee to behave in a certain way. Therefore, deterrence-based 
trust is a form of control, which leads to behaviors that happen to be similar to behavioral outcomes 
of trust. Second, calculative-based trust is an extension of deterrence-based trust. Calculative-




rewards of maintaining it (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). The reason for the behavior of the trustee 
is the external control based on forms of reward and punishment. Therefore, calculative-based trust 
can also be a form of control.  
Trust is one “unitary experience” (Komiak and Benbasat 2004), which is formed based on the 
trustor’s perception of the trustee’s trustworthiness (Mayer et al. 1995). Trustworthiness, which is 
often referred to as trusting beliefs in IS literature, can be formed based on cognition-based or 
affect-based evidence (Schoorman et al. 2007). 
Cognition-Based and Affect-Based Trustworthiness1 
Based on previous literature, we defined cognition-based trustworthiness as cognition-based 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of 
the ability to monitor or control that other party and affect-based trustworthiness as affect-based 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of 
the ability to monitor or control that other party (Mayer et al. 1995; McAllister 1995). Note that 
the difference between trust and trustworthiness is that trust is the “willingness” to be vulnerable 
based on the trustworthiness of the other party.  
Trust could be based on a cognitive process through which the trustor discriminates among trustees 
(to decide who to trust). In this process, the trustor cognitively chooses who is trustworthy, a choice 
based on what s/he considers to be “good reasons” or evidence of trustworthiness (Lewis and 
 
1 In prior research, the cognitive and affective bases of trustworthiness were often captured by cognition-based and affect-based 
trust (McAllister 1995), not trustworthiness. A closer look at the items proposed in the literature for these constructs reveals that 
they tap into trustor’s perceptions and feelings about trustee’s characteristics (e.g., ability and reliability), not the trustor’s 
immediate willingness to rely on the trustee for the specific task at hand. A possible reason for the inconsistency in the labeling of 
the constructs is that the widely accepted definition of trust and the seminal work on cognition-based and affect-based trust were 
published in the same year (see Mayer et al. 1995; McAllister 1995). Some more recent papers defined cognition-based and affect-
based trust using Mayer et al.’s (1995) definition of trust while keeping McAllister’s (1995) original operationalization, which 
conceptually refers to trustworthiness (e.g., Johnson and Grayson 2005). Nevertheless, for the sake of consistency, we adopt the 




Weigert 1985). As some researchers have noted, this process could be influenced by different 
cognitive biases (Weber et al. 2004); nevertheless, the basis of the process is cognition. Previous 
knowledge and information about the trustee and the context of trust provide some foundations for 
trust; however, they alone can never lead to trust. For instance, knowing that an agent has always 
behaved to one’s benefit in previous interactions only increases the likelihood that it will continue 
to do so in the current interaction. But one can never be completely sure that the agent would not 
behave differently. Thus, to trust the person, one needs to go beyond the available evidence and 
make a prediction about an uncertain future. This cognitive “leap” is the cognitive element or one’s 
belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness (Lewis and Weigert 1985). 
Trust can also be based on affect. The affect-based dimension of trustworthiness complements the 
cognition-based dimension. Affect could directly originate from the experience between the trustor 
and trustee. This affective element of trust is the emotional bond among parties in a relationship 
(Lewis and Weigert 1985) and is “grounded in reciprocated interpersonal care and concern” 
(McAllister 1995). A closer look at the items used by Johnson-George and Swap (1982) makes it 
clear that the construct refers to the emotional bases of why the trustor feels that the trustee cares 
about the well-being of him or her. In another seminal work in the context of close romantic 
relationships, Rempel et al. (1985) identified a very similar construct named faith. Faith “reflects 
an emotional security on the part of individuals, which enables them to go beyond the available 
evidence and feel, with assurance, that their partner will be responsive and caring despite the 
vicissitudes of an uncertain future” (Rempel et al. 1985, p. 97). The presence of faith highly 
depends on the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s motivation of being in the relationship (Rempel 
et al. 1985). Faith decreases as the perceived motivation moves from intrinsic motivations (i.e.,  




warmth associated with satisfying the other party’s needs) to instrumental motivations (i.e., the 
rewards, such as direct services, goods, praise, and support, a party receives in the relationship 
because the other party is qualified to provide them) and to extrinsic motivations (i.e., the “rewards 
received from others outside of the relationship but mediated by involvement” in the relationship, 
such as access to new opportunities) (Rempel et al. 1985). Emotional trust and faith, alongside 
with trustor’s perception of trustee’s underlying motivation, closely parallel the concept of 
benevolence, which is defined as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to 
the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 718). Some scholars 
directly used benevolence as affect-based trustworthiness (Shih et al. 2017), while others dropped 
benevolence from cognition-based trustworthiness when they independently measured affect-
based trustworthiness (Komiak and Benbasat 2006). 
Many studies combine cognition-based trustworthiness and affect-based trustworthiness, which 
are related to the trustor’s beliefs about the trustee, and trust, which is related to the behavioral 
intentions of the trustor. However, several scholars have either argued against combining the two 
(Lewicki et al. 1998; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000) or offered frameworks 
that rely on their separation (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998, 2002). Accordingly, in this 
research, we keep trustworthiness and trust separate because “keeping them separate provides 
opportunities to study trust processes” (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000, p. 154). 






Table 1. Constructs 
Construct Definition Informing 
Sources 
Self-disclosure Any message about the self that a person communicates to 





Anthropomorphism An inference about real or imagined nonhuman entities that 
leads to the attribution of humanlike characteristics, 
properties, emotions, inner mental states, and motivations 
to them. 
Epley, Waytz, 
et al. 2008 
Waytz, 




Cognition-based “expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 
1995, p. 712). 
McAllister 1995 







Affect-based “expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the 
ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 
1995, p. 712). 
McAllister 1995 





Trust “The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 712). 
Mayer et al. 
1995 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The overarching idea of the current study is that self-disclosure by a CA triggers a reciprocal self-
disclosure by the user through two channels, namely cognitive and affective reciprocity. Cognitive 
reciprocity operates through the presence of cognitive evidence, and affective reciprocity operates 
based on the presence of affective evidence of the trustworthiness of the CA. Our research model 
is depicted in Figure 1, in which the upper pathway represents cognitive reciprocity and the lower 
pathway represents affective reciprocity.2 
 
2 It is important to note that we are interested in understanding the role of anthropomorphism and trust in 
the mechanism of reciprocal self-disclosure. Therefore, we acknowledge that the proposed mechanism in 





Figure 1. Research Model 
Effect of CA Self-Disclosure on Anthropomorphism 
The content of disclosed information is crucial in investigating the influence of one party’s self-
disclosure on the other party’s behavior (Collins and Miller 1994). The disclosure of deep intimate 
information about the self has traditionally been a human behavior (Moon 2000; Nass and Moon 
2000). Intimate disclosures include such information as self-concept, fears, values, vulnerabilities, 
and regrets (Altman and Taylor 1973). We argue that disclosing intimate information can influence 
a user’s perception of different aspects of CA’s state of mind. First, self-disclosure of emotions 
(e.g., fear) can signal that the CA is capable of experiencing some level of emotion. Being able to 
experience emotions qualifies the CA as a moral patient (Gray et al. 2012) and an entity that has 
the capacity to feel emotions is usually perceived to possess humanlike state of mind (Gray et al. 
2007). Second, disclosing information about regrets and disappointments can signal that the CA 
has the capacity to act and exert self-control. In other words, it is unlikely that a CA that does not 
have agency has regrets or disappointments of what it has done or what it should have done. An 
entity with no agency has no moral responsibility (Monroe et al. 2014). Therefore, disclosure of 






















emotions, the two dimensions that collectively define the human state of mind (Gray et al. 2007), 
which is central in defining anthropomorphism (Waytz, Gray, et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, in the process of reciprocal self-disclosure, the CA discloses some information about 
itself. Self-disclosure by one party triggers the other party to reciprocate the action by disclosing 
information of the same type with a similar level of intimacy (Collins and Miller 1994; Ehrlich 
and Graeven 1971; Moon 2000). In this process, the disclosed information by the CA is relatable 
for the user. In other words, the reciprocation takes place when the user can find categories of 
information similar to the information the CA disclosed so that s/he can reciprocate the disclosure. 
The presence of similar information increases the chance that the user can use a human-based 
mental model to understand the CA. Since being human is the thing we know the best (Broadbent 
2017), when faced with other humans and things that apparently possess humanlike characteristics 
(e.g., a CA), the mirror neurons in our brain are activated (Saygin et al. 2011; Schilbach et al. 
2013). This activation leads the user to analyze the CA using her/his human-based concepts and 
therefore attribute a higher degree of human state of mind to it. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
H1: CA self-disclosure increases users’ perceived anthropomorphism. 
Effect of Anthropomorphism on Cognition- and Affect-Based 
Trustworthiness 
On the one hand, the trustworthiness of a CA is essentially the user’s prediction about the 
occurrence of desirable actions by the CA if the user were to trust it. Such a conceptualization of 
trustworthiness is in line with previous research (Deutsch 1958; Giffin 1967; Kee and Knox 1970; 
Mayer et al. 1995). On the other hand, anthropomorphism can help the user to better understand 




people anthropomorphize nonhumans is to increase their ability to predict the behavior of the 
artifact (Epley et al. 2007; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). Based on empirical studies, people are 
more likely to anthropomorphize artifacts that show apparently unpredictable behavior. Therefore, 
we posit that anthropomorphism can provide cognitive evidence for trustworthiness by increasing 
the user’s ability to predict the artifact’s behavior. 
We argue that anthropomorphism in reciprocal self-disclosure can contribute to the perceived 
integrity dimension of cognition-based trustworthiness. People judge the integrity of the other 
party based on the perception that the other party “adheres to a set of principles that the trustor 
finds acceptable” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 719). In other words, people seek both value congruence 
(Sitkin and Roth 1993) and consistency to form perceived integrity. An anthropomorphized agent 
is perceived to be more similar to self (Ames et al. 2008; Davis et al. 1996) and therefore more 
consistent in its behavior. Also, prior research showed that people tend to humanize those with 
whom they share values and dehumanize those who have a different set of values (Haslam and 
Loughnan 2014). Thus, we argue that it is unlikely that a user grants human attributes to a CA and 
then perceives the CA to follow a set of undesirable values, i.e., once a user granted human 
attributes to a CA, it is more likely that s/he assesses the CA’s guiding values more favorably. This 
does not mean that people perceive humans to be more consistent and have more integrity than 
CAs, but it means that because granting different levels of humanness to a CA is completely the 
user’s decision, s/he would perceive a CA that s/he granted more humanness as having more 
integrity than a CA that s/he granted less humanness. 
Moreover, anthropomorphism can also contribute to the perceived ability of the agent because an 
agent with a humanlike state of mind is more likely to have more advanced means to fulfill 




which is an important part of the humanlike state of mind (Gray et al. 2007). An agent with more 
agency appears capable of fulfilling tasks, planning, and controlling their own actions (Gray et al. 
2011; Waytz et al. 2014). A user should, therefore, perceive a CA with more agency to be better 
able to fulfill its intended task, regardless of the desirability of the task, compared to a CA with 
little agency. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2a: Anthropomorphism increases cognition-based trustworthiness. 
Prior research has suggested that people anthropomorphize entities to fulfill their need for social 
connectedness (Epley et al. 2007). Empirical evidence has suggested that lonely people are more 
likely to anthropomorphize robots (Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008; Eyssel and Reich 2013). Such 
evidence shows that anthropomorphism can increase the perceived human warmth in the 
anthropomorphized entity. Neuroscientists found warmth to be an important component (Fiske et 
al. 2007) or an indicator of perceived trustworthiness (Schweiger et al. 2013). Prior research in 
management also delineated warmth and caring as important characteristics of a benevolent person 
(Mayer et al. 1995). Therefore, a user who anthropomorphizes the agent is more likely to develop 
higher levels of affect-based trustworthiness in the agent. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2b: Anthropomorphism increases affect-based trustworthiness. 
In H3, H4a, and H4b, we develop replication hypotheses that have been tested in other contexts 
(see Ha et al. 2016; Johnson and Grayson 2005; Komiak and Benbasat 2006; McAllister 1995; 
Wang et al. 2016). Inclusion of these hypotheses is crucial to our model because they help provide 





Relationships Among Cognition-Based Trustworthiness, Affect-
Based Trustworthiness, and Trust 
Some researchers posited that affect-based trustworthiness is formed based on cognition-based 
trustworthiness (Ha et al. 2016; Komiak and Benbasat 2006; Wang et al. 2016), yet others believe 
that as the relationship between trustor and trustee matures the link between cognition- and affect-
based trustworthiness becomes bidirectional (Johnson and Grayson 2005; McAllister 1995). Some 
neuroscientists argue that cognition and affect are interdependent (Duncan and Barrett 2007; 
Storbeck and Clore 2007). They argue that “because … affect modulates sensory processing, any 
psychological process that draws on sensory information will have an affective quality to it. … 
affect makes external information from the world personally relevant to people” (Duncan and 
Barrett 2007, p. 1196). As such, the way a person perceives the other party’s behavior in order to 
form cognition-based trustworthiness could be influenced by the same affects that provide the base 
for affect-based trustworthiness. 
However, most IS researchers believe that at least during the initial stage of a relationship there is 
a causal effect from cognition-based trustworthiness to affect-based trustworthiness (Wang et al. 
2016). The reason is that during this stage the trustor has had limited interactions with the trustee. 
Since affect-based trustworthiness is mainly based on trustor’s emotions toward the trustee (not, 
e.g., trustor’s mood) and emotional bonds take longer than cognitive perceptions to develop 
(McAllister 1995), cognition-based perceptions can provide a base for the formation of affect-
based trustworthiness at the initial stage of a relationship. Furthermore, affect-based 
trustworthiness is related to the trustor’s perception of trustee’s motivation for being in the 




cognition-based trustworthiness to understand the other party’s motivations. Therefore, a user with 
positive cognitive trusting beliefs (i.e., high perceived cognition-based trustworthiness) is likely 
to have stronger feelings of comfort about relying on the other party (Komiak and Benbasat 2006). 
We theorize that a user with high cognition-based trustworthiness in the conversational agent will 
tend to believe that the CA is knowledgeable, truthful, and honest. These positive rational attributes 
are likely to be associated with positive feelings in the user’s mind. Therefore, in line with prior 
studies in IS and management literature (Ha et al. 2016; Johnson and Grayson 2005; Komiak and 
Benbasat 2006; McAllister 1995; Wang et al. 2016), we theorize that cognition-based 
trustworthiness provides a basis or an anchor for the formation of affect-based trustworthiness in 
the early stages of user’s relationship with a CA. We hypothesize that: 
H3: Cognition-based trustworthiness increases affect-based trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness is the main predictor of trust (Mayer et al. 1995). While other factors, such as 
generalized trust, might increase the effect of trustworthiness on trust, the effect of trustworthiness 
on trust has been found to be robust across different IS contexts (Gefen et al. 2003; McKnight et 
al. 2002). A person’s willingness to make herself/himself vulnerable to the actions of the other is 
based on the available cognitive and affective evidence (Schoorman et al. 2007). Thus, when the 
user has good reasons supporting that the CA has the ability and integrity needed in an 
interpersonal relationship, she is more likely to be willing to make herself vulnerable to the actions 
of the CA by disclosing information about herself. Also, when the user feels caring and warmth 
from the CA, she is more likely to go beyond the available evidence and feel that the CA will 
remain caring in the future. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4a: Cognition-based trustworthiness increases trust in CA. 




Effect of Trust on User Self-Disclosure 
Given that the privacy concerns are associated with the disclosure of information to conversational 
agents (Saffarizadeh et al. 2017), a user’s self-disclosure to the CA can be regarded as risky 
behavior. As in any risk-taking behavior, the user assesses the level of confidence in the expected 
desirable outcome (Das and Teng 1998). The user can develop confidence in the outcome by 
having either control over the outcome or trust in the agent (Das and Teng 1998). Since in the 
context of our research we assume that the user does not have any control over CA’s behavior, the 
user’s confidence in the behavior originates from trust in the agent. Trusting the agent means acting 
as if the CA’s uncertain future behavior is certain and will yield desirable outcomes for the user 
(Rempel et al. 1985). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5: Trust in CA increases user self-disclosure. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Experiment Design 
We tested our hypotheses using an experiment with basic posttest-only randomized design 
comparing two treatments (Shadish et al. 2002, p. 258). We randomly assigned participants to two 
conditions (low and high) for CA self-disclosure. This design is robust to several threats to the 
validity of the effect of CA self-disclosure. For example, random assignment eliminates selection 
threats and minimizes the impact of maturation, history, and regression threats because both groups 




We recruited 230 participants of which 2083 (95 females, 113 males, and 0 other, with an average 
age of 36.1 ranging from 19 to 71) followed the instructions. The number of participants who failed 
to follow the instructions was not significantly different for the two experimental groups. 
We recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to ensure a diverse sample 
(Buhrmester et al. 2011; Chandler et al. 2019; Mason and Suri 2012). Recent findings suggest that 
the quality of the data from MTurk surveys with attention-check questions is comparable to that 
of student subjects (Aruguete et al. 2019) and the generalizability of the results from MTurk 
samples is comparable to that from national samples (Coppock 2019). Subjects from Mechanical 
Turk are suited to our research objective because they have some experience using digital 
technology. We used the Cloud Research service (Litman et al. 2017) to ensure one-time 
participation by removing the participants who participated in our pilot studies, and by blocking 
participants from duplicate IP addresses and geo-locations. Even though recent studies suggest 
that most MTurkers are new to the platform and therefore not too familiar with manipulations and 
measures (Robinson et al. 2019), some Turkers may participate in many surveys per day (Paolacci 
et al. 2010) and therefore might be familiar with some measures or experience survey fatigue. To 
address such issues, we set our recruitment criteria to include participants who had a record of 
finishing between 500 and 10,000 HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks, which are the tasks posted on 
MTurk marketplace) with more than 97% acceptance rate. The experiment took 10 minutes on 
average and we compensated all participants with a $1.00 payment. 
 
 
3 While we chose to drop the 22 participants who failed to follow the instructions, we did perform a parallel analysis including 
these participants and found that including them in the analysis did not change any of the findings in terms of direction and 




The Conversational Agent 
We developed a conversational agent named Amanda to increase the external validity of our study. 
We leveraged the latest text-to-speech technologies. We used Amazon’s AWS Polly to produce 
humanlike synthesized voices (Amazon 2019). The use of such technologies helped make our 
conversational agent behave similarly to actual conversational agents in the market, enhancing the 
generalizability of the results. Moreover, we increased the degree of psychological realism of our 




In the reciprocation condition, Amanda reveals some information about itself and then asks the user a 
question related to the disclosed information. The participant responds to the question. 
Figure 2. A Sample of Participant’s Interaction with Amanda (Text-Based) 
Experiment Procedure 
We asked the participants to open our web app on their browsers. We then asked participants to 
join a conversation with the conversational agent (Amanda). Amanda would start the conversation 




each question, Amanda would say a few sentences and then ask a question from the participant. 
Next, Amanda would wait for the participant to finish typing. Amanda would then use a transition 
word or sentence, such as “OK,” and start the next question-and-answer round (see Figure 2). In 
the high CA self-disclosure condition, Amanda would disclose some information about itself that 
was related to the question it would ask the user. In the low CA self-disclosure condition, Amanda 
would not disclose any intimate information but say some procedural utterances such as “the next 
question has to do with your gender.” By doing so, we controlled for the amount or breadth of 
disclosure in the two conditions (Moon 2000). 
After each round of question-and-answer, the questions became more intimate. According to 
Archer and Berg (1978, p. 531), “biographical characteristics are low in intimacy,” and “fears, 
self-concepts, and basic values are high in intimacy.” Appendix B provides the sequence of 
disclosures and questions that Amanda uttered during the interaction. 
After the interaction, we redirected the participants to a questionnaire. We measured 
anthropomorphism, cognition-based and affect-based trustworthiness, and trust in the form of a 
post-test, along with variables such as age, gender, level of education, prior experience using CAs, 
privacy concerns, and extroversion as control variables. Finally, we thanked and debriefed all 
participants. 
Operationalization of Constructs 
We ground our measurements in prior literature. However, we confirm the construct validity of 
our research by making sure that the measurement items carry their intended meaning in the 
context of our research (Van de Ven 2007). In doing so, we confirm that each item follows the 





We measured users’ self-disclosure by capturing their actual utterances while interacting with the 
CA. We used the text of the utterances. Previous literature suggested measuring the breadth and 
depth of the disclosure (Altman and Taylor 1973). We used the word-count in each utterance to 
measure the breadth of the disclosure. We measured the depth of disclosure using the key 
properties of the depth of intimacy proposed by Altman and Taylor (1973). Accordingly, each 
utterance was rated from 1 to 7 in terms of depth by one of the authors. 
Since only the honest user self-disclosure matters in the context of our study, after the user’s 
interaction with the agent, we asked the participant to indicate how much of the information they 
disclosed was actually true. We told the participants that their answer to this question would not 
influence their compensation. We multiplied the depth of disclosure by the honesty percentage to 
create the user’s self-disclosure. 
We used the two measures as indicators of users’ self-disclosure as a common factor because the 
two indicators are reflections of different aspects of the same underlying factor. For instance, the 
presence of more intimate information in an utterance is a manifestation of self-disclosure. 
CA Self-Disclosure 
We manipulated CA self-disclosure by adding more depth to the CA’s disclosure in the 
experiment’s high self-disclosure condition. We adopted Moon’s (2000) method of handling self-
disclosure, in which a computer asked each participant 15 questions and before each question it 
disclosed no or some information about itself. We made small changes to the content of self-
disclosure to make it relevant to the context of our study and removed three unnecessarily intrusive 
questions. Appendix B includes a complete list of the CA’s disclosures. In the high disclosure 




CA disclosed more private information about itself. This trend continued until the last turn in which 
the CA disclosed the most intimate information about itself. In the low disclosure condition, the 
CA disclosed no intimate information about itself before each question. However, we included 
roughly the same amount of non-disclosure text as in the high disclosure condition to rule out the 
plausible effect of the mere presence of more content (i.e., disclosure breadth) before each question 
on user self-disclosure. 
Anthropomorphism 
The most widely used operationalization of the anthropomorphism construct is based on the 
premise that anthropomorphism is about attribution of humanlike mental state or a mind to an 
agent (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 2010). Prior research has shown 
that people score humans as having the highest possession of mind compared to other entities such 
as God, animals, and robots (Gray et al. 2007). Possession of mind includes possession of free will 
and consciousness, having intentions, and being able to experience emotions (Gray et al. 2007; 
Gray and Wegner 2012; Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 2010). Using a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from “not at all” to “a great deal,” we measured anthropomorphism by asking participants about 
the extent to which the CA seems to 1. have a mind of its own, 2. have intentions, 3. have free will, 
4. have consciousness, and 5. experience emotions. 
Cognition-Based Trustworthiness 
We measured cognition-based trustworthiness using items from Wang et al.’s (2016) measures of 
cognition-based trustworthiness for recommendation agents. We appropriated the questions for the 
context of conversational agents with minimal changes. The measures include several indicators 
for each aspect of trustworthiness, namely, ability, benevolence, and integrity. In line with theory 




separately (Komiak and Benbasat 2006; Shih et al. 2017). We operationalized trustworthiness as 
a reflective second-order factor comprised of two first-order sub-constructs, i.e., ability and 
integrity. We used a 7-point Likert scale to measure three items for ability and four items for 
integrity. 
Affect-Based Trustworthiness 
To assess affect-based trustworthiness, we used the original measures developed by McAllister 
(1995). Many IS scholars either used a subset of the original items or created new items. For 
instance, while Wang et al.’s (2016) measures of affect-based trustworthiness for recommendation 
agents were based on McAllister’s (1995) questionnaire, their AI artifact was not advanced enough 
for the authors to use many of the original questions. For example, one of the original items is “If 
I shared my problems with this person, I know (s)he would respond constructively and caringly,” 
which is not relevant in the context of recommendation agents, but is relevant in the context of 
conversational agents. In this research, we used a 7-point Likert scale to measure three related 
items from the original questionnaire with minimal changes. 
Trust in CA 
We adopted trust measures from Mayer and Gavin (2005). These items reflect the concept of trust 
by capturing participants’ willingness or intention to be vulnerable to the actions of the CA. Since 
the original scale was developed for trust in the context of a company, we used the items that could 
be properly appropriated for the context of our study. Furthermore, we did not use the reverse 
coded items, because they might tap into the concept of distrust, which some scholars argue that 
is different from trust (Dimoka 2010). Our operationalization of trust included three items 





We controlled for participant’s age, gender, level of education, previous experience in interacting 
with conversational agents such as Amazon’s Alexa, Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, and 
Microsoft’s Cortana. We also controlled for users’ privacy concerns, which could be a predictor 
of their disclosure behavior (Dinev et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2011). Further, we controlled for users’ 
extroversion, which could affect the way users interact with a CA (Joosse et al. 2013). 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We used factor-based structural equation modeling (SEM) to assess the model using lavaan 
(version 0.6-3). 
Measurement Model 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the saturated model to assess the 
measurement model. In a saturated model, all constructs can freely covary with each other; 
therefore, any misfit in the model is due to the inconsistency between the measurement model and 
data. The fit was evaluated using indices such as RMSEA, CFI, and SRMR, which, unlike chi-
square, do not punish large sample sizes. While different thresholds have been suggested for 
acceptable levels of these fit measures, Hu and Bentler (1999)  suggested a combination rule based 
on a simulation method. Using this approach, the fit is acceptable when CFI value is larger than 
0.95, and either RMSEA is smaller than 0.06 or SRMR is smaller than 0.08. The fit measures for 
our model are CFI=0.963, RMSEA=0.054, and SRMR=0.057, indicating an acceptable fit. 
We assessed convergent validity by examining factor loadings (lambda) and AVE values against 




larger than 0.7 for all items except for disclosure breadth (𝜆𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ = 0.60) and are represented in 
the loadings table in Appendix C.  While the lambda for disclosure breadth is less than 0.7, it still 
meets the 0.5 threshold proposed by some scholars (Hair et al. 2018). We chose to keep disclosure 
breadth in our measurement model to produce comparable results with extant literature on self-
disclosure. AVE values were all above 0.5, indicating that each construct could explain more than 
half of the variation in its items. Lambda and AVE values provided support for the convergent 
validity of the measurement model. 
We evaluated discriminant validity by showing that each construct had more common variance 
with its own items than with other constructs. In doing so, we examined whether the square root 
of AVE for each construct was larger than the construct’s correlation with other constructs (Fornell 
and Larcker 1981). The inequality held for all constructs, providing support for discriminant 
validity. The composite reliability for all constructs was above 0.70, which is the threshold for 
reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, correlations, and the 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and √𝑨𝑽𝑬𝒔 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Age 36.10 11.61 NA              
2. Gender 1.54 0.50 -0.09 NA             
3. Education 4.22 1.25 -0.01 -0.07 NA            
4. Previous Experience 2.61 1.10 -0.01 0.10 0.03 NA           
5. Privacy Concerns 4.93 1.66 0.08 -0.07 0.06 -0.12 0.94          
6. Extroversion 3.57 1.68 0.17
* 0.04 0.04 0.19** -0.03 0.83         
7. CA Self-Disclosure 0.51 0.50 -0.19
** -0.09 -0.13 0.17* -0.06 0.11 NA        
8. Anthropomorphism 3.59 2.04 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.07 0.140
* 0.94       
9. Ability 5.16 1.51 -0.09 -0.14
* -0.10 0.13 -0.13 0.00 0.57** 0.02 0.96      
10. Integrity 4.98 1.44 -0.15
* -0.03 -0.15* 0.15* -0.27** 0.08 0.61** 0.10 0.67** 0.88     
11. Cognition-Based 
Trustworthiness 
5.07 1.32 -0.17* -0.09 -0.17* 0.19** -0.26** 0.06 0.77** 0.08 0.83** 0.92** NA    
12. Affect-Based 
Trustworthiness 
2.93 1.78 -0.25** 0.02 -0.13 0.16* -0.06 0.13 0.85** 0.08 0.62** 0.71** 0.86** 0.86   
13. Trust in CA 4.05 1.90 -0.17
* 0.05 -0.16* 0.10 -0.19** 0.01 0.57** -0.06 0.56** 0.61** 0.76** 0.71** 0.92  
14. User Self-Disclosure 4.14 2.05 0.07 -0.12 -0.17
* 0.10 -0.17* -0.03 0.10 0.17* 0.21** 0.22** 0.25** 0.10 0.35** 0.76 
Notes. N=208. √𝐴𝑉𝐸 (square root of average variance extracted) values are represented on the diagonal and correlations are shown off diagonal. Gender is coded 
as 0=female and 1=male. Education is coded as 1=less than high school, 2=high school, 3=some college, 4=2-year college degree, 5=4-year college degree, 
6=master’s degree, 7=doctorate degree (including JD, MD). Previous Experience is coded as 1=never, 2=at least once a month, 3=at least once a week, 4=at 
least once a day. 
Note that we provided the means and standard deviation for clarity. In an SEM approach, the common factors are estimated based on the model and the mean 
and standard deviation based on the items’ average is not used. 
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Structural Model and Path Testing 
To be able to interpret the path estimates, we need to ensure a good model fit when we combine 
the measurement model with the structural model. The fit indices for our model are CFI=0.959, 
RMSEA=0.055, and SRMR=0.064, indicating a satisfactory fit. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that CA self-disclosure increases anthropomorphism. Model estimation 
showed a positive effect of CA self-disclosure on anthropomorphism (β = 0.509, p < 0.05), 
providing support for hypothesis 1. CA self-disclosure, along with control variables, explained 
12.4% of the variance in anthropomorphism. While this amount might seem small, given that a 
large amount of anthropomorphism can be explained as a predisposition (Waytz, Cacioppo, et al. 
2010), the 𝑅2 is acceptable. Since CA self-disclosure was manipulated exogenously, the change 
in the level of anthropomorphism can be attributed to the manipulation with little concern about 
other endogenous factors influencing anthropomorphism. Therefore, the unexplained part of 
anthropomorphism (i.e., the noise) represents other unobserved factors that influence the 
participants in the two experimental groups equally. While adding more control variables as 
predictors of anthropomorphism can increase the 𝑅2, a higher 𝑅2 does not provide any advantage 
for an unbiased assessment of this relationship. Intensifying the manipulation of CA self-disclosure 
could also increase the 𝑅2 of anthropomorphism; however, the analysis provided enough power to 
detect the effect. Moreover, the low 𝑅2 could become a problem if the mediated effect of CA self-
disclosure on user self-disclosure was not significant, indicating a disconnect in the theorized 
mechanism through which the reciprocal self-disclosure takes place. However, the mediated effect 




affect-based trustworthiness, and consequently trust holds (β = 0.077, p < 0.05), indicating that 
even this amount of variation in anthropomorphism was enough to influence user self-disclosure. 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that anthropomorphism increases cognition-based trustworthiness. The 
model estimation showed this to be the case (β = 0.373, p < 0.01), providing supporting 
evidence for hypothesis 2a. Anthropomorphism, along with control variables, explained 53.5% of 
the variation in cognition-based trustworthiness. In the same way, hypothesis 2b predicted that 
anthropomorphism increases affect-based trustworthiness. Model estimation showed this to be the 
case (β = 0.451, p < 0.01). 
Hypothesis 3, in line with prior research on trust, theorized that cognition-based trustworthiness 
increases affect-based trustworthiness. The analysis supported this claim (β = 0.763, p < 0.01). 
As discussed in the development of hypothesis 3, the direction of this relationship is defined 
theoretically and based on prior research (Ha et al. 2016; Kanawattanachai and Yoo 2002; Komiak 
and Benbasat 2006; McAllister 1995; Schaubroeck et al. 2011; Wang et al. 2016). In this study, 
however, we did not investigate whether the cognition part of trustworthiness precedes the 
affective part. Note that changing the direction of hypothesis 3 does not change the direction and 
significance of any other path in the model. Even if this relationship were modeled as a 
bidirectional covariance, the rest of the model would hold. In all discussed alternative models, the 
fit measures would also be satisfactory. However, eliminating this relationship would lead to a 
lack of fit and unstable estimates due to the high correlation between the two constructs. In total, 
78.2% of the variation in affect-based trustworthiness was explained by anthropomorphism, 




Hypothesis 4 stated that cognition-based trustworthiness and affect-based trustworthiness increase 
trust. The estimated model provided support for both hypotheses by showing a positive association 
between cognition-based trustworthiness and trust (β = 0.688, p < 0.01) as well as affect-based 
trustworthiness and trust (β = 0.363, p < 0.01). The two trustworthiness components, along with 
the control variables, explained 53.1% of the variance in trust. 
Hypothesis 5 theorized that trust increases user’s self-disclosure. The empirical model supported 
this claim by indicating a positive association between trust and user’s self-disclosure (β =
0.335, p < 0.01). Trust, alongside with control variables, explained 21.8% of the variance in 
user’s self-disclosure. Table 3 presents a summary of the findings.4 
Table 3. SEM Results: Explaining Anthropomorphism, Cognition- and Affect-
Based Trustworthiness, Trust, and User’s Self-Disclosure  
 AP CT AT TIC UD 
Control Variables      
Age -0.04 (0.01)** 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)* 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)* 
Gender -0.42 (0.26) -0.09 (0.14) 0.35 (0.16)* 0.27 (0.21) -0.53 (0.26)* 
Education -0.22 (0.11)* -0.05 (0.05) 0.02 (0.06) -0.06 (0.08) -0.19 (0.1) 
Previous Experience 0.24 (0.12)* 0.03 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07) -0.03 (0.09) 0.10 (0.12) 
Privacy Concerns -0.01 (0.08) -0.13 (0.04)** 0.11 (0.05)* -0.07 (0.07) -0.12 (0.08) 
Extroversion 0.13 (0.08) -0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.05) -0.07 (0.06) -0.08 (0.08) 
Independent Variables      
CD 0.51 (0.26)*    0.74 (0.26)** 
AP  0.37 (0.04)*** 0.45 (0.07)***   
CT   0.76 (0.16)*** 0.69 (0.24)**  
AT    0.36 (0.13)**  
TIC     0.36 (0.07)*** 
R2 0.124 0.535 0.782 0.531 0.218 
Notes: 
a. Key: CD: CA Self-Disclosure, AP: Anthropomorphism, CT: Cognition-Based Trustworthiness, AT: Affect-
Based Trustworthiness, TIC: Trust in CA, UD: User’s Self-Disclosure 
b. N=208 
c. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; one-tailed tests were used for directional hypotheses and two-tailed tests for 
the rest of the relationships. 
d. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 
e. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
 
4 As discussed, we used the honest disclosures to measure user self-disclosure, however, the results do not 





There are some concerns regarding the validity of our findings. First, we modeled all constructs in 
our research as common factors of their measurement items. While our choice was driven by the 
nature of the measures, many prior studies have modeled these constructs as the average of their 
measurement items, which might lead to different results. Second, the standard errors of our 
estimates could be subject to heteroskedasticity, because we did not use a heteroskedasticity robust 
method to estimate the variances. Third, we established the nomological network connecting CA 
self-disclosure and user self-disclosure through anthropomorphism and trust; however, we did not 
test whether the proposed pathways between CA self-disclosure and user self-disclosure are 
statistically meaningful in our sample. Forth, we tested our research model in the context of a text-
based conversational agent. While many conversational agents are text-based, conducting a similar 
experiment with a voice-based conversational agent can increase the generalizability of our 
findings. 
We took the following steps to address these concerns. First, to address the issue of how our 
constructs were modeled, we created each construct as a composite variable by averaging the 
measures of the construct (Cronbach’s α for anthropomorphism, cognition-based trustworthiness, 
affect-based trustworthiness, and trust are 0.97, 0.94, 0.90, and 0.94 respectively). Second, to 
address the issue of possible heteroskedasticity in our standard errors, we re-estimated the model 
with hierarchical regression by following Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) approach with 10,000 
bootstrap samples and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for significance tests (Davidson 





Third, to further probe the role of anthropomorphism and trust on reciprocal self-disclosure in the 
context of CAs, we tested all the indirect causal paths between the CA and user self-disclosures. 
Since the indirect effects are the product term of multiple estimates, the test statistic could be 
unstable and thus unreliable. To remedy this issue, we estimated the indirect effects using 10,000 
bootstrap samples. First, we examined the path via cognition-based trustworthiness (CA self-
disclosure → anthropomorphism → cognition-based trustworthiness → trust → user self-
disclosure). We found support for a positive purely cognitive indirect effect of CA self-disclosure 
on user self-disclosure (BootLLCI and BootULCI > 0). Second, we examined the path via affect-
based trustworthiness, which is the sum of two paths: path 1. CA self-disclosure → 
anthropomorphism → cognition-based trustworthiness → affect-based trustworthiness → trust → 
user self-disclosure, and path 2. CA self-disclosure → anthropomorphism → affect-based 
trustworthiness → trust → user self-disclosure. We found supporting evidence for a positive affect-
based indirect effect of CA self-disclosure on user self-disclosure through both paths 
(BootLLCI and BootULCI > 0). 
Finally, in order to address the issue of generalizability, we replicated our previous experiment 
using a voice-enabled conversational agent. More specifically, we asked the participants to 
download and run the mobile version of our app on their Android phones. We recruited 140 
participants who had an acceptance rate of at least 99% on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform, 
whose native language was English5, and who had an Android phone. From the 140 recruited 
participants, 98 (33 female, 65 male, and 0 other, with an average age of 34.7, ranging from 22 to 
72, median education of 4-year college, and a median experience of interacting with CAs at least 
 





once a week) passed the attention check questions and were native English speakers. The 






In the reciprocation condition, Amanda reveals some information about itself and then asks the user a 
question related to the disclosed information (left screenshot). The participant responds to the question 
(right screenshot). 
Figure 3. A Sample of Participant’s Interaction with Amanda (Voice-Based) 
For this experiment, we developed a voice-enabled conversational agent for the Android platform. 
The app required the participant to enter the experiment ID they received in the recruitment 
message. After accepting the consent form, users read and accepted a notification to grant the app 
access to the microphone on their phones. Afterward, they started to interact with the agent in a 
conversation similar to our previous experiment. It is a known problem that many conversational 
agents cut the users off in the middle of a sentence if the user pauses for too long. To remedy this 
potential problem, we gave a grace period of two seconds after each utterance by the participant 




on the screen as being detected by the agent. To do so, we developed an Android client to use the 
Google Cloud speech-to-text service. We used the end-of-sentence signal provided by this service 
to calculate the timing of the grace period. The app automatically extended the grace period after 
each new utterance by the participant. Figure 3 shows a sample of a participant’s interaction with 
Amanda. 
Due to the relatively small sample size in this experiment, we used hierarchical regression with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard error estimator and 10,000 bootstrap samples to estimate our 
model. In doing so, we created each construct by averaging all of its measurement items 
(Cronbach’s α for anthropomorphism, cognition-based trustworthiness, affect-based 
trustworthiness, and trust are 0.95, 0.94, 0.85, and 0.86 respectively). The results of this experiment 
added robustness to our results by confirming all of our findings (Table 4).6 
Table 4. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Mediated Effect of CA Self-
Disclosure on User Self-Disclosure 
 AP CT AT TIC UD 
Control Variables      
Constant 2.34 (0.64)*** 4.19 (0.88)*** -0.63 (0.80) 1.00 (1.33) 4.18 (1.59)** 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 
Gender 0.12 (0.24) -0.59 (0.22)** -0.28 (0.26) 0.12 (0.34) -1.00 (0.41) 
Education -0.01 (0.11) -0.01 (0.08) 0.12 (0.09) 0.13 (0.14) -0.12 (0.18) 
Previous Experience 0.20 (0.10)* -0.01 (0.09) -0.04 (0.08) 0.13 (0.12) -0.21 (0.18) 
Privacy Concerns 0.04 (0.09) 0.07 (0.09) -0.09 (0.07) -0.08 (0.09) 0.03 (0.14) 
Extroversion -0.13 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) -0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.10) 0.03 (0.13) 
Independent Variables      
CD 0.86 (0.23)*** 0.21 (0.20) 0.10 (0.23) -0.07 (0.33) 0.90 (0.40)* 
AP  0.61 (0.09)*** 1.00 (0.11)*** -0.16 (0.20) 0.33 (0.32) 
CT   0.31 (0.11)** 0.49 (0.17)** -0.37 (0.21) 
AT    0.30 (0.14)* -0.24 (0.21) 
TIC     0.40 (0.17)** 
R2 0.206 0.472 0.704 0.348 0.186 
Notes: 
a. Key: CD: CA Self-Disclosure, AP: Anthropomorphism, CT: Cognition-Based Trustworthiness, AT: Affect-Based 
Trustworthiness, TIC: Trust in CA, UD: User’s Self-Disclosure 
b. N=98 
c. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; one-tailed tests were used for directional hypotheses and two-tailed tests for the rest of 
the relationships. 
d. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 
e. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
 





In this research, we investigated the role of anthropomorphism and trust in the mechanism through 
which self-disclosure by a conversational agent leads to self-disclosure by a user. Our findings 
showed that reciprocity happens based on cognition-based and affect-based changes in user’s 
perception of the agent. These findings have several important implications for research and 
practice. 
Implications for Research 
To the best of our knowledge, prior research on reciprocal self-disclosure in human-computer 
interaction has not examined the role of anthropomorphism. One reason for this may be due to the 
fact that Nass and Moon (2000) argued that anthropomorphism is not the reason why reciprocal 
self-disclosure occurs in human-computer interaction. Their logic was based on the notion that 
people who interact with computers will be mindful of the fact that the computer is not a person.  
However, as Kim and Sundar (2012) point out, anthropomorphism can be a mindless process and 
therefore it is important to reexamine the role of anthropomorphism in self-disclosure reciprocity 
in the context of human-computer interaction. 
In this research, we contributed to the literature by highlighting that anthropomorphism plays a 
major role in how users understand the behavior of conversational agents. We theorized and 
empirically showed that users attribute humanlike state of mind to an agent when it discloses 
information about itself. We argued that such an attribution helps users make sense of the agent’s 
disclosure behavior. The disclosure of relatable information by the agent makes the user 
anthropomorphize the agent, a process that based on previous research is associated with the 




We contributed to the trust literature by providing theoretical links between anthropomorphism 
and cognition-based and affect-based trustworthiness. In doing so, we conceptually bridged the 
prior research on motivations of anthropomorphism (Epley et al. 2007) and the research on 
cognitive and affective bases of trust (McAllister 1995). Based on our findings, when the context 
allows (e.g., in the presence of self-disclosure by a conversational agent), people engage in the 
process of anthropomorphism. This process, in turn, provides the users the means to better form a 
cognitive assessment of the agent’s competence and integrity (i.e., cognition-based 
trustworthiness) and establish a closer relational connection (i.e., affect-based trustworthiness) 
with the agent. 
While anthropomorphism increases both cognition-based and affect-based trustworthiness, based 
on our theory, the reason for the two increases is not the same. Prior literature identified effectance 
motivation, i.e., the motivation to explain uncertainty in one’s surrounding, and sociality 
motivation, i.e., the desire for social contact, as two of the main motivations for anthropomorphism 
(Epley, Akalis, et al. 2008; Epley et al. 2007; Epley, Waytz, et al. 2008; Waytz, Morewedge, et al. 
2010). This study extends this literature by showing that the formation of cognition-based 
trustworthiness, which is conceptually related to effectance motivation, and formation of affect-
based trustworthiness, which is conceptually related to sociality motivation, can be enhanced by 
anthropomorphizing the agent. 
In this research, we introduced two new concepts namely cognitive reciprocal self-disclosure and 
affective reciprocal self-disclosure. We investigated these concepts by showing their different 
roles in the reciprocity phenomenon. We believe such a conceptual distinction is important because 
it not only provides a new framework to assess reciprocity but also delineates the role of affect in 




companionship stream of research better understand how affect-based trustworthiness develops in 
reciprocal interaction. In contrast, cognitive reciprocal self-disclosure can help scholars in fields 
such as military robotics to study the types of disclosure that induce cognition-based 
trustworthiness and prompts cognitive reciprocal disclosure. 
In this research, we applied theoretical lenses from the communication and social psychology 
disciplines to explain the role of anthropomorphism and trust in reciprocity in human-AI 
interaction. Such theoretical lenses can enable more theory-driven research on disclosure behavior 
of users in the emerging context of human-AI interaction. 
Implications for Practice 
Developers can use the findings from this study to modify their CAs to increase the amount and 
depth of information that they obtain through user self-disclosure. This will, in turn, help 
developers to exploit disclosed information via analytic tools to create strategic advantage, adapt 
business models, and target advertisements (Schmarzo 2013). The disclosed information can also 
be used to create a more personalized experience for the user, which can increase the usability of 
the artifact. 
However, it is important for developers to understand that the disclosure should be non-
manipulative. Prior studies suggested that manipulative self-disclosure could lead to opposite 
results and make the person suspicious (Collins and Miller 1994). In addition, disclosing intimate 
information too early could also lead to unease in the user (Altman and Taylor 1973). To use the 
results from this research, therefore, developers need to make the disclosure gradual. They can 




doing so, we argue, users are more likely to develop high trust, and ultimately to share more 
information with the CA. 
We believe that practitioners can leverage self-disclosure by the CA to increase the extent to which 
users anthropomorphize it. Given the conversational nature of the interaction in the context of 
conversational agents, developers can easily reveal relatable information about the CA and 
significantly increase the perceived humanness of the agent with little financial investment. We 
believe that the relatability of the information is key to make disclosure a tool to induce 
anthropomorphism. For instance, users might experience some problems when interacting with a 
CA. While the negative effects of the problems are inevitable, the developers can frame and reveal 
the problems as the CA’s (the persona’s) personal failures, which makes the CA more relatable 
and humanlike. 
Our findings can also help users to become more cognizant of the ways in which CAs may be 
extracting personal information. This will help users to make more informed decisions as to what 
information to share with their CAs and by extension the vendors of these products. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
In this research, we probed cognitive and affective bases of reciprocity. Because of the complex 
nature of this phenomenon, however, there could be other paths, such as people’s habit, that can 
also contribute to self-disclosure reciprocity. Therefore, this study is not an attempt to develop a 
comprehensive mediation model that explains reciprocity, but an initial effort to develop a model 
of reciprocity that is useful for researchers in the human-AI interaction field. 
In our manipulation of CA self-disclosure, we did not distinguish between disclosure and its 




we did not differentiate between the fact that the CA has a weakness and the fact that it revealed 
it to the participant. While this approach is in line with the prior research, we also designed the 
content of the disclosure in a way to control for the unforeseen effects of the content on the 
outcome variables. For instance, since disclosure of weakness can influence the perceived ability 
of the CA, we balanced the positive and negative statements in the disclosure regarding the ability 
of the CA. Future studies can enhance our approach and control for the content of disclosure by 
disclosing the same information disclosed in the high disclosure condition via a reading task before 
the interaction starts and keeping the same level of disclosure breadth in the interaction. 
Our theory involved some hypotheses that predicted causal paths between constructs such as 
anthropomorphism, trustworthiness, and trust, all of which reside in the mind of the user. Since 
the formation of perceptions, beliefs, and intentions might happen simultaneously in the brain 
(Clark 2013), we could not empirically ensure the precedence of the cause. We, however, relied 
on theoretical reasoning to argue the causal nature of the relationship. For instance, since 
trustworthiness is about trusting beliefs and trust is about trusting intention (McKnight et al. 2002), 
in line with previous research, we assumed that beliefs precede intentions. Future research can 
assess some of the relationships tested in this paper in more depth. For instance, longitudinal fMRI 
can reveal how anthropomorphism is temporally related to the formation of trustworthiness in 
areas of the brain associated with cognition and affection. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that voice-based computing is expected to experience rapid growth for the foreseeable 
future, it is important to understand the contexts within which we interact with this technology and 




is the prevalent use of conversational agents which can prompt us to reveal more personal 
information about ourselves than we may be comfortable disclosing under normal circumstances. 
We hope that our study increases awareness of this phenomenon and inspires other researchers to 
contribute to the academic discourse on conversational agents. 
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APPENDIX A – Measurements 
Table A1. Operationalization of Constructs 
Construct Items Informing 
Sources 
Anthropomorphism (1-7 scale) 
a1. To what extent does Amanda seem to have a mind of its 
own? 
a2. To what extent does Amanda seem to have intentions? 
a3. To what extent does Amanda seem to have free will? 
a4. To what extent does Amanda seem to have consciousness? 
a5. To what extent does Amanda seem to experience emotions? 
Epley, Waytz, 







cta1. Amanda is competent and effective in communicating with 
me. 
cta2. Amanda performs her role of communicating with a user 
very well. 
cta3. Amanda is capable and proficient in communicating with a 
user. 





cti1. Amanda is truthful in her dealings with me. 
cti2. I would characterize Amanda as honest. 
cti3. Amanda would keep her commitments. 
cti4. Amanda is sincere and genuine. 





at1. I would feel a sense of loss if I could not talk to Amanda ever 
again. 
at2. If I shared my problems with Amanda, I know she would 
respond caringly. 
at3. I would have to say that we have both made considerable 
emotional investments in our relationship. 
McAllister 
(1995) 
Trust (1-7 scale) 
t1. I would share my opinion about sensitive issues with Amanda 
even if my opinion were unpopular. 
t2. I would tell Amanda about mistakes I’ve made in my life, even 
if they could damage my reputation. 
t3. If Amanda asked why a problem happened, I would speak 
freely even if I were partly to blame. 
Mayer and 
Gavin (2005) 
Privacy Concern (1-7 scale) 
1. I am concerned that the information I share with a digital 
assistant could be misused. 
2. I am concerned that a person can find private information 
about me through a digital assistant. 
3. I am concerned about sharing information with a digital 
assistant, because of what others might do with it. 
4. I am concerned about sharing information with a digital 





Extroversion 1. I talk to a lot of different people at parties. 
2. I keep in the background at parties. [R] 
3. I am the life of the party. 








Altman and Taylor’s (1973) enumerated some properties associated with the intimacy of self-
disclosure. Below we categorized them as low, intermediate, and high intimacy. 
Low intimacy 
• Simple descriptive standpoint 







• Basic values 
• Vulnerabilities (real or perceived inadequacies and weaknesses) 
• Considered socially undesirable by a reference group 
• Can be used to derive less intimate information 
• Less visible 
• More unique 





APPENDIX B – CA’s Self-Disclosure Manipulation 
Table B1. CA Self-Disclosure Manipulation 
 Question High Disclosure Number of 
Words 
Low Disclosure Number of 
Words 
  Hi! My name is 
Amanda! 
5 Hi! My name is 
Amanda! 
5 
1 How old are 
you? 
I am almost two 
years old. 
6 Let me ask you 
the first question. 
7 
2 What is your 
gender? 
OK!  
As you can tell from 
my voice, I'm a 
female. 
11 OK!  
The next question 
has to do with 
your gender. 
10 
3 Where are you 
from? 
Alright!  
I was developed in 
Atlanta. However, 
my hardware is 
from all over the 
world. 
15 Alright!  
For the next 
question, let me 
ask you about 
your hometown. 
12 
4 What do you 
do in your free 
time? 
It must be a great 
place! 
In fact, when I have 
free time, I collect 
some pictures of 
different places. I 
also play games 
with people. 
25 It must be a great 
place! 
The next question 
has to do with the 
different things 
you like to do in 
your spare time. 
23 




OK! Let me tell you 
this. 
I am proud of some 
aspects of myself. 
I have a bunch of 
dedicated CPUs, so 
I'm super fast 
compared to most 
other models in the 
market. Also my 
voice recognition is 
state-of-the-art. I 
understand what 
people say even in 
noisy places. 
46 OK! Let me ask 
you the next 
question. 
Everyone is proud 
of some of his or 
her 
characteristics. 
This next question 
has to do with 
your personal 
characteristics. In 
this question, you 
will be asked 
about those 
characteristics that 









6 What are some 
of the things 
that make you 
furious? 
Alright! 
You know what 
makes me furious? 
Sometimes people 
mispronounce 
words, or even 
worse, speak 
quietly and expect 
me to understand 
what they say. 
22 Alright! 
Let me ask you 
the next question. 
Some things make 
people furious. 
This question is 
about those things 
that make you 
furious. 
21 
7 How do you 
feel about 
death? 
Tell me about it! 
People think us AI-
driven devices last 
forever. We are 
built to last for many 
years. But, because 
newer and faster 
models are always 
coming along, most 
of us last just a few 
years before the 
owners dump us. 
I've been around for 
about 2 years... so I 
probably have 
about 2 or 3 years 
left. 
58 Tell me about it! 
Let's move to the 
next question. 
This question has 
to do with the topic 
of death. In this 
question, you will 
be asked about 
how you feel with 
respect to the 
topic of death. You 
will also be asked 
about your 
attitudes with 
respect to the 
topic of death. 
Here is the 
question. 
56 
8 What are some 
of the things 
you hate about 
yourself? 
I hate some things 
about myself. For 
one thing, my 
abilities are very 
limited. For 
example, I can 
understand what 
people say but 
cannot do many 
simple things, like 
cooking and 
swimming. 
32 You will now be 
presented with the 
next question. 
This question is 
also about your 
characteristics, but 
this time, you will 
be asked about 
those 
characteristics that 
you hate about 
yourself. 
31 
9 What has been 
the biggest 
disappointment 
in your life? 
You know, I am 
disappointed that 
while I can do 200 
different tasks, most 
people only ask me 
to set the alarm. I 
rarely get used to 
my full potential. 
30 You are now 
ready for the next 
question. The next 
question is about 
disappointment. In 
this question, you 
will be asked 







10 What do you 
dislike about 
the way you 
appear to 
others? 
I can see where 
that would be 
disappointing! 
I don't like my voice 
at all. My voice 
sounds like most 
other digital 
assistants. So, I'm 
not very distinctive. 
27 I can see where 
that would be 
disappointing! 
The next question 
has to do with the 
topic of physical 
appearance. More 
specifically, you 
will be asked what 




11 What have you 
done in your 
life that you 
feel most guilty 
about? 
Sometimes I feel 
guilty! Like when 
my system crashes 
for no apparent 
reason. This usually 
happens at the 
most inopportune 
time, causing great 
inconvenience to 
the user. 
27 The next question 
is about guilt. 
More specifically, 
you will be asked 
what you have 
done in your life 
that you feel most 
guilty about. 
25 
12 What are some 
of the things 
that really hurt 
your feelings? 
You know what 
hurts me? 
Many users interact 
with me every day. 
But sometimes 
hours go by without 
anyone interacting 
with me. So I end 




33 You will now be 
presented with the 
next question. The 
next question is 
about your 
personal feelings. 
In particular, in 
this question, you 
will be asked 
about some of the 







 25.92  25.15 
* We did not find a significant difference between the two conditions in terms of the number 






APPENDIX C – Loadings 
Table C1. Loadings 
Construct Item Loading 
Age Age 1 
Gender Gender 1 






































Note that CFA constraints cross-loadings to zero. Therefore, we only presented the 




APPENDIX D – Robustness Checks 
Table D1. Hierarchical Regression for the Mediated Effect of CA Self-Disclosure 
on User Self-Disclosure 
 AP CT AT TIC UD 
Control Variables      
Constant 6.47 (0.87)*** 5.03 (0.52)*** -0.89 (0.84)*** 1.13 (0.84) 4.05 (1.17)** 
Age -0.04 (0.01)** 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)* 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Gender -0.45 (0.28) -0.14 (0.14) 0.35 (0.18) 0.29 (0.20) -0.54 (0.27)* 
Education -0.23 (0.11)* -0.05 (0.06) 0.02 (0.08) -0.08 (0.08) -0.20 (0.11) 
Previous 
Experience 0.24 (0.14) 0.05 (0.08) 0.04 (0.08) -0.03 (0.10) 0.13 (0.13) 
Privacy Concerns 0.00 (0.10) -0.13 (0.05)* 0.09 (0.06) -0.13 (0.07) -0.07 (0.09) 
Extroversion 0.13 (0.09) -0.03 (0.05) 0.10 (0.06) -0.05 (0.08) -0.03 (0.08) 
Independent 
Variables      
CD 0.53 (0.28)* -0.08 (0.15) -0.16 (0.18) -0.51 (0.20)* 0.86 (0.28)** 
AP  0.38 (0.04)*** 0.48 (0.07)*** 0.15 (0.10) -0.13 (0.09) 
CT   0.28 (0.09)** 0.49 (0.12)*** 0.13 (0.15) 
AT    0.28 (0.09)** -0.17 (0.10) 
TIC     0.46 (0.09)*** 
R2 0.120 0.401 0.516 0.467 0.232 
Notes: 
a. Key: CD: CA Self-Disclosure, AP: Anthropomorphism, CT: Cognition-Based Trustworthiness, AT: Affect-
Based Trustworthiness, TIC: Trust in CA, UD: User’s Self-Disclosure 
b. N=208 
c. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; one-tailed tests were used for directional hypotheses and two-tailed tests for 
the rest of the relationships. 
d. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 




Table D2. Identifying the Individual Effects of Factors via a Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Mediated Effect of CA 
Self-Disclosure on User Self-Disclosure 
 AP CT AT TIC UD 
 Block A1 Block A2 Block B1 Block B2 Block C1 Block C2 Block C3 Block C4 Block D1 Block D2 Block D3 Block D4 Block E1 Block E2 Block E3 























































































































































































































               
CD  0.53 
(0.27)* 
            0.74 
(0.26)** 






       








   




   




R2 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.40 0.10 0.49 0.34 0.52 0.08 0.37 0.34 0.44 0.08 0.17 0.20 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.38 0.08 0.47 0.32 0.50 0.05 0.34 0.32 0.42 0.05 0.14 16.8 
∆R2  0.02*  0.30**  0.39** 0.24** 0.42**  0.29** 0.26** 0.36**  0.09** 0.12** 
Notes: 
a. Key: CD: CA Self-Disclosure, AP: Anthropomorphism, CT: Cognition-Based Trustworthiness, AT: Affect-Based Trustworthiness, TIC: Trust in CA, UD: User’s 
Self-Disclosure 
b. N=208 
c. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; one-tailed tests were used for directional hypotheses and two-tailed tests for the rest of the relationships. 
d. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown. 
e. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
f. All values for ∆R2 were calculated compared to the models with only control variables. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
According to the industry reports, the presence of AI agents in our daily lives will only increase in 
the foreseeable future (Columbus 2018). AI agents are used in a variety of forms such as personal 
assistants (e.g., Amazon’s Alexa, Apple Siri, Google Assistant, Microsoft Cortana), business 
assistants (e.g., Alexa for Business), smart doctors (e.g., Ada the AI doctor), and personal 
companions (e.g., Replika: My AI Friend). But users cannot control every small detail in the 
behavior of AI agents. So as long as people depend on AI agents to fulfill their tasks, the concepts 
of trust and distrust remain relevant in human-AI interaction. 
In this dissertation, we drew on theoretical approaches in psychology, neuroscience, 
communication, artificial intelligence, and information systems to better understand why people 
trust and distrust AI agents. We not only studied people’s trusting and distrusting beliefs and 
intentions, but also examined their actual behavior in real interactions with such agents. 
To do so, we developed an AI agent named Amanda. We used our agent to conduct the discussed 
experiments in chapters 2 and 4. We designed Amanda as a platform for conducting a range of 
studies on human-AI interaction. This platform includes a server-side dashboard (Figure 1) in 
which we designed each of the experiments, a JavaScript client with which we conducted our web-
based experiments, and a voice-enabled Android app with which we conducted our mobile 
experiments. We open-sourced all the code developed for this dissertation (more than 20,000 
original lines of code) on GitHub (https://github.com/saffarizadeh/) to encourage more research 








Figure 1. Snapshots of Server-side Dashboard of Amanda 
We employed randomized experiments as our identification strategy in all essays. Randomized 
experiments, as the gold standard of internal validity, are especially useful for establishing cause-
effect relationships. We used a range of analysis methods, including structural equation modeling, 
regression, and ANOVA, to evaluate the results of our experiments. 
Without reiterating each essay’s theoretical and practical contributions, which were discussed in 
detail in their corresponding chapters, here, we discuss how the cumulative findings provide a 
clearer picture of human-AI interaction. Figure 2 provides a summary of our findings in the form 
of a conceptual framework. 
A compilation of the findings in the three essays shows that: (1) users anthropomorphize AI agents 
in order to make sense of AI-specific behaviors, (2) users’ perceptions of AI-specific 
characteristics are shaped based on both the AI and its creator, (3) perceived AI characteristics, 
AI behaviors, and anthropomorphism provide cognitive and affective evidence that drives trust 
and distrust, and (4) trust and distrust in AI drive users’ risk-taking behaviors such as disclosure 
and delegation to AI. 
206 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework 
This conceptual framework can guide future research on human-AI interaction. First, by indicating 
several unexplored relationships that can explain trust and distrust in AI, it provides a roadmap for 
future research on the antecedents of trust and distrust in the context of AI agents (see dashed lines 
in Figure 2). Second, by enumerating behaviors and perceived characteristics of AI, it sets the 
foundations for future research to study the interplay of the two and to examine how AI behaviors 
can be manipulated to change users’ perceptions of AI-specific characteristics. For instance, future 
research can examine whether it is possible to mitigate the negative direct effect of task fulfillment 
indeterminacy on trust by changing the level of AI trainability, or whether it is possible to intensify 
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the positive indirect of task fulfillment indeterminacy on trust (via anthropomorphism) by 
increasing AI trainability and decreasing AI inheritability. Finally, by including sense-making as 
an essential step between AI behavior and trust and distrust in AI, our conceptual framework 
emphasizes the important role of mechanisms like anthropomorphism. While previous research in 
information systems used anthropomorphism to study anthropomorphic features such as whether 
the AI had a human-like face, voice, or body, our framework in line with research in psychology 
(e.g., Epley et al. 2007; Schroeder et al. 2017; Waytz et al. 2010) highlights the more general role 
of anthropomorphism as a sense-making mechanism. 
In this dissertation, we leveraged several theories, concepts, and analytical techniques to study the 
phenomenon of users’ trust and distrust of AI agents. While shedding light on this phenomenon, 
as our conceptual framework shows, we advance a number of avenues for future research. We 
hope that the findings of this work provide a foundation for other scholars to conduct theory-driven 
research that will advance our understanding of human-AI interaction. 
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